(concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted leave to appeal in this case to decide whether the Civil Rights Act1 provides the spouse of a person subjected to discrimination with a remedy for loss of consortium, and to decide whether that act allows recovery of exemplary damages.2 We would answer both questions in the negative.
i
Plaintiff Valerie Eide was employed as an inspector in the Milford, Michigan, plant of the defendant, Kelsey-Hayes Company, from January, 1972, until April 10, 1980, when she walked out of the plant. Thereafter, she and her husband, Craig Eide, filed this employment discrimination suit, alleging that she had been sexually harassed during the course of her employment in violation of the Civil Rights Act. The amended complaint alleged that Mrs. Eide suffered severe physical and mental injuries as well as economic losses as a result of sexual harassment.3_
*40In the same complaint, Mr. Eide set forth a derivative claim alleging that
[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices causing the resulting injuries to Plaintiff, Valerie A. Eide, her husband, Plaintiff, Craig A. Eide, has suffered a loss of consortium since the beginning of the sexual harassment and discriminatory practices against his wife ....
At trial, over objection by defendant, the court instructed the jury regarding the availability to Mr. Eide of damages for loss of consortium.4 The court also instructed the jury on the availability to Mrs. Eide of both (1) compensatory damages for "mental anguish, fright and shock, . . . embarrassment, humiliation or mortification . . . the increase in her physical and emotional distress . . .” and (2) exemplary damages for "added injury to her feelings” resulting from alleged egregious conduct on the part of the defendant.
The jury awarded Mrs. Eide $240,000 in compen*41satory damages and $32,000 in exemplary damages. Mr. Eide was awarded $28,000 for loss of consortium. Thereafter, the trial court’s judgment on the verdict was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 154 Mich App 142; 397 NW2d 532 (1986).
n
We first address the issue whether a cause of action for loss of consortium is available under the Civil Rights Act to the spouse of a person subjected to discrimination.
A similar question was before this Court in Boscaglia v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 420 Mich 308; 362 NW2d 642 (1984). In that case, an employee complained of employment discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment Practices Act (fepa),5 and his wife joined in the action seeking damages for loss of consortium. This Court determined that although the fepa made available, for the first time, a remedy to an employee claiming employment discrimination, "[t]he statute did not . . . provide a remedy to the employee’s spouse for loss of consortium or injury to the marital relationship.” Id., p 322.
Undergirding the Court’s reasoning in Boscaglia was recognition that
"prior to the passing of [the fepa] in 1955, there was in Michigan no recognized legal remedy for acts of discrimination ... in private employment.” Pompey v General Motors Corp, [385 Mich 537, 552; 189 NW2d 243 (1971)]. The common law did not provide a remedy either to an employee who claimed to be a victim of employment discrimination or to an employee’s spouse who claimed to have suffered injury to the marital relationship as *42a result of the discrimination against the employee. [Boscaglia, supra, p 321.][6]
This Court observed that
"the question whether a statute creates a private right of action is ultimately 'one of [legislative] intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that [the Legislature] enacted into law ....’” [Universities Research Ass’n, Inc v Coutu, 450 US 754, 770; 101 S Ct 1451; 67 L Ed 2d 662 (1981) (quoting Touche Ross & Co v Redington, 442 US 560, 578; 99 S Ct 2479; 61 L Ed 2d 82 [1979]). Boscaglia, supra, pp 317-318.]
After examining the language and history of the fepa, the unanimous Boscaglia Court concluded that the fepa did not provide a derivative cause of action for an employee’s spouse.6 7 The Court said:
*43The question once again is one of legislative intent. Absent a legislative intent to provide such a derivative cause of action, the spouse of a person subjected to discrimination does not have a right of recovery. [Id., p 324.]
This Court’s holding in Boscaglia was limited to the provisions of the fepa, and we expressly reserved judgment as to whether an employee’s spouse might maintain an action for loss of consortium under the Civil Rights Act. Id., p 324, n 23. Accordingly, we look now to the language and history of the Civil Rights Act to see how it differs from the fepa.
