(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The plaintiffs petition for hearing before the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation does not claim benefits for a period prior to two years preceding the filing of the petition. It merely states that Mr. Howard sought "such relief as he is entitled to under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Law of Michigan.” There is no notice whatsoever of an intention to seek damages beyond the extent provided for by MCL 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381)(2):
[I]f any compensation is sought under this act, payment shall not be made for any period of time earlier than 2 years immediately preceding the date on which the employee filed an application for a hearing with the bureau.
Upon appeal to the wcab, the wcab held that the defendant lost its ability to rely on MCL 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381)(2) because, the issue had not been raised before the hearing referee:
By its failure to invoke the two-year-back rule of Section 381(2) before the trial court, defendant has waived the nonjurisdictional affirmative defense, akin to a statute of limitations. It cannot thus raise that issue for the first time before the appeal board.
Because the "complaint” — that is, the petition *389for hearing — gave no notice of an issue concerning benefits beyond the two-year limit of MCL 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381X2), there is no basis for finding waiver in this case. No responsive pleading under MCR 2.110(B) could be made to such an unstated claim. Since the hearing referee implicitly raised the two-year-back rule by the nature of the award of benefits, the first opportunity of the defendant to raise the two-year-back rule was before the wcab. In Kleinschrodt v General Motors Corp, 402 Mich 381; 263 NW2d 246 (1978), we held that failure to raise the one-year-back rule of MCL 418.833; MSA 17.237(833) before the appeal board resulted in a waiver. We did not hold that such a defense must be raised even before a plaintiff gives notice that benefits are sought for a period prior to two years preceding the filing of a petition. Such a requirement would make a mockery of the rules of civil procedure and possibly violate due process of law. Therefore, I concur with the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the remand to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.
Finally, while the one-year-back rule and the two-year-back rule bear some similarities, they are not identical. I would not decide issues related to the one-year-back rule in the instant case. Thus, I would disagree with the overruling of Kleinschrodt, supra.Williams, C.J., and Cavanagh, J., concurred with Boyle, J. Levin, J.
(separate opinion). I adhere to the view expressed in Kleinschrodt v General Motors Corp, 402 Mich 381; 263 NW2d 246 (1978), where this Court held that a workers’ compensation "back” rule is a defense that can be waived by nonassertion and is not jurisdictional.
*390While subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, there is no suggestion that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by plaintiff Harry Howard. Certain constitutional claims cannot be waived even by a plea of guilty.1 Those narrow exceptions apart,2 the concept of waiver as a result of nonassertion of right permeates the jurisprudence and is not limited to the defense of the statute of limitations.
In Kleinschrodt, supra, p 384, the Court spoke of the back rule as "akin to the statute of limitations.” The back rule is also "akin” to the right in a civil case to trial by jury and to the right of appellate review, both of which may be waived by failure timely to assert the right.
A failure timely to plead an affirmative defense, to file a motion to suppress evidence claimed to have been obtained in violation of constitutional rights, to make evidentiary objections, or to object to instructions, and many others are waived by nonassertion.
The rights that can be so waived are as important and positive in their verbal formulation as the back rule. The statutes of limitations generally provide, for example, that "[n]o person may bring or maintain any action”3 beyond the time limited.
A change in the Kleinschrodt rule would be inconsistent with the legislative objective of according greater finality to the decision of the trier of fact in workers’ compensation proceedings.4
*391We would affirm the Court of Appeals decision upholding the award of workers’ compensation benefits to the plaintiff.
Archer, J., concurred with Levin, J.See People v New, 427 Mich 482; 398 NW2d 358 (1986).
No doubt there are others that do not come readily to mind.
See, e.g., MCL 600.5801; MSA 27A.5801, MCL 600.5803; MSA 27A.5803, MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805, MCL 600.5807; MSA 27A.5807.
See Civil Service Comm v Dep’t of Labor, 424 Mich 571, 621; 384 NW2d 728 (1986).