APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing appellant raises the issue of the effect of Art. 37.14, Tex.Code Crim.Pro., which states that when a defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense of that with which he is charged, such conviction serves as an acquittal of the higher offense. It is appellant’s position that the conviction for voluntary manslaughter necessarily implies an acquittal for murder, and that if the evidence does not support the findings regarding sudden passion and adequate cause then the present conviction must be reversed.
This Court recognizes the applicability of Art. 37.14 to convictions for manslaughter, when murder is the offense charged. See Brown v. State, 99 Tex.Cr.R. 19, 267 S.W. 493, 494 (Tex.Crim.App.1925). As we read Art. 37.14, it addresses itself to the issue of acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. It does not mean, in the instant ease, that the elements of the greater offense have been found not to exist. Again, it must be borne in mind that an affirmative finding concerning the elements of voluntary manslaughter necessarily includes the same for the elements of murder. Compare Tex.Penal Code § 19.02 with § 19.04(a).
Nor can we agree with appellant that we are applying different, inconsistent standards for the State and defendant in determining the propriety of charging the jury on the lesser included offense. A defendant is entitled to the requested charge only when the evidence raises such issue that he, if guilty, is guilty only of the lesser offense. McBrayer v. State, 504 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Our opinion does not set a less stringent standard for determining the propriety of charging on the lesser offense when requested by the State, and should not be interpreted as such. Rather, we hold that no reversible error was committed in that the evidence would have supported a conviction for the greater offense.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is OVERRULED.