Enacted by the Michigan Legislature in 1976, the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, national origin, religion, height, weight, or marital status in employment, housing, use of public accommodations, public service, and educational facilities. Broader in scope, it repealed and replaced the fepa, which was limited in its application to discrimination in private employment.8
In reaching the conclusion that an employee’s spouse could not maintain an action under the fepa for loss of consortium, the Boscaglia Court focused on the remedies section of the fepa which in relevant part provided:
Any individual claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice may . . . make, sign and file with the board ... a verified complaint in writing .... [MCL 423.307(b); *44MSA 17.458(7)Gt>). Emphasis supplied.]
This Court held that an employee’s spouse was not a person "aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute. Boscaglia, supra, p 322.
Corresponding language in the remedies section of the Civil Rights Act provides:
A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both. [MCL 37.2801(1); MSA 3.548(801)(1). Emphasis supplied.]
As this Court has said, "[statutory analysis necessarily begins with the wording of the statute itself.” Carr v General Motors Corp, 425 Mich 313, 317; 389 NW2d 686 (1986). The phrase "a violation of this act” plainly refers to a violation of an individual’s civil rights as defined in the Civil Rights Act. Insofar as employment discrimination is concerned, the act makes clear that
[t]he opportunity to obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized and declared to be a civil right.[9] [MCL 37.2102(1); MSA 3.548(102)(1). Emphasis supplied.]
As we read the act, this civil right is conferred upon two groups of individuals: (1) employees, and (2) applicants for employment:
(1) An employer shall not:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire, or recruit, or discharge, *45or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.
(b) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a way which deprives or tends to deprive employee or applicant of an employment opportunity, or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee or applicant because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.
(c) Segregate, classify, or otherwise discriminate against a person on the basis of sex with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment, including a beneñt plan or system. [MCL 37.2202; MSA 3.548(202). Emphasis supplied.]
Significantly, the only conduct addressed by this controlling portion of the act is conduct "with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment,” which directly affects employees or applicants for employment. This Court has stated that "[w]here a statute creates and regulates, . . . and names the parties granted [the] right to invoke its provisions . . ., such parties only may act.” Taylor v Public Utilities Comm, 217 Mich 400, 403; 186 NW 485 (1922).
Further, our review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act indicates that there were two principal purposes behind its enactment, neither of which lends support to plaintiffs’ contention that the Legislature intended to create a new derivative cause of action for the spouse of an employee who complains of employment discrimination. First, the history makes plain that it was the Legislature’s purpose to "codify protection against discrimination in the areas of employment, *46housing, education and public accommodations.”10 (Emphasis supplied.) Prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act, there were four separate statutes which dealt with civil rights protection in the several areas mentioned.
The codification purpose was served by a change in the wording of the remedies section from the phrase "[a]ny individual claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice” (emphasis supplied) in the fepa to "[a] person alleging a violation of this act” in the Civil Rights Act. Thus, the remedies section of the act was not limited to employment discrimination actions. We do not read this change as creating a new cause of action for Mr. Eide. The act requires that the person filing a complaint must be the "person alleging a violation of this act.” MCL 37.2801(1); MSA 3.548(801)(1). There is no indication in the act that a person alleging a violation of the act *47might be anyone other than a person whose rights have been violated.
Mr. Eide does not claim that he is the victim of discrimination. His civil rights were not violated, and, since he makes no such claim, we conclude that he is not "a person alleging a violation” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.
A second purpose behind the Civil Rights Act, as revealed by its legislative history, was to provide by statute for an alternate, equal forum in the circuit courts for individuals otherwise entitled to file a complaint with the Civil Rights Commission.11 Contrary to the position urged by plaintiffs, the legislative history reflects no intention on the part of the Legislature to expand the class of protected persons. An analysis provided by the House Legislative Analysis Section explained the purpose of the "direct access” provision:
The bill would also outline more specifically the legal action a person could take if that person feels that he or she has been unfairly discriminated against, and would provide stricter penalties for violation of the Act. [House Legislative Analysis, First Analysis, HB 4055, April 9, 1976, p 1; House Legislative Analysis, Second Analysis, HB 4055 (as enrolled), December 30, 1976, p 1. Emphasis added.]
