concurring.
I agree with the Court that the “right-to-control” test should be rejected as the test to apply when determining who the “employer” is in the workers’ compensation context. Unfortunately, though rejecting the test, the Court appears to rely on that test to conclude that Tandem is a joint employer in this case.1 So, I-must disagree with the Court’s reasoning. Under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, an “employer” is defined as a person who makes a contract of hire and has workers’ compensation insurance coverage.2 Because Tandem hired Alvarado and purchased workers’ compensation insurance covering Alvarado, Tandem is an “employer” entitled to receive the benefit of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision.3 Because I agree with the Court’s judgment, I concur.
Rather than rely on a shared right-to-control to determine under the workers’ compensation statute who the employer is, I would follow the approach outlined by Texas Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Am-mean:i In Ammean4, Richard J. Ammean was hired by Texas Industrial Contractors, but assigned to work at Bayer Corporation.5 Ammean was injured at Bayer’s facility and later filed and received workers’ compensation benefits from Texas Industrial Contractors’ carrier.6 Ammean maintained that Bayer was his “employer” for workers’ compensation purposes because Bayer controlled his work, thus, Texas Industrial Contractors was not immune from his suit for negligence. Not knowing if he was correct in his assessment, Ammean also brought a negligence action against Bayer. In deciding which entity qualified as Ammean’s employer, the court stated:
[When] a worker is hired by one company that has contracted to do work for another, that company has a workers’ compensation policy, and the worker receives benefits under that policy following an award by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, the worker’s common law claim against that company is barred by the Act’s exclusive remedy provision, even if control over the details of the work is in the hands of the other company with which that company has contracted.7
My principal concerns with the Court’s position are two-fold. First, it applies the right-to-control test-a test that leads to unfair results — to determine the “employer” for workers’ compensation purposes. And second, under these circumstances, it concludes that Alvarado has joint employers — a holding that is neither supported nor predicted by relevant legislative enactments.
Using the right-to-control test is unfair because it leaves employees in Alvarado’s circumstance at a loss as to whom they should look for compensation coverage. On the other hand, in these circumstances, though the actual employer procured workers’ compensation for its employee *151and the employee actually received benefits from the policy, the employer would not know if it was the “employer” under the compensation act and thus is entitled to the act’s exclusivity protection, until a court determines who controls the employee’s particular activity. For example, in Ammean, were the court to have applied the right-to-control test, then Ammean could have sued Texas Industrial Contractors for negligence even though Ammean collected workers’ compensation benefits under a policy paid for by that company.
Furthermore, in concluding that Alvarado has two employers for workers’ compensation purposes because they exercise joint control, the Court applies the right-to-control test very broadly. This seems peculiarly inconsistent with the Court’s application of this same right-to-control test in St. Joseph’s Hospital v. Wolff,8 in which a majority of the Court concluded that the status of “employer” was limited to the entity that was in immediate control of the specific details of the employee’s work. The test applied in Ammean, I think, produces results more in keeping with Texas’s workers’ compensation scheme. And it is a more accurate test for determining who Alvarado’s “employer” is for workers’ compensation purposes.
Texas’s workers’ compensation scheme was adopted and designed to benefit both the employee and the employer.9 While it is true, as the Court states, that “nothing in the Act provides that there must be only one ‘employer’ for workers’ compensation purposes,”10 it is not at all clear to me that the Legislature would permit a temporary employee to have two employers under the Act or that the “co-employer” relationship would further the purposes of the Act.11
In relying on “joint” control to conclude that Alvarado had two employers for workers’ compensation purposes, the Court looks for guidance by reviewing other parts of the Texas Labor Code, specifically the Staff Leasing Services Act.12 Section 91.042(c) of that Act states that the staff leasing company and its client company are co-employers for workers’ compensation purposes.13 Interestingly, though, the concept of “co-employers” has not been recognized by the Legislature beyond what it provided in the Staff Leasing Services Act.14 Particularly, the Legislature has not added the concept to the Workers’ Compensation Act. As well, the Legislature’s recognition of “co-employer” status in the Staff Services Leasing Act is a specific statutory proviso designed solely for leased employee situations.15 I note further that the Staff Leasing Act’s enactment coincided with the litigation embodied in Texas Workers’ Compensation Insurance Fund v. Del Industrial, Inc., which was resolved by us in 2000. And the real issue in that case was over how to calculate insurance premiums 16-an issue *152specifically addressed in the statute.17 The Staff Leasing Act is as consistent with the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to recognize, generally, that there could be more than one employer for worker’s compensation purposes, as it is with the conclusion that the Legislature intends the workers’ compensation scheme to recognize dual-employerships.
