OPINION
Opinion by
Justice LANG-MIERS.Relator contends that the trial court erred by granting real party’s motion to set aside the court’s previous orders after the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction had expired. We conclude that relator has not shown that it is entitled to the relief requested and deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
Plaintiffs below, Cindy Berry, Megan Taylor, and the Estate of Irvin Matthew Taylor, filed their original petition on December 6, 2006 naming Jesus Guevara, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, and Minter Electric Company, Inc. as defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that Irvin Matthew Taylor was killed as a result of being struck by a vehicle driven by Jesus Guevara when Guevara was acting within the scope of his employment with Minter. Plaintiffs paid for citation to issue *542and it was issued for all three defendants. Only Minter was actually served with process.2 Approximately one month later, Minter filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Estate of Irvin Matthew Taylor was not a legal entity and lacked the capacity to bring the claims and that the proper plaintiff would be the personal representative or administrator of the estate of the decedent. Plaintiffs did not respond to that motion. The court granted the motion and dismissed the Estate of Irvin Matthew Taylor from the case on April 18, 2007. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration one month later, but the court did not rule on the motion.
On September 6, 2007, Minter filed a no evidence motion for summary judgment regarding all of the remaining plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs did not file a response and did not appear at the hearing. The court granted the motion by an order dated October 24, 2007 entitled “Final Judgment” with the word “Final” struck through. Six days later, plaintiffs filed a response to the no evidence motion for summary judgment. About a month later, plaintiffs also filed a motion for new trial, asserting that they did not file a timely response to the no evidence motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs’ counsel had calendared the wrong dates for the response due date and the hearing. The court did not rule on the motion.
On June 4, 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the no evidence summary judgment and the dismissal of the Estate. Plaintiffs stated that their previous counsel had been disbarred, but that he did not disclose that fact to them, and that he failed to respond to the opposing party’s motions or discovery. They also argued that the no evidence motion for summary judgment should have been denied. Minter responded, contending that the judgment granting the no evidence motion for summary judgment had become final and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider its previous rulings.
The trial court signed an order setting aside the dismissal of the Estate and the no evidence summary judgment on October 13, 2008. In the order the court stated, “After considering the evidence and argument of counsel, this Court is of the opinion that the Court retains jurisdiction of this cause and that the above mentioned orders should be set aside and this cause set for trial on the merits.” Relator contends that the trial court erroneously determined that it retained plenary power to set aside its previous orders.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or a violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex.2005)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992). A relator who seeks mandamus relief must demonstrate a “clear right” to the action it seeks. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 682-83 (Tex.1996). Mandamus is proper if a trial court issues an order after its plenary power has expired because such an order is void. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.2000).
*543In Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex.2001), the Texas Supreme Court considered the problem of determining when a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final. It held that there is no presumption of finality for an order granting summary judgment. Id. at 205-96; Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex.2007). Instead, it concluded that an order granting summary judgment is not final “unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. If the order is written in clear and unequivocal language, we must give it effect “despite any other indications that one or more parties did not intend for the judgment to be final.” Id. at 206.
In this case, the issue is whether a judgment granting a no evidence motion for summary judgment in favor of one of two defendants is a final judgment if the other defendant has not been served with citation at the time the judgment is signed. The parties agree that our analysis is governed by Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.1962), and M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671 (Tex.2004).
In Youngstoum, the trial court signed a judgment granting summary judgment for all but one of the defendants. That defendant, Cannan, had not been served with citation and had not answered. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that the judgment was a final judgment, even though it did not specifically dispose of the claims against Cannan, because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the petitioner ever expected to obtain service on Cannan. The court held that under those circumstances, “the case stands as if there had been a discontinuance as to Can-nan, and the judgment is to be regarded as final for the purposes of appeal.” Youngs-toum, 363 S.W.2d at 232. The court did not state whether the parties disputed the finality of the judgment or whether it raised the issue sua sponte. See id.
In M.O. Dental, the court sua sponte raised the issue of finality of the trial court’s judgment, denoted “Order Granting Summary Judgment.” Relying on Lehmann, the court reaffirmed that “ ‘if the record reveals the existence of parties ... not mentioned in the order, the order is not final,’ unless it is made final by its own language.” M.O. Dental, 139 S.W.3d at 674 (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206). The court concluded in M.O. Dental that the judgment was correctly considered final because the record affirmatively showed that the plaintiff never intended to serve the remaining defendant: the plaintiffs pleadings expressly stated that the defendant’s “location for service ... is unknown at this time, so no citation is requested.” M.O. Dental, 139 S.W.3d at 674. Additionally, the plaintiff was the party contending that the judgment was final.
Unlike this case, both Youngstoum, and M.O. Dental were direct appeals from summary judgments. And neither case establishes what a reviewing court should consider as sufficient indication that the plaintiff expects to serve the unserved defendant. Nor do those cases establish at what point in the trial proceeding such a determination should be made, or what demonstrates an abuse of discretion when the trial court determines the judgment was not final.
Applying the reasoning of Youngstown and M.O. Dental, to find an abuse of discretion in this case, we would have to conclude that there is nothing in the record to support the trial court’s decision that the no evidence summary judgment was not final. In other words, we would have to conclude that there is nothing in *544the record to indicate to the trial court that real parties ever expected to obtain service on Guevara. But the petition recited where Guevara could be served, and the citation was paid for and issued for him at the same time citation was issued for Minter. In addition, the record shows that the litigation in this personal injury case had proceeded for only four months when the trial court dismissed the Estate from the lawsuit, and for only ten months when the trial court granted the no evidence summary judgment in favor of Minter. See In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d at 187. Although the stage of the trial proceeding is not determinative, we may consider it as part of the mandamus record for evidence that demonstrates whether or not the plaintiff intended to serve the unserved defendant.3 See id. at 187-88. Plaintiffs continued to include Guevara in the pleadings they filed after the no evidence summary judgment was granted in favor of Minter. Further, the judgment granting the no evidence motion for summary judgment shows that the word “Final” in the heading “Final Judgment” was struck through. Finally, the trial court’s order setting aside the dismissal of the Estate and no evidence summary judgment states that the court heard evidence in ruling on the motion to set aside, but the mandamus record does not contain that evidence and the parties do not argue what that evidence showed. Without a record of the evidence presented at the hearing, we must presume that the evidence supports the trial court’s ruling. In re Bill Heard Chevrolet, Ltd., 209 S.W.3d 311, 313-14 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding).
We conclude that relator has not demonstrated that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by setting aside the dismissal of the Estate and no evidence summary judgment and that it has no adequate remedy at law because the mandamus record does not clearly indicate that the trial court had lost its plenary power when it signed the order. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. As a result, relator has not demonstrated a clear right to the relief it seeks.
We DENY relator’s request for mandamus relief.
FITZGERALD, J. dissenting.
. Service on the Texas Health and Human Services Commission is not an issue in this proceeding.
. For example, plaintiffs pleaded that discovery should be conducted under rule 190.4, or Level 3. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 190.4. Under rule 190.4, discovery is conducted in accordance with a control plan tailored to the circumstances of the specific suit. Id. However, the discovery control plan applicable to this case is not part of the mandamus record. And the mandamus record does not indicate that the time for discovery was complete when the trial court dismissed the claims against Minter. See In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d at 187-88 & n. 6.