(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the Court. The underlying issue presented in this case is whether there was competent evidence before the magistrate on which to base a finding that the crime charged, murder in the first degree, had been committed. Upon a close review of the preliminary examination transcript it is clear that there was competent evidence produced on each element of the crime charged. The magistrate abused his discretion by concluding otherwise. Accordingly, I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for trial upon the charge of first-degree murder.
Under MCL 766.13; MSA 28.931, the magistrate has the duty to bind a defendant over for trial if it is found at the conclusion of the preliminary examination that a felony has been committed and *156there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it.
In conducting this function, there is no question that the magistrate should consider all testimony in regard to the offense charged and any other pertinent matters connected with such charge. Furthermore, the magistrate should exercise his or her best judgment in the matter and determine whether competent evidence supports the charged crime or some lesser included offense, if any. See Yaner v People, 34 Mich 286 (1876).1
It is also clear that in determining whether a crime has been committed, a magistrate has the right and duty to pass judgment on the weight and competency of the evidence as well as the credibility of the witnesses. People v Paille #2, 383 Mich 621, 627; 178 NW2d 465 (1970). The object of the preliminary examination is not to prove guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 103; 276 NW2d 9 (1979). However, the test of the sufficiency of evidence produced at a preliminary examination requires that there must be evidence on each element of the crime charged or evidence from which those elements may be inferred. Doss, supra, 100-101.
Regarding the requirement of "probable cause”, our Court has previously offered direction in People v Asta, 337 Mich 590, 609-610; 60 NW2d 472 (1953), as follows:
"The matter of 'probable cause’, as the expression is used in the statute, has reference to the connection of *157the defendants with the alleged offense rather than to the corpus delicti, that is, to the fact that the crime charged has been committed by some person or persons.”
See also Doss, supra, 100; Paille #2, supra, 628.
Turning to an assessment of whether the crime charged has been committed, the basic query is whether competent evidence has been presented on which to base a ñnding that the crime charged, or some included offense, has been committed. In Asta, where the defendants were charged with the crime of conspiracy, the circuit judge found that there was a "complete lack of such proof’. Our Court stated:
"A careful analysis of the proofs offered on the examination impels us to a like conclusion.
"The circuit judge correctly determined that there was no competent evidence taken on the examination to show that the crime charged against defendants had been committed.” Asta, supra, 610, 614.
Likewise, in People v Medley, 339 Mich 486; 64 NW2d 708 (1954), the defendant was bound over after preliminary examination on a charge of assault with intent to kill. The circuit court granted a motion to quash the information on the basis that there was no showing that the defendant intended to kill the victim. This Court reversed, stating:
"The question of what his intention was in so doing may be determined from the evidence produced at the examination.
"In our opinion there was evidence produced at the *158examination on the question.” Medley, supra, 493. See also People v Auerbach, 176 Mich 23, 42; 141 NW 869 (1913).2
Finally, with respect to the responsibility of the magistrate, a defendant should not be discharged when the evidence is conflicting or raises reasonable doubt of guilt. Such questions should be left for the jury upon the trial. Doss, supra, 103.
In this regard the Medley Court approved as "well stated” the following passage from 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (1st ed), § 224, pp 254-255:
" 'The object of the examination is not to determine guilt or innocence, and it is not as necessary to make strict proof as on the trial. The magistrate does not act judicially in a technical sense. He is not required to nicely weigh the evidence as a petit jury, or to discharge the accused where there is a conflict of evidence, or where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as all such questions should be left to the jury upon the trial.’ ” 339 Mich 492.
The opinion of the Court, citing People v Evans, 72 Mich 367, 387; 40 NW 473 (1888), emphasizes that the magistrate is required to make his determination "after an examination of the whole matter”. This phrase, mentioned in dicta, simply quoted what the statute then required the magis*159trate to do. From this phrase a quantum leap is made by this Court’s opinion to conclude that "[t]he inquiry is not limited to whether the prosecution has presented evidence on each element of the offense”.
The reference in Evans affords no precedential basis upon which to predicate a new rule which permits the magistrate to disregard the fact that competent evidence has been presented on each element of the crime charged. Such a conclusion allows the magistrate inappropriately "to nicely weigh the evidence as a petit jury”. The function of a magistrate is not that of a jury. See People v Weiden, 239 Mich 169; 214 NW 120 (1927).
With respect to appellate review of a magistrate’s determination at a preliminary examination, it is well settled that the standard to be observed is that the decision should not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Doss, supra, 101; Medley, supra, 492-493; People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486, 491; 251 NW 594 (1933).
In the instant case, the magistrate did not find "sufficient evidence” to bind over the defendant on either first- or second-degree murder. With respect to the first-degree murder charge, the magistrate stated:
"Intoxication, in order to constitute defense to specific intent crimes, in this case only, first-degree murder, must be so complete that the defendant didn’t know what he was doing, or if he knew what he was doing, he didn’t know why or didn’t know that what he was doing was naturally culpable or * * * causing harm alleged to be intended. That’s a * * * Court of Appeals case cited [People v Berryhill, 8 Mich App 497; 154 NW2d 593 (1967)]. Evidence of intoxication can * * * negate requisite specific intent necessary to sustain defendant’s conviction for a crime which requires proof of specific *160intent. In this case it would be only relative to the first-degree murder charge. * * * To entirely eliminate voluntary intoxication as a defense to a specific intent crime defendant must while sober have formed the specific intent requisite to commission of the particular crime he is charged with * * * committing, that, to-wit: is the crime charged of first-degree murder, not speaking yet to second-degree murder.
