dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the "amendment to Tex.Code CrimProoAnn. art. 87.07, § 3(a) creates a threshold of admissibility requiring the trial court to determine that the extraneous crime or bad act has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Such preliminary determinations are also made concerning the admissibility of statements made by the accused (Tex.Code CrimProo. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1979 & Supp.1995)) and whether evidence was obtained in violation of the Constitution and laws of this State (Tex.Code CrimProcANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp.1995)), but the jury is still required to determine the facts related to this evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Extraneous offenses have long been admissible for limited purposes at the guili/inno-cence phase of the trial. Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held, and continues to hold after the enactment of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, that the standard of proof necessary to admit extraneous offenses is beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal Appeals has further held that if the defendant requests at the guili/innocence phase of the trial that the trial court instruct the jury not to consider extraneous offense evidence admitted for a limited purpose unless it believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the extraneous offense, then the defendant is entitled to that instruction. George v. State, 890 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). I see no reason why this instruction should not also apply at the punishment stage of the trial. Otherwise, it would appear that the trial court becomes the exclusive fact finder on this matter instead of the jury. This is contrary to the basic functions in the trial court under Tex.Code CrimProc. Ann. art. 36.13 (Vernon 1981) where the jury is designated to be the exclusive judge of the facts. I recognize that Article 36.13 is prefaced with the limitation, “[ujnless otherwise provided in this Code [of Criminal Procedure].” The Texas Legislature, however, has not specifically provided that the trial court will ultimately preempt the jury in this factual determination, but rather provides that the trial court will make a preliminary determination for the purpose of admissibility — not *217for the purpose of the ultimate use of this evidence in determination of the punishment.
I respectfully dissent.
. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.22, § 6 (Vernon 1979), specifically sets forth that the jury “shall be instructed that unless the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntarily made, the jury shall not consider such statement for any purpose nor any evidence obtained as a result thereof” and that TexCode Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp.1995), specifically provides that “[i]n any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the juty shall be instructed that if it believes, or has reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.”