(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In ordering restitution for the Hu Plig ceremony, which involves the sacrifice of animals to restore the victim’s soul, the trial court evaluated and delved into significant religious and spiritual traditions. This constitutes excessive entanglement, and thus the trial court’s application of the restitution statute violated the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. I; Minn. Const, art. I, § 16.
The United States Constitution provides generous accommodation of all faiths and cultures and their various forms of religious expression. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-78, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); see also Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn.*6771992) (construing Minn. Const. art. I, § 16 to afford even greater protection of religious liberties than that afforded by the Federal Constitution). In affording individuals the opportunity to pursue their own religious beliefs and practices, however, the government may not become excessively entangled with or impermissibly supportive of religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). To pass constitutional muster, a governmental action must have a secular purpose, must have a principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation [between necessary and permissible contact and excessive entanglement], far from being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.” Id. at 614, 91 S.Ct. 2105.
The trial court and court of appeals both determined that the Hu Plig ceremony was not religious and, accordingly, required appellant to pay for the cost of the ceremony. However, the lower courts erred in finding that the Hu Plig ceremony was not religious based almost exclusively on the testimony of Neng Xiong, who declined to characterize the Hu Plig ceremony as a religious ceremony because it had not been “institutionalized.” However, the “institutionalization” test adopted by the trial court does not conform to the objective test established by the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965).
In Seeger, the United States Supreme Court recognized “the richness and variety of spiritual life in our country” and the diverse forms of expression these religions encompass. Id. at 174, 85 S.Ct. 850. The Court stated that a belief is religious if it is a “sincere and meaningful [belief that] occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.” Id. at 165-66, 85 S.Ct. 850. Thus, to determine whether a belief is religious, a court must decide whether it is sincerely held and whether it is, objectively, religious. See id. at 184, 85 S.Ct. 850.
There is no dispute in this case regarding the sincerity of the victim’s deeply held belief. There is, however, a dispute as to whether the Hu Plig healing or soul restoration ceremony is religious. This court now must determine the resolution of that dispute. The answer to the religious question is dependent on whether the ceremony “occupie[d] a place in [the victim’s] life parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.” Id. at 166, 85 S.Ct. 850. In concluding that the Hu Plig ceremony is not religious, the trial court ignored the Seeger test, instead relying exclusively on an expert witness’ statement that the ceremony had not been “institutionalized.”
Had the trial court used the appropriate test in determining whether the Hu Plig ceremony was religious, several undisputed facts would have led it to the conclusion that the ceremony was religious. According to the victim impact statement, which is not contradicted in the record, the Hu Plig ceremony is based on the belief that the “victim’s soul is replaced by that of animals,” and that without the restoration of the soul through the Hu Plig ceremony, the victim will become sick and eventually die. Although specific practices differ among religions, many religions focus on the existence and restoration of the soul. Furthermore, the Hu Plig ceremony is performed by a shaman (“holy man”) or shao woman (“holy woman”). It is undisputed in the record that these holy people are “religious leaderfs] in the Hmong community.” Thus, they are objectively as vital to the Hu Plig ceremony as other religious officials are in other religions. Thus, the appellant has met his burden of proof that the Hu Plig ceremony is, from an objective perspective, religious, regardless of the institutionalization of that ceremony.
The trial court became excessively entangled in religious beliefs by picking and *678choosing what portions of the Hu Plig ceremony were compensable. The trial court ordered that appellant pay restitution for the costs' of two of the sacrificed animals, a cow and a pig. However, the trial court then determined that the victim was not entitled to restitution for the sacrifice of two chickens because, based on the extent of the victim’s injuries, that sacrifice was “excessive.” It is inappropriate for the trial court to evaluate the necessity of certain aspects of the victim’s religious practices and disallow reimbursement for those practices that the trial court does not deem “appropriate.”
As Justice Douglas stated, “Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.” United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944). “[T]he ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, [and thus] there remains [only] the significant question whether [the belief] is ‘truly held.’ ” Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185, 85 S.Ct. 850. The lower courts and the majority of this court avoid the excessive entanglement issue by classifying the Hu Plig ceremony as nonreligious. However, as previously discussed, under the objective Seeger test the Hu Plig ceremony was religious. Accordingly, the trial court should only have determined whether the victim’s belief was sincerely held, an issue that is undisputed in this case. Yet the trial court went on to require the victim to prove that his religious beliefs and practices were not “excessive,” thereby thrusting the judiciary into the religious or spiritual realm. The majority opinion now ratifies this error by continuing to require the victim to prove the appropriateness of his religious beliefs. Judicial determination of “appropriate” religious practices constitutes excessive entanglement and places the judiciary in an untenable position.
We must heed the United States Supreme Court’s warning about mixing government and religion: “[cjandor compels acknowledgement * * * that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105. “Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” Id. at 622, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (citations omitted).
Even though this case may not per se involve political divisions along religious lines, the majority’s decision leads to broader ramifications and to the potential for political divisiveness related to religious beliefs and practices. The power of the state, through the courts, has been invoked against the wishes of the appellant, who has been compelled to support and maintain portions of this religious practice.' As the Supreme Court reminded us in Lemon, the difficulty is that trial courts must now draw the lines of religious demarcation. See id. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105. This area may now become a battle of experts on religious and spiritual practices with no discernable bounds, except what a judge determines to be appropriate or non-excessive.
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals and the trial court and quickly remove the courts from the religious arena.