Obviously, the focus of the act plainly rests on persons who bring discrimination actions in their own right.
It is argued on behalf of plaintiffs that a statutory basis is not required to bring a derivative action for loss of consortium because this claim *48existed at common law and continues to be available unless abrogated by the constitution or statute.
However, plaintiffs rely on cases where the action for loss of consortium was derivative to recognized common-law claims. As discussed in Pompey v General Motors Corp, supra, 385 Mich 552, prior to the enactment of the pepa, employment discrimination was not a recognized common-law tort in Michigan.12 The common law did not provide a remedy either to an employee who claimed to be a victim of discrimination or to an employee’s spouse for loss of consortium as a result of the discrimination. Boscaglia v Michigan Bell, supra, 420 Mich 321.
We therefore find inapposite plaintiffs’ citation of Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502, 507; 309 NW2d 163 (1981), for the proposition that "statutes which abolish the common law should be construed narrowly.” Rusinek involved the recovery of damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium as a result of an automobile accident. Such actions were recognized under Michigan tort law prior to the enactment of the no-fault statute. Cf. Cotton v Minter, 469 F Supp 199 (ED Mich, 1979); Warner v Brigham, 90 Mich App 640; 282 NW2d 428 (1979) (involving claims under the no-fault statute). Here, by recognizing only those actions allowed under the Civil Rights Act, this Court would not abolish any loss of consortium claim as it existed at common law.13
*49While it is true that a derivative14 claim for loss of consortium has been recognized in connection with various other common-law causes of action, Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33, 49; 101 NW2d 227 (1960), we do not regard that to be a basis for judicial expansion of the terms of the Civil Rights Act, which is wholly a creature of the Legislature. Such expansion would ignore the reasoning of Boscaglia and its holding that
[ajbsent a legislative intent to provide such a derivative cause of action, the spouse of a person subjected to discrimination does not have a right of recovery. [Boscaglia, supra, p 324.]
Having declined in Boscaglia to go beyond the terms of the fepa, we would take the same approach with respect to the Civil Rights Act.15
Accordingly, we conclude that the Civil Rights *50Act does not provide a remedy on the basis of loss of consortium for the spouse of an individual who claims to be the subject of discrimination.16
hi
Next, we turn to the question whether exemplary damages were properly awarded to Mrs. Eide. As already noted, in addition to $240,000 in compensatory damages, the jury’s verdict included an award to Mrs. Eide of $32,000 in exemplary damages.17_
*51In the early Michigan decisions, there was authority for assessing exemplary or punitive damages in a civil proceeding for the purpose of punishing a defendant for egregious conduct. However, in 1884 Justice Cooley wrote two opinions which sharply altered the course of Michigan jurisprudence in this area.18 Since then, Michigan has been among a minority of jurisdictions which adhere to the rule that exemplary damages may not be awarded to punish. They are available, if at all, only as an element of compensatory damages.
In Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280, 284; 18 NW 815 (1884), Justice Cooley wrote:
[I]t is manifestly proper that the jury should estimate the damages with the aggravating circumstances in mind, and that they should endeavor fairly to compensate the plaintiff for the wrong he has suffered. But in all cases it is to be distinctly borne in mind that compensation to the plaintiff is the purpose in view, and any instruction which is calculated to lead them to suppose that besides compensating the plaintiff they may punish the defendant is erroneous. [Emphasis supplied.]
