¶ 26. (dissenting). Not telling a defendant that he or she is subject to a commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 does not make his or her guilty plea not "knowing and voluntary." State v. Myers, 199 Wis. 2d 391, 393-395, 544 N.W.2d 609, 610-611 (Ct. App. 1996). The same is true with the requirement that a defendant register as a sex offender. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶ 27, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 577, 605 N.W.2d 199, 206.
¶ 27. As the Majority points out, the State conceded in Bollig that under the circumstances in that case not knowing about the sex-registration requirement was "a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal." Id., 2000 WI 6, ¶ 31, 232 Wis. 2d at 578, 605 N.W.2d at 206. That does not, of course, end the matter because whether the State would be prejudiced by a plea withdrawal is vested in the trial court's discretion. Id., 2000 WI 6, ¶ 32, 232 Wis. 2d at 578, 605 N.W.2d at 206.
*521¶ 28. Unfortunately, the Majority here overrides the trial court's discretion with its own, and weighs the evidence. In my view, the trial court rationally assessed the evidence presented to it; our commission thus does not give us warrant to second-guess its determination.
¶ 29. The upshot of this sad case is that the victim of horrendous assaults will have to suffer anew (if the State can still produce her) for something, as Bollig teaches in the context of registration as a sex offender, that did not violate Jarmal Nelson's due-process rights. Id., 2000 WI 6, ¶ 27, 232 Wis. 2d at 577, 605 N.W.2d at 206. Indeed, Myers teaches that the trial court here did not have any obligation to tell Nelson that he could be committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. Myers, 199 Wis. 2d at 394, 544 N.W.2d at 610. Nevertheless, despite the Majority's apparent conclusion that the evidence against Nelson is so overwhelming that the State could not possibly be prejudiced, the victim will have to endure more rounds of humiliation and torment added to what she has already suffered. Of course, this ignores prejudice to the victim. In my view, nothing in the law or logic either does or should compel that result. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983) (Sparing victim the potential trauma of having to testify at a new trial is an appropriate factor to consider in deciding whether to reverse a conviction.). I respectfully dissent.