concurring.
I concur in the result. I write separately because the majority opinion misstates the legal definition of constitutionally adequate notice and fails to address Appellant’s main contention.
Appellant complains that the three indictments deprive him of his federal and state constitutional rights to adequate notice of the true nature and cause of the accusations against him. Adequate notice essentially requires two things. First, notice must fairly inform the defendant of the specific offense with which he is charged. Second, notice must be particular enough that the defendant, if convicted or acquitted, can plead the prosecution as a bar to a future prosecution under the same statute and for the same exact conduct. See e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); McElroy v. State, 720 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).1 The majority opinion misrepresents the legal definition of adequate notice, as it assumes that notice is *687constitutionally adequate if it only meets the first requirement.2
Appellant argues that notice is inadequate because the three indictments returned against him are identically worded — charging the same offense, committed in the same manner, against the same victim — and can be differentiated only by the date. Appellant’s main contention, which the majority opinion does not address, is that he is potentially subject to double jeopardy because the indictment’s statement that the offense occurred “on or about [date]” includes the entire statute of limitations period. Essentially, Appellant argues that the three indictments could be multiple indictments for the same specific instance of conduct.3
As the majority’s opinion correctly states, the date the offense was allegedly committed is not material. Our jurisprudence has never required the State to prove a specific date even where a specific date has been pled in the indictment. See Mireles v. State, 901 S.W.2d 458, 463-66 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Meyers, J. dissenting) (tracing the history of date allegations). The State is, however, required to prove at trial a separate statutory violation for each indictment. Stated another way, if the State returns three indictments alleging identical conduct, then the State must show proof at trial that the defendant engaged in that conduct on three separate occasions. Because each incident of indecency with a child is a separate offense, See Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (each instance of sexual assault is a crime and may be prosecuted separately), the State may return three identically worded indictments and obtain three convictions at trial, if the State provides proof of three separate statutory violations.
The answer to the question presented in this case is found in Ex parte Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d 859 (1998). In Goodbread, the appellant argued that two identically worded indictments alleging “on or about” different dates subjected him to double jeopardy. A majority of this Court disagreed. Relying on our past decision in Luna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Crim.App.1973), we held that “trial upon the indictment bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial.” Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d at 860-61.
The same principle applies in the present case. The indictments presented in this case will bar prosecution for the offenses for which proof was offered at trial. As I elaborated in my concurring opinion in Goodbread:
[J]eopardy attaches to the elements and factual matters pled in the indictment, but not to any specific date alleged. See Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). As trial proceeds, jeopardy attaches more specifically to those offenses that otherwise fit the indictment and for which proof is offered. Jeopardy may be further narrowed (or un-attached) by the State’s election of a particular offense on which it will rely for conviction.
Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d at 862. As such, the State is prohibited from re-trying Appellant for the specific instances of conduct which it proved at trial in support of the three indictments returned against Appellant.
Finally, Appellant argues that past case law holds the information providing the required notice must be apparent from the face of the indictment alone. In light of our holding in Goodbread, supra, I believe that the cases upon which Appellant relies for that contention are no longer sound precedent in this particular context.
With these comments, I concur in the judgment.
. In light of our decision in Ex parte Goodbread, discussed infra, our law does not require this notice to be presented in the indictment only; constitutionally adequate notice may be derived from both the indictment and the State's proof at trial.
. See op. at 685-686. The single paragraph defining constitutionally adequate notice states only that "notice be given with sufficient clarity and detail to enable the defendant to anticipate the State’s evidence and prepare a proper defense to it" and concludes that ”[t]hus, an indictment must allege, in plain and intelligible language, all the facts and circumstances necessary to establish all the material elements of the offense charged." The application of the law to fact paragraph thus addresses the concept of adequate notice only in terms of "notice adequate to enable [the defendant] to prepare a proper defense.”
. It is equally plausible that the three indictments are for three distinct instances of identical conduct.