concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s finding that the trial court erred in failing to direct the commissioners to make the factual findings necessary to determine heritage value. In addition, I agree that, without the factual findings of the commission, the trial judge lacked the ability to make a determination as to heritage value. I disagree, however, with the majority’s holding that issuance of a writ of prohibition is required and, therefore, dissent from the majority’s opinion making the preliminary writ absolute.
*576Commission Findings Functus Officio
The majority finds that the language of section 523.0611 requires the trial judge to determine heritage value and that this determination is not discretionary. I agree with this statutory interpretation and recognize the mandates placed upon the trial judge within chapter 523. The majority, however, then concludes that because of this mandatory language and the trial court’s failure to comply, remand to the commission for factual findings is necessary. I respectfully disagree.
As both parties have filed exceptions to the commission’s report, there will now be a jury trial to make a new appraisement and to make the factual findings necessary to determine heritage value. See sections 523.050 and 523.060. Upon the filing of exceptions to the commission’s report, Re-lators are entitled to a jury trial as to the damages sustained by them, the report of the commissioners becomes “functus offi-cio”,2 and the cause then stands “as though no commissioners had ever been appointed.” State ex rel. State Highway Com’n v. Deutschman, 346 Mo. 755, 142 S.W.2d 1025, 1028 (1940). The question of damages, including the making of factual findings necessary to determine heritage value, will be tried de novo by the jury as though no commissioners had ever been appointed. See State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Meadows, 444 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo.App.1969).
Here, since the report of the commissioners has become functus officio, no purpose would be served by having the commissioners amend their report. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Polk, 459 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Mo.1970). As any findings by the commission will be a nullity now that there will be a jury trial, remand back to the commission is superfluous.
Commission Findings Lack Practical Value
In addition to the factual findings of the commission as to heritage value being a legal nullity, remand will also result in commission findings that have no practical value. Relators contend that the factual findings by the commission as to heritage value will be practically relevant. They argue that these findings will impact the proceedings because the condemnor, the city, is required to pay to the clerk the amount assessed, which they assert includes heritage value. Review of section 523.040, however, demonstrates that the payment required by the condemnor to the clerk does not include heritage value.
Chapter 523 is structured in such a way to allow the condemnor to gain possession of the property despite disputes over the amount of damages. See section 523.050. Following the commission’s determination of damages, the condemnor must pay to the clerk the amount of “damages assessed” by the commission. Section 523.040. Once this payment is made, the condemnor is entitled to possession, despite the filing of exceptions by either party. See sections 523.050 and 523.055. In the event exceptions are filed, the determination of damages will then proceed to trial by jury for a determination of the final amount due. Sections 523.050 and 523.060.
While the commission determines the damages and the factual findings relevant to heritage value, it does not determine *577heritage value. See section 523.061. As such, the damages assessed by the commission, which must be paid to the clerk, inherently cannot include heritage value. The commission determines damages, section 523.040, and makes the factual findings necessary to determine heritage value, section 523.039, but only the trial court makes the actual determination of heritage value. Section 523.061. The trial judge increases the commissioners’ award after he establishes heritage value. Section 523.061. The amount due to the clerk, however, is based only on the commission’s assessments, see section 523.040, not the findings of the commission, and, therefore, does not include heritage value.
Because the amount of the commissioners’ award to be paid to the clerk does not include heritage value, remand back to the commissioners will have no impact on any actions taken by either party. Therefore, there is no relevance to the commission’s factual findings as they relate to heritage value unless the trial judge relies on those findings to determine an amount due. Here, as the trial judge will not be relying on the commission’s findings due to the impending jury trial, the factual findings of the commission have no effect.
Writ of Prohibition Not Appropriate
“Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent exercise of extra jurisdictional power and is not a writ of right.” State ex rel. K-Mart Corp. v. Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. banc 1999) (emphasis added). As such, this Court must exercise caution when issuing wilts of prohibition.
This Court will issue a writ of prohibition when the circumstances fit within one of three categories. State ex rel. Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. Rains, 706 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Mo. banc 1986). First, this Court has entertained writs of prohibition “where there is a usurpation of judicial power because the trial court lacks either personal or subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. The second category of cases where this Court will issue a writ of prohibition is when “there exists a clear excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion such that the lower court lacks the power to act as contemplated.” Id-. Under this second category, not every violation of a statute on the part of a court constitutes an act in excess of jitris-diction. See State ex. rel. Morasch v. Kimberlin, 654 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. banc 1983).
