(concurring specialty)-
I concur in the opinion of the court except insofar as it reasons that the statute is ambiguous. In my view, the statute is unambiguous. The third sentence plainly states that a person may not cover the pertinent parts of a license plate “with any material whatever.” This language is absolute and does not admit exceptions. “The word ‘any’ is given broad application in statutes, regardless of whether we consider the result reasonable.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.2005) (applying plain meaning of phrase “any person” in Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (2004)); see also In re PERA Police & Fire Plan Line of Duty Disability Benefits of Brittain, 724 N.W.2d 512, 519 (Minn.2006) (holding that phrase “any act of duty” in Minn.Stat. § 353.656, subd. 1 (2004), is unambiguous); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.1997) (interpreting phrase “any litigation ... resulting from the use or operation of any motor vehicle” in Minn.Stat. § 169.685, subd. 4 (1996), by “looking] no further than the express language of the statute”). The final clause, which begins with the word “including,” cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude anything from the category of prohibited materials because the clause merely provides examples of prohibited materials. Furthermore, the statute cannot be deemed ambiguous by suggesting an alternative interpretation that is contrary to the statute’s plain meaning. See Ubel v. State, 547 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Minn.1996). Because the statute is unambiguous, we should not refer to or rely on its legislative history. See Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 114 n. 13 (Minn.2006). With these qualifications, I join in the opinion of the court.