Furthermore, this case is not one of dual employers. Two entities are “co-employers” when they have joint control over an employee’s work. Co-employers have been widely recognized in the labor and employment context, as well as in the workers’ compensation context.18 But these cases reflect situations where the parties either had the intent to conduct business as “co-employers” or situations where the parties expressly contemplate a “co-employer” relationship.19
For example, the facts in Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C. demonstrate an actual “co-employer” circumstance.20 In Ingalls, two separate companies joined together to operate one facility. Accordingly, the employee was working for all parties at the time of his injury. But the relationship between Tandem and Web is entirely different. Tandem’s business is providing temporary help. Web’s business is manufacturing. Tandem assigned its employees on a temporary basis to work at Web’s premises, but no joint undertaking between Tandem and Web ever existed.
As another example, in Brown v. Aztec Rig Equipment, Inc., William Brown signed an employment agreement which declared that the staff leasing company, Administaff, Inc., and the client company, Aztec, were his “co-employers.”21 As mentioned above, the Legislature has now expressly addressed the circumstances of Brawn in the Staff Leasing Services Act, which expressly allows a co-employer relationship22 And here, we are dealing with a temporary help provider, not a staff leasing company.23 As well, Alvarado has no express agreement regarding co-employment.
Of course, in situations where the parties expressly contemplate a “co-employer” relationship, there is no reason to disregard such a relationship.24 But I cannot assume that the Legislature intended for an employee to have two employers under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act when the Legislature has not expressly said so, generally, and has expressly said so only in one narrow business circumstance-staff leasing.
Furthermore, workers’ compensation statutes in other jurisdictions have not only clearly recognized “co-employers” and provided the exclusivity defense to each, but those jurisdictions, with limited exceptions, require all employers to carry workers’ compensation insurance,25 which is not the case in Texas. For the Court to recog*153nize “co-employer” status not only seems inconsistent -with the Legislature’s intent expressed in the third-party liability section of the Texas Act,26 but also it may create ramifications significantly affecting Texas’s unique workers’ compensation scheme. I would not alter the Legislature’s workers’ compensation scheme so dramatically. That should be the Legislature’s choice. Thus, I would not afford Tandem and Web “co-employer” status for purposes of the exclusivity defense unless the parties expressly contemplated such a relationship.27
To determine whether one is immune from a negligence suit under Texas’s workers’ compensation scheme as an employer, I would reject the right-to-control test and adopt the test suggested in Ammecm: whether the entity hired the employee and purchased workers’ compensation insurance that covered the injured employee. And because I reject the right-to-control test, I necessarily reject the concept of “joint” control embodied in the Court’s conclusion that a “co-employer” relationship exists in this case. Further, I do not agree that the Legislature permits such a concept, generally, under the workers’ compensation scheme when it has expressly provided for one, but only in a narrow circumstance.
Tandem hired Alvarado and provided workers’ compensation insurance that covered Alvarado’s injury. Tandem is Alvarado’s “employer” as defined by the Act and under the test outlined by Ammean. As such, Alvarado’s common law claims against Tandem are barred by the Act’s exclusivity provision. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment.
. See 111 S.W.3dat 136.
. Tex Lab.Code § 401.001(18).
. Id. § 408.001(a).
. 18 S.W.3d 828 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. dism’d by agr.).
. Mat 831.
. Id.
. Id.
. 94 S.W.3d 513, 537 (Tex.2002) (plurality op.).
. See, e.g., Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 206-07 (Tex.2000); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex.1980).
. Ill S.W.3dat 145.
. Id. at 145-46.
. Id. at 140; Tex. Lab.Code §§ 91.001-.063.
. Tex. Lab.Code § 91.042(c).
. Compare id. § 91.042(c) with id. § 408.001(a). See also Tex. Workers' Compensation Ins. Fund v. Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 591, 596 (Tex.2000).
. Del Indus., 35 S.W.3d at 596.
. Id. at 593-95.
. See Tex Lab.Code § 91.042(b).
. See Garza v. Excel Logistics, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 280, 283-88 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. filed); Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C., 70 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Brown v. Aztec Rig Equip., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 835, 847 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Callaway, 429 S.W.2d 548, 549-51 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ).
. See, e.g., Ingalls, 70 S.W.3d at 258; Brown, 921 S.W.2d at 847.
. Ingalls, 70 S.W.3d at 256-57.
. Brown, 921 S.W.2d at 838.
. See Tex Lab.Code § 91.042(c).
. Brown, 921 S.W.2d at 838.
. See, e.g., id. at 847.
. See, e.g., Ar.Rev.Stat. § 23-1022(A); Cal. Lab.Code §§ 3601, 3602; Or.Rev.Stat. § 656.018(3); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-2(3)(C); Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-43, 35-1-60.
. Tex. Lab.Code§ 417.001.
. See Brown, 921 S.W.2d at 847.