(dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. As the majority concludes, Delaware law applies to the issue of standing of appellants to pursue their derivative claim on behalf of Green Tree.
The majority correctly recognizes the leading role of Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del.1984). I disagree with the majority, however, that appellants’ claims are preserved as a result of the ruling of the Third Circuit in Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir.1992).
As respondent points out, unlike the situation in Blasband, appellants here have tried to maintain a derivative suit on behalf of a corporation in which they hold no stock and Blasband is thus irrelevant. This case is squarely controlled by Lewis:
A plaintiff who ceases to be a shareholder, whether by reason of a merger or for any other reason, loses standing to continue a derivative suit.
Id. at 1049. A Delaware chancery court has correctly criticized Blasband, holding that the principles in Lewis remain the law of the State of Delaware. In re First Interstate Bancorp Cons. Shareholder Litigation, 729 A.2d 851 (Del.Ch.Ct.1998).
I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint in this matter because appellants no longer have standing to continue this suit because they are no longer shareholders of respondent corporation. I believe this result is compelled by the principles enunciated by the Delaware Supreme Court and, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary by the Delaware Supreme Court, it is our obligation to follow existing Delaware law.