(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I believe this case is indistinguishable in any significant way from the controlling case of State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128 (Minn.1999).
Here, a credible CRI with a proven track record called the police and told them that Shilow Cook was selling crack cocaine on a particular day at the YMCA located at 34th and Blaisdell in Minneapolis. He described Cook’s height, weight, approximate age, and race. The CRI described the colors of Cook’s pants and shirt and said Cook would be wearing a baseball cap. The CRI said Cook would have the dings in the waistband of his pants. The CRI also said Cook would be driving a blue Lincoln with a specific Minnesota license plate number.
The police went to the YMCA. They saw the Lincoln parked in the lot. As they watched the YMCA, they saw a man fitting the description given by the CRI leave the building and get into the Lincoln. The police arrested the man, searched him, and found 7.2 grams of crack cocaine in the waistband of his pants. This was Shi-low Cook.
On these facts, the majority holds that there are two reasons the police lacked probable cause to arrest Cook. First, there was no evidence of the basis for the CRI’s claim that Cook was selling drugs. The CRI did not say he observed any sale of drugs, nor did he purchase drugs himself. Second, although the police verified the CRI’s descriptions before arresting Cook, these were innocent details and they “lacked any incriminating aspects” that might corroborate the CRI’s claim.
In Munson, a CRI with a proven track record called the police and said that within 1⅜ to 2 hours a rented 1996 green Bronco or jeep-type vehicle with Minnesota license plates would arrive at a specific St. Paul address. Id. at 132. In the vehicle would be three African-American males, two of whom would be Kirk Munson and Roosevelt Curtis. Id. The vehicle would contain crack cocaine and the occupants might be armed. Id.
The police went to the vicinity of the address, and a Blazer matching the general description the CRI gave drove past the officers. Id. at 132-33. The police confirmed that the vehicle was registered to a rental agency. Id. at 133. When the Blazer pulled to the curb in front of the *670address the CRI had given, the police turned on their squad car lights, pulled behind the Blazer, approached with weapons drawn, and ordered the three African-American male occupants to raise their hands. Id. The police then ordered the men out of the vehicle. Id. They frisked the men and found no weapons. Id. Two of the men identified themselves as Mun-son and Curtis. Id. The police used a narcotics dog to locate marijuana and cocaine in the Blazer. Id.
The supreme court upheld the search, saying:
Thus, in total, prior to searching the Blazer, the police had corroborated the type, year, and color of the vehicle, the fact that it was registered to a rental agency, its destination, the timing of its arrival, and the identity of its occupants. The independent corroboration of even innocent details of an informant’s tip may support a finding of probable cause. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the corroborated details of the CRI’s tip, together with the past reliability of the CRI, gave the police probable cause to believe that the Blazer was carrying illegal drugs * ⅝ *.
Id. at 136-37 (citatio.ns omitted).
There is nothing in the evidence.in Munson that showed the CRI’s basis for believing the vehicle would be carrying drugs. That omission did not negate probable cause. The police in Munson independently verified that the Blazer was rented and that Munson and Roosevelt were in the vehicle. Id. at 133. But these were totally innocent facts that lacked any incriminating aspects that might have corroborated the CRI’s claim that there would be illegal drugs in the Blazer. The lack of incriminating corroboration did not negate probable cause.
Here, the police corroborated the CRTs tip by observing that the car, the man, the location, and the date were precisely what the CRI said they would be. That corroboration, coupled with the CRI’s past substantial reliability, provided the same nature and degree of probable cause found in Munson.
There seems to be no meaningful distinction between the two cases. Therefore, I believe Munson should be applied as controlling law. The trial court’s suppression of the evidence was error, and I would reverse.