"It is my opinion, after listening to the facts of this case that I do not find sufficient evidence to warrant the charge of first-degree murder.”
Turning to the second-degree murder charge, the magistrate related:
"In this particular case, I have difficulty finding that the respondent acted with the intent to take a life. I’ll indicate that there is sufficient evidence upon this record to indicate that he did not.
"It is not necessary, as the Court so aptly points out in [People v Raher, 92 Mich 165; 52 NW 625 (1892)], it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the assaulter extended, entertained a specific intent to kill the person who was injured where it appears that he committed an assault under such circumstances that the natural and usual consequences would be to take a human life.
"I find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find that the natural and unusual [sic] consequence of firing that gun through that door in that situation which I listened to testimony for six hours constitutes a natural and usual consequence which could be found in the respondent.”
Upon a full evaluation of the record, it is concluded that the magistrate clearly abused his discretion in not binding defendant over as charged. As stated by the Court of Appeals in the instant case:
"As the magistrate noted, there was evidence tending *161to negate deliberation, premeditation and the specific intent to kill. Such evidence suggested defendant might have been drunk at the time, that he was angry, jealous and possibly provoked by the decedent. Yet, it seems clear that, on the magistrate’s inquiry as to whether a crime had been committed, there was evidence of first-degree murder.”
Turning to the included offense of second-degree murder, the magistrate’s determination that it was "extremely difficult, if not impossible”, to find that the natural and usual consequence of firing a gun through the door under thé circumstances would be to take a human life was also an abuse of discretion. .
The facts presented to the magistrate demonstrated malice. The actions of the defendant could reflect at a minimum an intent to do great bodily harm or wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of his behavior was to cause death or great bodily harm. See People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980).
Testimony at the preliminary examination revealed that the defendant and decedent had known each other for a substantial period of time. There had been previous antagonism between them. The decedent was living with the defendant’s estranged wife. Testimony indicated that the defendant had been drinking liquor for a substantial period of time immediately prior to the shooting. The defendant informed the decedent on the telephone approximately one-half hour before the event that he was going to "blow him away”.
Within approximately one-half hour, the defendant drove to the house of his estranged wife where the decedent was staying. He was armed with a loaded .22-caliber pistol. Testimony indi*162cated the pistol was usually kept unloaded. The defendant, with menacing language, demanded entry into the house and tried to kick down the door. The decedent held the door. The defendant and decedent pushed the door back and forth. Ultimately, the defendant fired the fatal shot through the door while the decedent was leaning against it in an attempt to block the defendant’s entry. The decedent fell to the floor.
Eyewitness testimony indicated that the defendant burst into the house, stomped the decedent on his shoulder, pointed the gun at him and stated, in effect, "You got what you wanted”. A struggle ensued while the occupants of the house attempted to disarm the defendant. During the fracas, the gun was pointed directly at the stomach of the defendant’s wife. A young son of the defendant broke open the pistol and got the bullets out. The defendant then turned, stomped on the face of the decedent, called the decedent a scurrilous name and left the home.
There was testimony that the defendant became mean when he consumed alcohol excessively. There was also eyewitness testimony that he did not appear to be "staggering drunk” and that he "knew what he was doing”.
The question in this case is whether there was competent evidence for the magistrate to base a finding that the crime of murder, in the first degree or second degree, had been committed.
In making his determination, the magistrate did not indicate that he found the eyewitness evidence either incompetent or without credibility. There was credible evidence both supporting and negating the existence of malice, premeditation and deliberation. The finding that the defendant was so intoxicated as to negate the requisite elements of *163first-degree murder and that the actions of the defendant did not at a minimum constitute a wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that death or great bodily harm could result, are issues appropriately left to the finder of fact upon trial. Under the facts and circumstances of this case the magistrate clearly abused his discretion.
Thus, I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for arraignment upon the charge of first-degree murder.
Coleman, C.J., concurred with Blair Moody, Jr., J.The opinion of the Court quotes a passage from Yaner. The Yaner Court thereafter also stated:
"We do not desire to be understood that the magistrate must nicely weigh evidence as a petit jury would, or that he must discharge the accused where there is a conflict of evidence, or where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt; all such questions should be left for the jury upon the trial.” Yaner, supra, 289.
In Auerbach, the Court stated:
"It is urged by respondent’s counsel that the court should have dismissed the proceedings and quashed the information before the jury was impaneled, because the preliminary examination, a record of which was before the court, showed that there was no competent evidence introduced before the examining magistrate authorizing him to hold the respondent for trial.
"We have examined the record relating to the examination before the magistrate, and are unable to agree with respondent’s counsel that, as a matter of law, we should say there was not sufficient evidence to hold the respondent for trial.” Auerbach, supra, 42.