(dissenting). I agree with the trial court that there was a sufficient causal relationship between plaintiff’s use of the vehicle and his injuries. This case is distinguishable from the cases in which benefits were denied because the plaintiff’s presence in the vehicle at the time of the injury was a mere fortuity. See, e.g., Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange v Higginbotham, 95 Mich App 213; 290 NW2d 414 (1980) (the insured’s husband forced her to the curb, trapped her in her car, and shot her several times with a revolver), Kangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1; 235 NW2d 42 (1975) (passengers of the insured’s vehicle assaulted a pedestrian), O’Key v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 89 Mich App 526; 280 NW2d 583 (1979) (the insured was shot by an assailant while she was sitting in her vehicle). In these cases, the injury could have *63resulted whether the plaintiff was using the vehicle or not. The vehicle was more than merely the site of the injury. Under the facts in this case, turning the ignition key must be identified with the normal manner of starting a vehicle. There was a direct causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and plaintiff’s injuries.
I would affirm.