(concurring specially).
I agree with the court majority that the writ should be sustained but I disagree as to the extent of the judiciary’s “inherent power” to spend or commit public funds without authorization or delegation of authority by the legislature. The legislative branch cannot execute the laws or judge, and the executive branch cannot legislate or judge. I think the judicial branch should take especial care not to legislate or execute the laws. All of the three branches in their respective spheres are equal in power, and none can exercise the powers of the other branches. The Iowa Constitution states in § 1 of Article III (Of the Distribution of Powers):
The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments- — the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
While Iowa appears to the present time to have been practically free from judicial orders which impinge on legislative powers, the citations by the court majority show that such orders have been made elsewhere. I think this court should in strong language forestall any such trend here except in the very narrow area in which by default in appropriating the legislative branch brings the courts to a halt or is about to bring them to a halt — assuming such an unlikely contingency should occur.
I. The power to appropriate or commit public funds, and the power to tax, are handmaidens. For responsibility in government, the same individuals who appropriate and commit funds are the ones who levy the taxes to provide the funds. They are the elective members of the legislative branch who must regularly confront opposing candidates on the ballot before the taxpayers. The powers to spend and to tax, both at the state and the local levels, are legislative and not judicial in character. Morgan County Comm’n v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So.2d 830; Opinion to the Governor, 239 So.2d 1 (Fla.); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 308 P.2d 537; Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky.); Carso v. Board of Liquidation of State Debt, 205 La. 368, 17 So.2d 358; Board of Supervisors of George County v. Bailey, 236 So.2d 420 (Miss.); State ex rel. Judges for 22nd Judicial Circuit v. City of St. Louis, 494 S.W.2d 39 (Mo.); Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.); Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120; Board of Education of Wyoming County v. Board of Public Works, 144 W.Va. 593, 109 S.E.2d 552.
In Iowa, legislative power is conferred by the constitution on the general assembly. The constitution states in § 1 of Article III (Legislative Department): “The Legislative authority of this State shall be vested in a General Assembly . . . .” The basic principle of appropriation as a legislative function is emphasized by § 24 of the same Article, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law,” and by a clause in § 31, “[N]or, shall any money be paid on any claim, the subject matter of which shall not have been provided for by pre-existing laws . .” In various statutes the general assembly has delegated the twin legislative powers of appropriation and taxation to such local bodies as county supervisors, city councils, and school boards. In this case we have supervisors. See Code 1977, §§ 332.-3(10), 341.1, 344.10.
How then can courts have power to appropriate or commit public funds? The claim is, “inherent” power. What are the powers of the judicial branch?
II. Section 1 of Article V of the Iowa Constitution contains the grant of power to the courts. Without defining “judicial power”, § 1 simply states, “The Judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, District Courts, and such other Courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, as the General Assembly may, from time to time, establish.”
To me, the words “inherent power” do not indicate some mysterious authority *879placing the judiciary above the separation of powers. Section 1 of Article V gives the courts only judicial power. Hence the inherent powers the courts have must merely be the components of the judicial power the courts possess. Thus the power to adjudicate “inheres” in judicial power; it is an “inherent power” of courts. In like manner courts possess inherent powers to adopt rules for the management of their cases, Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa), to issue writs of prohibition, Pottawattamie County Dep’t of Social Services v. Landau, 210 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa), and to license and discipline their own officers. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Bromwell, 221 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa). All of these are essentially judicial functions.
But the powers to appropriate and to tax do not inhere in judicial power; they inhere in legislative power, possessed by the general assembly. They are inherent powers of the general assembly.
III. Our decisions reveal however that a court can commit the public treasury in a very narrow area without violating the separation of powers: when a court cannot function due to default of the appropriating branch. White v. Polk County, 17 Iowa 413; Seaton v. Polk County, 59 Iowa 626, 13 N.W. 725; State v. Tyler, 122 Iowa 125, 97 N.W. 983. Legislative officials cannot halt the operation of the courts by default in appropriating, for Article Y of the constitution contemplates we shall have ongoing courts. For appropriating officials by inaction to compel the courts to shut down would itself be unconstitutional — a violation of Article V.
If the supervisors of a county thus razed an old courthouse in the process of constructing a new one without providing any facility in which the courts could operate, I have no doubt that the judges could commit the public treasury for temporary courtroom space. In so doing, however, the judges would not exercise legislative power; they would carry out the mandate of Article V of the constitution that we shall have an operating judicial system. They would thus fulfill a judicial function under Article V, rather than perform a legislative function. If the general assembly should correspondingly fail to provide any facility within which the governor could operate, I have no doubt he could temporarily commit the state treasury for space. In so doing he would carry out Article IV for an ongoing executive, and thus perform an executive function. That would be an inherent executive power.
IV. The cases which actually arise, however, are not of that kind. State and local appropriating authorities normally provide at least essential facilities, equipment, salaries, and personnel for the courts. Cases from other jurisdictions demonstrate that the conflict arises when the appropriating authorities and the judges disagree on how much the judicial branch shall have — -how much in salaries, equipment, facilities, personnel. The judges contend that they could be more efficient, do a better job, and dispose of additional work if they had more funds than the appropriating authorities are willing to raise by taxes or take from other public agencies — such as funds for more court reporters (Rappaport v. Payne, 139 Cal.App. 772, 35 P.2d 183), for higher probation officer salaries (Deddens v. Cochise County, 113 Ariz. 75, 546 P.2d 811), for better furnishings for chambers (State v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689), or for cooler facilities by use of air conditioners (State v. County Court of Kenosha County, 11 Wis.2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876).
If the courts can function but the dispute is over the extent of the salaries, equipment, facilities, and personnel which are to be provided, I come down on the side of the appropriating authorities. A main purpose of having a general assembly and corresponding local bodies is to provide officials to make the choices on how much shall be spent for what and to divide up revenues among public agencies accordingly — and also to levy taxes as necessary. If the judges inject themselves into this budgetary process they enter the legislative arena. Their role in the process is to present their needs to appropriating authorities as the executive branch does, not to overrule ap*880propriating authorities. If judges can overrule appropriating authorities in the name of greater efficiency or better operations, why cannot the governor do likewise?
In sum, the ultimate decision on how much and in what way public funds are to be spent is for the people, and they voice their views through their elected officials in the legislative branch at the state and local levels. I would thus prohibit judges from spending or committing public funds not legislatively authorized except in the narrow area in which, through default by the appropriating officials, a court cannot perform its functions.
Since the Webster County District Court can function without the investigator the supervisors refused to authorize, I concur in sustaining the writ.
LeGRAND and REES, JJ., concur in this special concurrence.