The continuing viability of this principle was recognized in Kewin v Massachusetts Mutual Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 419; 295 NW2d 50 (1980):
In Michigan, exemplary damages are recoverable as compensation to the plaintiff, not as punishment of the defendant. [Citations omitted.] Our *52review of the precedent indicates that those cases which permit recovery of exemplary damages as an element of damages involve tortious conduct on the part of the defendant. [Citations omitted.] An award of exemplary damages is considered proper if it compensates a plaintiff for the "humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity” resulting from injuries "maliciously, wilfully and wantonly” inflicted by the defendant. McFadden [v Tate, 350 Mich 84, 89; 85 NW2d 181 (1957)]. The theory of these cases is that the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct both intensifies the injury and justifies the award of exemplary damages as compensation for the harm done the plaintiff’s feelings. [Emphasis supplied.][19]
However, in 1982, this Court ruled that exemplary damages for mental distress are not separately recoverable as "exemplary” damages where a plaintiff is fully compensated for mental distress through the award of actual or "compensatory” damages. In Veselenak v Smith, 414 Mich 567, 573-574; 327 NW2d 261 (1982), this Court concluded that an earlier justification for separately awarding exemplary damages for mental distress no longer exists;
A close reading of the early exemplary damages cases also suggests that these unusual damages may have been used to supply a remedy for mental injury not otherwise recognized. Actual damages compensated for economic loss, but not for non-economic loss. In addition, the award of actual damages seemed to preclude the award of additional compensation for non-economic loss. Warren *53v Cole, 15 Mich 265 (1867); Hyatt v Adams, 16 Mich 180 (1867). Assuming actual damages were not provable but mental injury certain, exemplary damages became available to compensate the injured party. Fay v Swan, 44 Mich 544; 7 NW 215 (1880).
As proof of actual damages is no longer a bar to the award of exemplary damages, so too actual damages, where properly pled, now include compensation for shame, mortiñcation, mental pain and anxiety, Beath v Rapid R Co, 119 Mich 512; 78 NW 537 (1899), and for annoyance, discomfiture, and humiliation, Grenawalt v Nyhuis, 335 Mich 76; 55 NW2d 736 (1952). In short, actual damages now include compensation for mental distress and anguish. [Emphasis supplied.]
In Veselenak, supra, p 576, we also said:
Amicus curiae . . . contends that ordinary damages and exemplary damages are not redundant. It maintains that a distinction may be drawn between "mental distress intrinsic to the injury itself (no matter how it occurred) and mental distress emanating from the manner in which the injury occurred.” In addition, it claims that ordinary damages for shame and mortification and exemplary damages for humiliation and indignity are compensating "distinct wrongs.”
These distinctions are, at least, legally unsound. Semantic niceties aside, juries are not asked to differentiate between mental states, such as shame, mortification, humiliation and indignity. Juries are asked to compensate mental distress and anguish, which flows naturally from the alleged misconduct and may be described in such terms as shame, mortification, humiliation and indignity. In addition, if the plaintiff is being compensated for all mental distress and anguish, it matters not whether the source of the mental distress and anguish is the injury itself or the way *54in which the injury occurred. [Emphasis supplied.][20]
Following Veselenak, this Court has further stated:
When compensatory damages can make the injured party whole, this Court has denied exemplary damages. [Hayes-Albion Corp v Kuberski, 421 Mich 170, 187; 364 NW2d 609 (1984).]
Notwithstanding the reasoning in Veselenak, we have recognized a distinction where the cause of action is statutorily based and where the statute expressly provides for exemplary damages. In Peisner v Detroit Free Press, 421 Mich 125, 135, n 10; 364 NW2d 600 (1984), a libel case, this Court said:
In the absence of a legislative prescription for exemplary damages, we held in Veselenak that compensatory-type exemplary damages are merely a component of actual damages attributable to defendant’s conduct and hence should not be separately awarded.