The third and final category has perimeters described by this Court in Norauda:
When this Court is presented with an action that is not an abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in the customary fashion in which we have interpreted those concepts, we occasionally will issue a writ of prohibition if the party can satisfy a number of conditions-often falling under the rubric of no adequate remedy by appeal. This category often acts as a mechanism for deciding an important legal question that routinely escapes this Court’s attention because of the litigation process and the lack of interest in some instances to prosecute an appeal at a client’s expense. It might be noted that there are no interlocutory appeals in civil cases in Missouri, which in other jurisdictions might cover some of the situations in this third category. Thus, where there is an issue which might otherwise escape this Court’s attention for some time and which in the meantime is being decided by administrative bodies or trial courts whose opinions may be [sic] reason of inertia or other cause become percedent [sic]; and, the issue is being decided wrongly and is not a mere misapplication of law; and, where the aggrieved party may suffer considerable hardship and expense as a consequence of such action, we may *578entertain the writ for purposes of judicial economy under our authority to “issue and determine original remedial writs.” Mo. Const, art. V, § 4.1.
706 S.W.2d. at 862-63 (footnote omitted).
Applying the three categories of circumstances where this Court will issue a writ of probation to the facts of this case, the first question is whether the trial court, here, “lackfed] either personal or subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 862. There is no claim of lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, so there is no entitlement to issuance of a writ under the first category.
The second category of circumstances where a writ of prohibition may issue is when there “exists a clear excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion such that the lower court lacks the power to act as contemplated.” Id. As noted above, not every violation of a statute constitutes an act in excess of jurisdiction on the part of a court. See Morasch, 654 S.W.2d at 892. I agree with the majority that the trial court misapplied the law in not directing the commissioners to make the required finding related to heritage value, but that error was not an act in excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion. As such, this Court can properly issue a writ of prohibition only if the third category applies.
Under the third category, this Court can issue a writ of prohibition only if a number of conditions are satisfied. The first condition is when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. The remedy of appeal is not adequate when, as in this case, there is an important legal question that would otherwise escape this Court’s attention because of the litigation process. The trial court’s failure to order the commission to make a factual finding necessary to determine heritage value will escape review because the jury’s subsequent finding supersedes the commission’s finding. Nevertheless, even if this is a case where there is no adequate remedy on appeal, there are additional conditions that also must be met. A writ of prohibition is not available under the third category unless the writ also addresses an “issue [that] is being decided wrongly and is not a mere misapplication of law,” and the writ is necessary to prevent a situation “where the aggrieved party may suffer considerable hardship and expense as a consequence of such action.” Noranda, 706 S.W.2d at 862-63.
These last two conditions, under category three, preclude the issuance of a writ in this case. The issue that the majority found was wrongly decided, the failure to authorize the commission to make a necessary factual finding, was a mere misapplication of law by the trial court. Additionally, the aggrieved party, Relators, will not suffer considerable hardship and expense as a consequence of the trial court’s error because the factual findings necessary to determine heritage value will be made by the jury. In fact, the issuance of the writ will cause unnecessary expense rather than eliminate it as it will require additional, superfluous proceedings. Because this case does not comply with two of the three conditions necessary for issuing a writ of prohibition under category three, a writ should not issue.
While a writ of prohibition is appropriate if it is necessary to preserve “the orderly and economical administration of justice,” id., that is not the circumstance here. The orderly and economical administration of justice is not promoted by requiring remand to the trial court for the commission to make factual findings when the filing of exceptions results in a jury trial on these same matters, and the commission’s findings will not be utilized to determine the heritage value. To the contrary, this Court’s writ directs the trial *579court to conduct unnecessary proceedings, as opposed to promoting judicial economy.
Conclusion
The interpretation by the majority of the newly enacted statutes pertaining to heritage value is sound. In addition, such interpretation is beneficial to offer clarification of the duties that are imposed on the trial court by the statutes related to determining heritage value as the applicable statutes are both new and lacking in clarity. The failure of the trial court to comply with the statute, however, is not in and of itself a circumstance where a writ of prohibition should issue.
Here, the trial court explicitly “declined” to send the question of heritage back to the commission when the request to do so occurred after the issuance of the commissioners’ report and after the filing of exceptions by both parties. While the trial court erred in its initial order to the commission, the trial court’s decision not to correct that error by requiring further action by the commission is not a circumstance involving ignorance of the law on the part of the trial court but, instead, the trial court declining to order superfluous proceedings.3
The writ of prohibition will require the commission to make factual findings that will have no effect in determining the damages due to the Relators. The prior filing of objections to the commissioner’s report by both Relators and the city make any findings by the commission a nullity since the factual findings that will actually be used to determine heritage value will be made by a jury. Any findings by the commission as to heritage value have no impact during the interval between the commission’s report and the jury trial as the amount required to be paid by the City prior to gaining possession does not include heritage value. The circumstances of this case do not fit within any of the three categories this Court has recognized for the “extraordinary remedy” of a writ of prohibition. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion making the preliminary writ of prohibition absolute.
. All references are to RSMo Supp.2007 unless otherwise noted.
. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004) defines fundus officio as: "(Of an officer or official body) without further authority or legal competence because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished."
. Both parties already had filed exceptions prior to Relators raising the issue of heritage value and, while requiring the commission to make factual findings as to heritage value might aid settlement, this Court should not issue a writ merely to facilitate that goal.