(dissenting). 1 agree unequivocally with the majority’s treatment of the first *386issue and I believe the very raising of that issue reflects the atmosphere which characterizes this record.
However too many of the remaining issues contain overtones of antagonism toward plaintiffs counsel. They may have richly deserved a tight reign at times, but it appears to me that, an over-tried case resulted in a miscarriage of justice. I think the trial judge should have granted a new trial.
Since I am a minority of one there is little to be served by dissecting the record for instances of querulousness. This matter is addressed in the majority opinion as the second issue. The two distinguished former trial judges who sign that opinion perhaps find little sympathy for my view that a too easily aggravated trial judge is as much an impediment to a fair trial as an error of fact or law. I can only say that I come to a different conclusion and disagree that both sides were treated evenly. More than anything else it is the cumulative effect of the atmosphere of impatience which compels my vote for reversal.
On the issue addressed as number 3 by the majority I am tempted to excoriate appellant for failure to supply the video-tape deposition with the exhibits submitted on this appeal. I understand that steps are being taken to require the filing of such tape or a written verbatim certified transcript of the same in future cases. This video-tape deposition issue appeared to me to be extremely troublesome and was recognized to be so by the trial judge. If I read the record correctly the plaintiff was guilty of two criminal sexual episodes, one in 1964 (homosexual) and one in 1973 (defendants refer to it as a "1974 sex episode”) with a female minor and defendants further say *387that the first time they learned of the second sex offense was at the taking of Dr. Danto’s deposition.
The deposition was taken after a pretrial rule which unequivocally excluded such evidence from jury consideration. It is unclear to me how defense counsel could have, in the face of the pretrial ruling, taken the opportunity to inquire into the criminal sexual conduct in violation thereof. I was unable to view the video tapes without taking extraordinary measures and it became unnecessary to do so when the majority opinion was forwarded to me by my colleagues. It appears that although the plaintiffs attorneys obtained a stipulation to exclude the prior criminal record at pretrial and subsequently obtained a letter from the pretrial judge amending the pretrial order to expressly exclude such evidence, nevertheless, it came to be included in a deposition taken thereafter. The majority opinion refers to GCR 1963, 302.4(4) which prohibits piecemeal or selective introduction. That is beside the point here. At the very least there should have been an attempt on the part of the defendants to get a modification of the pretrial ruling instead of waiting until the time came to introduce the deposition at trial. The laying back placed plaintiffs’ attorneys on the horns of a dilemma. They either had to forego the entire video tape deposition which, besides being expensive, may have been critical to their presentation of damages or be forced to allow the exposure of the criminal sexual misconduct, which may have been devastating to some of the jurors. In any event I find the prejudicial effect of the evidence far outweighed its probative value and I believe further that plaintiffs counsel were justified in relying on the pretrial ruling and expecting that evidence to be excluded.
*388The only other issues I address have to do with the expert witnesses. The majority in issue 8 condones disallowing the model valve because it was mounted on a board, not on a forklift. I think that’s ridiculous on the face of it and consider that the trial judge extracted too stringent a requirement that the model be an exact duplicate of the entire vehicle. This is tantamount to requiring the introduction of a whole automobile to prove a hydraulic valve defective. I think the court abused its discretion in excluding the model valve and in excluding the testimony of the out-of-court experiments.
In issue 12 likewise I believe the majority came to the wrong conclusion. Each party’s principal expert came to court with a safety device model to use for demonstration purposes. The plaintiffs’ expert’s model had a tendency to stick. The defendant’s expert’s device operated smoothly. During the plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony he was allowed to disassemble defendant’s device and upon doing so he discovered in the presence of the jury that the model brought to court by the defense contained a longer spring that the spring specified in the manufacturer’s list of components. How this occurred was suggested to be by design change which took effect about six months after plaintiffs’ accident. Defendants had placed the device in evidence as exhibit three. I believe the trial court erred reversibly in foreclosing the plaintiff and his expert from thoroughly explaining the differences between the device prepared pursuant to the specifications in effect at the time of plaintiff’s accident and the smoothly operating device brought into court by the defendant and/or its expert. The jury apparently later confused this safety device spring with an inching spring and directed a question to *389the court shortly after retiring to deliberate. The net effect of the ruling was that the defendant’s false model, a telling weapon indeed, was subtracted from the plaintiffs’ rebuttal arsenal, which gave a totally false complexion to what should have been a crucial blow to the defense. Whether this single specification of error should result in reversal to both defendants or only to the manufacturer I do not choose to address in dissent as it would only unnecessarily add to the volume of unavailing literature (my dissents).
I would reverse.