In the libel context, by contrast, the Legislature has provided separately for actual damages for injury to feelings and "exemplary and punitive” damages. In keeping with the reasoning applied in Veselenak, we define exemplary and punitive damages in this context to be a component of compensatory damages awardable only where defendant’s conduct amounts to common-law malice. [Emphasis supplied.]_
*55Unlike § 2911(2) of the libel statute, MCL 600.2911(2); MSA 27A.2911(2), the Civil Rights Act includes no express "legislative prescription” for exemplary damages. The remedies section of the Civil Rights Act in relevant part provides:
A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both.
As used in subsection (1), "damages” means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney’s fees. [MCL 37.2801; MSA 3.548(801).]
Clearly, there is no express provision in the Civil Rights Act for exemplary damages. Further, our review of its legislative history reveals no basis for inferring a legislative intent to provide such an unusual remedy.
It is noteworthy that the Legislature in fashioning other statutes has not hesitated, where it intended such a result, to include words expressly providing for exemplary damages. For example, exemplary damages are expressly made available in the following statutes: MCL 295.127; MSA 12.1377 (Weather Modification Control Act); MCL 408.488; MSA 17.277(18) (wage violation); MCL 600.2911; MSA 27A.2911 (libel or slander); MCL 750.539h; MSA 28.807(8) (eavesdropping, allowing for punitive damages).21
A comparison of the language used in the Civil Rights Act with the language employed in the remedies section for the Weather Modification *56Control Act, MCL 295.127; MSA 12.1377, is revealing. The latter statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person alleging a violation of this act or a rule promulgated pursuant to this act, may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, and may bring an action for exemplary damages of not more than $500.00.
(3) As used in subsection (1), "damages” means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney’s fees. [Emphasis supplied.]
The specific provision for exemplary damages in the language of the Weather Modification Control Act stands in sharp contrast with § 801 of the Civil Rights Act, particularly in light of the fact that the definition of "damages” is identical in both statutes. Obviously if the Legislature had determined that exemplary damages should be available in civil rights actions, it could easily have found the words to say so.22
Having found no basis in the statute for a separate award of exemplary damages,23 we would follow this Court’s decision in Veselenak, supra, and would hold that the jury was erroneously instructed in the instant case to award Mrs. Eide *57damages on the basis of mental distress as both actual and exemplary damages.
We are not unmindful that good reasons can be summoned to justify recovery of exemplary damages by victims of sexual discrimination or harassment. Judge Feikens made a valid point in Freeman v Kelvinator, Inc, 469 F Supp 999, 1004 (ED Mich, 1979), when he wrote that "[a]s anyone who has been the victim of discrimination can attest, the wounds run deeper than the pocketbook.” Nevertheless, we are mindful also that the Legislature may have good reasons for omitting from the statute any specific reference to exemplary damages. In the final analysis, whether exemplary damages should be allowed is essentially a policy question, and particularly where, as in this case, the underlying cause of action is a legislative product, we deem it appropriate to leave such a policy determination to the Legislature. See Davidson v Secretary of State, 351 Mich 4, 8; 87 NW2d 131 (1957); French v Ingham Co, 342 Mich 690, 700; 71 NW2d 244 (1955).
IV
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed with respect to the award to Mr. Eide of damages for loss of consortium and with respect to the award to Mrs. Eide of exemplary damages.
Riley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Griffin, J.1976 PA 453, as amended by 1977 PA 162, 1979 PA 91, and 1982 PA 45, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq.
This Court’s order granting leave to appeal specifically limited our review to the following issues:
(1) whether the Civil Rights Act provides a remedy based on loss of consortium, and (2) whether the Civil Rights Act allows recovery of exemplary damages. [428 Mich 873 (1987).]
The Civil Rights Act provides that an employer shall not:
Fail or refuse to hire, or recruit, or discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, *40compensation or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of . . . sex .... [MCL 37.2202(l)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(l)(a).]
The act further provides:
Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment which means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature when:
(iii) Such conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment . . . environment. [MCL 37.2103(h); MSA 3.548(103)(h).]
For a definition of "consortium,” see Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33, 35-36; 101 NW2d 227 (1960).
