dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. This Court has addressed the issue at bar, whether physical contact is a necessary element for recovery of uninsured benefits from a negligent but unidentified driver, on many occasions.
*480It has been our collective opinion that when the General Assembly enacted KRS 304.20-020, it “did not presume to write an uninsured motorist policy, but merely gave a general outline of the coverage required,” recognizing that the limits and terms of such coverage would be specifically defined by reasonable terms and conditions in various insurance contracts. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Christian, Ky., 555 S.W.2d 571, 572 (1977).
In Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company v. Oliver, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 574, 577 (1977), we stated that, “it must be noted that the purpose of mandatory uninsured motorist coverage is to provide those who purchased liability insurance with the same protection that they would have if the uninsured motorist had carried the minimum limits of liability coverage.”
This Court has repeatedly noted that uninsured motorist coverage is personal to the insured and that we must look at the insured’s reasonable expectation with regard to the insurance coverage which has been bought and paid for. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., Ky., 789 S.W.2d 754 (1990) and Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 555 (1979).
To quote from Justice Leibson’s eloquent dissent in Masler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Ky., 894 S.W.2d 633, 637 (1995):
The uninsured motorist law provides statutory coverage for the liability of an offending uninsured motorist, permitting the insurance company to include in the policy three specified exceptions. Physical contact is not one of those exceptions _The statute should be construed as including an unidentified motorist within the concept of an uninsured motorist because, when the offending motorist is unidentified, no recovery can be obtained from an insurance company providing coverage to the offending motorist.
If, as contended by Appellee Farm Bureau, this Court and the General Assembly believe the physical contact requirement exists to express the public policy of this state to prevent fraudulent claims, and the record reflects there was no evidence of fraud, Appellee has negated its reasoning for non-payment.
Appellant purchased insurance to pay for bodily injury caused by an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle. The definition of an uninsured motor vehicle in Appellant’s policy included a hit-and-run land motor vehicle whose owner or driver remains unknown. Appellant’s reasonable expectation was recovery for what he had paid for.
This case is similar to one of the first cases we reviewed involving a hit-and-run situation, Jett v. Doe, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 221 (1977). Like Jett, here the insured was injured when he tried to avoid a collision with a vehicle driven recklessly by an unidentified driver. There was no physical contact between the vehicles and the unidentified drivers in either case. As in Jett, Appellant argues that since the accident was witnessed and corroborated by an impartial observer, physical contact is an unreasonable restriction to recovery. I agree.
It is my opinion that the time has come to address the public’s reasonable expectation to be paid for what they purchase. I am persuaded by the argument that a balancing of “clear and convincing evidence” would more adequately address the interests of society and protect the insurance industry against fraud. I see no justification for this Court’s endorsement of an unwarranted and unproven “fraud” assertion as a refuge that insurance com*481panies may cower behind while issuing blanket denials in claims like the one at bar. Instead of categorically excluding recovery to an entire class of plaintiffs because of the mere possibility of fraud, we should place our faith in a jury’s ability to discover fraud in cases where it actually exists. In this country, we utilize juries to decide whether capital defendants will live or die; juries are up to the task of determining whether an injured plaintiff’s claim is fraudulent or genuine.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand the decision of the Court of Appeals.
KELLER, J., joins this dissent.