(concurring). I concur with *142the result reached by my colleague Justice Fitzgerald.
In Gerzeski v Department of State Highways (decided today 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 [1978]), this Court was asked to delineate the perimeters of the judicially created "nuisance” exception to governmental immunity.
In that case, my opinion stated that when a nuisance in fact is alleged, whether or not the particular thing or act creates a nuisance is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. If the trier of fact finds the existence of a nuisance in fact, the trier of fact must then determine whether the nuisance in fact was created negligently or intentionally. When the trier of fact determines that the alleged nuisance was intentional, governmental immunity is not a bar.
In order to find an intentional nuisance, the trier of fact must decide based upon the evidence presented that the governmental agency intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance. This finding comports with the definition of intentional nuisance set forth in Denny v Garavaglia, 333 Mich 317, 331; 52 NW2d 521 (1952):
"A second [type of nuisance] includes nuisances which are intentional, using that word as meaning not that a wrong or the existence of a nuisance was intended but that the creator of them intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance.”
Therefore, in the present case, if the plaintiff pled an intentional nuisance claim, the trial court’s summary judgment for the City of Lansing on governmental immunity grounds must be reversed.
*143Plaintiffs complaint against the governmental agency alleged the following:
"That the City of Lansing, its agents, servants, or employees, knew or should have known that there was no top on said drain and that said open drain constituted an inherently dangerous condition, but that the City of Lansing neglected, failed and refused to place any top on said drain, failed to provide any barricades around said open drain, or to provide any warning or take any steps whatsoever to remove, repair, or eliminate this inherently dangerous condition.” (Emphasis added.)
The terms "neglected” and "failed” allege negligent activity. However, liberally construed,1 the underscored language pleads more than negligence on the part of the City of Lansing. The word "refused” denotes more than a "want of care in maintenance” or neglect. In this context, "refused” describes an alleged deliberate act by the governmental agency to create the complained-of condition.2
*144Accordingly, plaintiffs pleadings allege conduct which, if established by proofs, could conceivably result in a trier of fact determination that the City of Lansing intentionally brought about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance. Therefore, the summary judgment should be reversed and the plaintiff given the opportunity to present proofs establishing a prima facie case of intentional nuisance.
Williams, J., concurred with Blair Moody, Jr., J.Lahar v Barnes, 353 Mich 408; 91 NW2d 261 (1958). See Rose v Wertheimer, 11 Mich App 401, 405; 161 NW2d 406 (1968), where the Court of Appeals stated:
"[T]he rules and practice of pleading have been liberalized greatly pursuant to the equitable consideration that a person should be allowed his day in court if it appears reasonably certain that his pleadings set forth a justiciable question and that, taken in their entirety, they are reasonably adapted to inform the adverse party of the cause which he is called upon to contest.”
In discussing conduct that may result in nuisance liability, William Prosser made the following differentiations between intentional nuisances and negligent nuisances:
"Occasionally [intentional nuisances] proceed from a malicious desire to do harm for its own sake; but more often they are intentional merely in the sense that the defendant has created or continued the condition causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the harm to the plaintiff’s interests is substantially certain to follow.
"[A] nuisance may also result from conduct which is merely negligent, where there is no intent to interfere in any way with the *144plaintiff, but merely a failure to take precautions against a risk apparent to a reasonable man. * * * In particular, negligence is the usual basis of liability where the defendant is doing something authorized by the legislature, or, without knowledge that anything is wrong, he has merely failed to inspect and repair his premises, or he has only failed to discover or to repair or abate a condition which he has not created, but which is under his control.” (Emphasis added.) Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 87, pp 574-575.