1955 PA 251, MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458(1) et seq.
In St John v General Motors Corp, 308 Mich 333; 13 NW2d 840 (1944), this Court did allow recovery of damages in a civil action on the basis of a violation of a penal statute which prohibited discrimination as between the sexes in the payment of wages.
Declining to expand the common law to create a parent’s action in tort for loss of a child’s society and companionship, this Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Riley, recently said:
The consortium action is somewhat of an anomaly in the law of tort in that it is generally the rule that a negligent tortfeasor’s liability only extends to an obligation to compensate the person directly injured. Although it is eminently foreseeable that a negligent injury to one party will result in adverse consequences that affect others to one degree or another, the law cannot redress every injury, and the determination of where to draw the line of liability is essentially a question of policy.
Foreseeability of injury alone does not mandate recognition of a cause of action. Social policy must intervene at some point to limit the extent of one’s liability.
[T]he determination of whether this state should further extend a negligent tortfeasor’s liability for consortium damages *43should be deferred to legislative action rather than being resolved by judicial fiat. [Sizemore v Smock, 430 Mich 283, 292-293, 299; 422 NW2d 666 (1988).]
In 1965, the fepa was amended to prohibit discrimination in employment on account of age, 1965 PA 344, and, in 1966, to prohibit discrimination on account of sex, 1966 PA 349.
By definition the term "discrimination because of sex” includes sexual harassment. See n 3.
Department of Labor Analysis, HB 4055, April 5, 1976:
1. What is the purpose of the bill?
The purpose of the bill is to codify protection against discrimination in the areas of employment, housing, education and public accommodations.
6. What are the arguments for and against the bill?
The bill would pull together the separate public acts that the Department of Civil Rights is currently operating under into one comprehensive act for administrative and management purposes.
The bill would clarify and coordinate remedies for proven violations.
The bill would provide consistent jurisdictional coverages. Currently different categories have either partial or total protection within the four areas of employment, housing, education and public accommodations. The proposed legislation would provide for uniform jurisdiction for all categories. [Emphasis supplied.]
See also Department of Education Analysis, HB 4055, February 18, 1975, and Department of Labor Analysis, HB 4055, January 21, 1976.
The provision of direct access to the courts for a civil rights violation could also be viewed as codification since this Court had already recognized the right of direct access as a cumulative judicial remedy for an employer’s violation of the fepa. See Pompey v General Motors, 385 Mich 537; 189 NW2d 243 (1971).
There were early civil rights penal statutes which were interpreted to allow a cumulative civil rights action for an individual who suffered discrimination. See Pompey, supra, 385 Mich 556.
The Kansas Court of Appeals has taken the same approach we do here: In Albertson v Travis, 2 Kan App 2d 153; 576 P2d 1090 (1978), the court held that since there was no common-law claim for loss of *49consortium and one was not created by the applicable state statute, the consortium action could not be recognized.
For other court decisions which have not allowed derivative loss of consortium claims in discrimination actions, see: Hart v Sullivan, 84 AD2d 865; 445 NYS2d 40 (1981), aff'd 55 NY2d 1011; 449 NYS2d 481; 434 NE2d 717 (1982); Long v American Int’l Adjustment Co, 40 EPD ¶ 36,289 (D Mass, 1986).
Although Michigan has treated loss of consortium claims as derivative, Rusinek, supra, other jurisdictions have taken the view that loss of consortium is an independent right belonging solely to the injured spouse. See Dickson, Loss of consortium: An independent or derivative cause of action?, 22 Trial 53 (Aug, 1986). 2 Speiser, Krause & Gans, The American Law of Torts, Damages, § 8:22, pp 581-582, discusses the view that the claim is derivative:
A claim of a deprived spouse for loss of consortium is usually considered to be derivative — but only in the sense that it does not arise at all unless the other — the impaired spouse — has sustained some kind of harm or injury that is legally compensable and is a valid main claim.
