¶ 55. {concurring). I join the majority because the text of the statutes upon which it relies support its conclusion. I write separately, however, for two reasons: (1) I am concerned about the ramifications of the majority's interpretation, and (2) I remain uncertain if its interpretation correctly reflects the intent of the legislature.
¶ 56. The majority adopts the position advanced by the State. At oral argument the State acknowledged that the ramifications of its position extend well beyond cases involving the prosecution of child sexual assaults. They extend to all criminal cases involving statute of limitations questions. Although I am unsure how the majority's decision will play out in the context of other criminal cases, I will confine my discussion to how it may affect other child sexual assault cases.
¶ 57. I am concerned that in an effort to save this prosecution, the State (and thus the majority) is actually undermining the prosecution of other child sexual assault cases. Let me explain.
¶ 58. The legislature recognized the need to expand the time period of the statute of limitations because often child sexual assaults are not reported until many years after the offense. Even though the legislature has consistently expanded the time, the majority's interpretation is going to leave many child sexual assaults with a very limited time for prosecution.
¶ 59. The State advocates, and the majority adopts, a bright-line rule. For all prosecutions of child *580sexual assaults that occur prior to July 1, 1989, a six-year statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the commission of the charged offense.1 At the end of the six-year period, the prosecutions are barred forever. Simple enough. But what are the ramifications of this statutory interpretation?
¶ 60. Consider the case of a four-year-old who is sexually assaulted on June 30, 1989, but who does not report it until 2005, when he is 20 years old. Under the majority's interpretation the statute of limitations would expire on June 30, 1995, when the victim is ten years old. Period. The same six-year bar for prosecutions would apply to probably countless child sexual assaults that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s that were not reported at the time of the offense.
¶ 61. Was it the intent of the legislature to bar the prosecution of the above described June 1989 offense (and all of those other prosecutions) while at the same time consistently extending the statute of limitations? In 1987, effective July 1, 1989, the legislature recognized that the period of limitations for child sexual assault cases should extend at least to the time the victim turns 21.
¶ 62. Subsequent amendments to § 939.74(2)(c) extended the period of limitations even further. In 1993, for example, the legislature determined that the violations could be commenced until the victim turned 26.2 *581The age was raised again in 1997, 2003, and 2005.3 The most recent version of § 939.74 provides that prosecutions under § 948.02(1), first degree sexual assault of a child, "may be commenced at any time." Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(a) (2005-06). It also provides that prosecutions under § 948.02(2), second degree sexual assault of a child, "shall be commenced before the victim reaches the age of 45 years or be barred." Id.
¶ 63. According to the majority, a sexual assault of a child committed June 30,1989, must be prosecuted by 1995 or be barred. In contrast, a sexual assault of a child committed just one year later in 1990 may be prosecuted until the victim turns 45, or without time limitation, depending on the crime charged. It seems unlikely that the legislature intended such wildly different outcomes based on small differences as to when sexual assaults of children take place.
¶ 64. The legislature has paid a great deal of attention to the period of limitations for child sexual assault prosecutions. It has consistently expanded that period, accounting for the fact that such assaults are often reported years after they occur. The majority's interpretation, however, indicates that the legislature intended to expand the period for assaults that took place after July 1, 1989, while at the same time strictly limiting the periods for assaults that took place before that date. It also indicates that the legislature intended dramatically different outcomes based on small differences in when an assault was committed. I am uncertain whether such results were actually intended by the legislature.
*582¶ 65. Nonetheless, I join the majority because the text of the statutes upon which it relies support its interpretation. As the majority explains, under Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07, when the legislature replaces or amends a statute of limitations, the prior statute applies to any cause of action that accrues before the effective date of the new statute or amendment, unless the legislature provides otherwise. Majority op., ¶ 42. There is no express provision in any of the legislation amending § 939.74 indicating that the amendments apply to the chapter 944 offenses with which MacArthur has been charged. Thus, the majority concludes that the applicable statute of limitations is the one in effect on the date of the charged crime: six years.
¶ 66. For the reasons set forth, I respectfully concur.
The majority concludes that the applicable statute of limitations is set forth in the version of § 939.74 in effect in December 1988. See majority op., ¶¶ 10-11. That statute provides "prosecution for a felony must be commenced within 6 years ...." Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) (1985-86).
1993 Wis. Act 219, § 6; see majority op., ¶ 12.
1997 Wis. Act 237; 2003 Wis. Act 279, § 9; 2005 Wis. Act 276, §§ 1, 2; see majority op., ¶¶ 13-14.