In interpreting title vn of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 USC 2000e-5(g), many federal courts have held that an employee’s spouse is not entitled to recover for loss of consortium. As the federal district court said in United States v Biloxi Municipal School Dist, 219 F Supp 691, 694 (SD Miss, 1963), aff'd 326 F2d 237 (CA 5, 1964), "[o]nly *50persons actually deprived of their individual civil rights can redress such rights.” See also Torres v Claytor, 25 FEP Cases 998 (SD Cal, 1978); Asklar v Honeywell, Inc, 95 FRD 419; 29 FEP Cases 1596 (D Conn, 1982). We recognize, however, that the title vn remedy has been construed by a number of courts as equitable in nature only.
In view of our holding, it is unnecessary to address the claim of amicus curiae that Mr. Eide lacks standing to sue under the act.
The trial court instructed the jury regarding actual or compensatory damages, including damages for "mental anguish,” as follows:
If you decide that the plaintiff, Valerie Eide is entitled to damages ....
include each of the following elements of damages which you decide has been sustained by the plaintiff to the present time. Physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, fright and shock, denial of social pleasure and enjoyment, embarrassment, humiliation or mortiñcation . . . the increase in her physical and emotional distress .... You should also include each of the following elements of damages which you decide plaintiff Valerie Eide is reasonably certain to sustain in the future:
Physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, denial of social pleasure and enjoyment, embarrassment, humiliation or mortiñcation, the increase in her physical and emotional distress .... [Emphasis supplied.]
Concerning exemplary damages, the court instructed the jury:
If you find that the conduct of the defendant Kelsey-Hayes Company was malicious and reckless [sic] disregard of Mrs. Eide’s rights, then you may award exemplary damages. Such damages represent the amount by which you may increase or augment any award of compensatory damages to Mrs. Eide. Amount of such damages if you find them, may be determined *51in accordance with the degree of wantonness or recklessness in the defendant’s misconduct or in accordance with the defendant’s motivation and/or to compensate the plaintiff for the added injury to her feelings as a result from egregious conduct of the defendant. [Emphasis supplied.]
Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280; 18 NW 815 (1884), and Watson v Watson, 53 Mich 168; 18 NW 605 (1884).
The rule in Michigan that exemplary damages must be an element of compensation, not punishment, has been criticized. See, e.g., Shecter, Exemplary damages — A new exemplar, 60 Mich B J 654 (1981), 2 Speiser, Krause & Gans, The American Law of Torts, § 8:45, p 801, and Wade, The Michigan Law of Damages, p 27-1.
Plaintiffs contend that Veselenak is inapplicable because it was limited to the negligence or malpractice context. On the contrary, the Court in Veselenak expressly stated it did not reach the issue stated in the grant of leave to appeal, which was "whether exemplary damages should be recoverable in a malpractice or negligence action.” Id., p 571. The Court noted that there was no dispute that exemplary damages, if available, would have to be based on intentional, malicious acts, rather than negligence. Id., p 575.
See 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), ch 53, pp 549-560, on the use of statutes on other subjects for interpretation. Cf. Citizens for Pretrial Justice v Goldfarb, 415 Mich 255; 327 NW2d 910 (1982).
We note that the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101; MSA 3.550(101), has been held to permit recovery of exemplary damages. Wardlow v Great Lakes Express Co, 128 Mich App 54, 70; 339 NW2d 670 (1983). The holding in Wardlow, however, was based on cases which held that the Civil Rights Act provides for exemplary damages. Ledsinger v Burmeister, 114 Mich App 12; 318 NW2d 558 (1982); Moll v Parkside Livonia Credit Union, 525 F Supp 786 (ED Mich, 1981); Freeman v Kelvinator, Inc, 469 F Supp 999 (ED Mich, 1979). Our holding in the instant case therefore disapproves of the reasoning in the cases relied on in Wardlow. Although this Court denied leave to appeal in Wardlow, 419 Mich 871 (1984), such a denial is “not to be regarded as precedent.” See MCR 7.321(4).
Cf. Freeman v Kelvinator, Inc, n 22 supra, 1004.