¶ 30. (dissenting). Tyran Anderson asked the court to review this case to resolve a conflict between the court of appeals decision in State v. Hoffman, (No. 98-3101-CR, January 18, 2000) and the single-judge court of appeals decision here, both unpublished.
¶ 31. In Hoffman, the defendant signed a written waiver of trial by jury and the case proceeded to a bench trial. There was no colloquy with the defendant on the record before trial and no explicit expression of approval by the court or consent by the state. The court of appeals determined that the absence of an oral colloquy to determine whether the defendant was making a voluntary and knowing choice to give up his right to a jury trial made his waiver "constitutionally infirm." Moreover, the court ruled that the failure of the circuit *608court and district attorney to take affirmative action to approve or consent to the defendant's waiver violated Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1), citing Spiller v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 372, 182 N.W.2d 242 (1971). The remedy for these deficiencies, the court said, was a new trial, not a remand for a hearing, pursuant to Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 282, 267 N.W.2d 602 (1978); State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991); and State v. Moore, 97 Wis. 2d 669, 671, 294 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980).
¶ 32. In State v. Anderson, No. 00-1563-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000), Judge Ted Wedemeyer came to contrary conclusions on these issues, creating an intradistrict conflict for this court to resolve.
¶ 33. The majority opinion appears to strike a middle ground between the two decisions. Yet, in doing so, it opens the door to a substantial body of new and troublesome law. Because I agree with Judge Wedemeyer's reasoning and conclusions and disagree with the majority's decision to reverse his decision, I respectfully dissent.
rH
¶ 34. The Wisconsin Constitution provides for waiver of jury trial in Article I, Section 5: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law . . . but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law" (emphasis added).
¶ 35. The legislature prescribed the manner of waiving a jury trial in Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1). The statute reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, criminal cases shall be tried by a jury selected as prescribed in s. *609805.08, unless the defendant waives a jury in writing or by statement in open court... on the record, with the approval of the court and the consent of the state (emphasis added).
¶ 36. Section 972.02(1) dates back to 1970. § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969 (effective July 1, 1970). This section, in turn, was preceded by several earlier statutes, Wis. Stat. § 957.01 (1959), § 357.01 (1925), and § 4687 (1911), which contained similar language authorizing jury waivers in writing. Consequently, Wisconsin statutory law has approved jury waivers in writing for close to a century.
¶ 37. Any question whether Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) is linked to Article I, Section 5 was settled in Dascenzo v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 225, 132 N.W.2d 231 (1965). In a previous case, Jennings v. State, 134 Wis. 307, 114 N.W. 492 (1908), this court held that an accused could not waive the right to trial by jury in the absence of legislation providing for waiver. The court said: "If it is deemed good public policy to extend the privilege of waiving a jury in criminal cases, such policy should find expression in appropriate legislative action." Jennings, 134 Wis. at 310. Thereafter, the legislature passed a statute — identified in Dascenzo as Wis. Stat. § 957.01(2), the immediate predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) — that prescribed the manner of waiving a jury trial.
¶ 38. This court later interpreted the jury trial waiver statute to permit a defendant's attorney to waive a jury trial on behalf of a defendant, on the theory that the presence and silent acquiescence of the defendant demonstrated the attorney's authority and made the attorney's statement the defendant's own. Dascenzo, 26 Wis. 2d at 230; State ex rel. Derber v. Skaff, 22 Wis. 2d *610269, 274, 125 N.W.2d 561 (1964). But in 1978, the court overruled Derber and Dascenzo. In Krueger, the court said:
[W]e now overrule State ex rel. Derber v. Skaff and Dascenzo v. State insofar as they permit a trial court.. . to presume from a defendant's silence that a waiver of the jury trial made by counsel is an expression of the defendant's knowing and voluntary intent. Even if it is reasonable to assume that most defense attorneys will inform a client of the right and its meaning to the defendant, it seems wholly unreasonable to expect a defendant who does not understand these matters to contradict a waiver made by his attorney. We hold that the record must support, without the aid of these presumptions, the conclusion that the defendant in fact made a knowledgeable and voluntary choice.
[W]e further hold that henceforth a record demonstrating the defendant's willingness and intent to give up the right to be tried by a jury must be established before the waiver is accepted. We do not at this time adopt a formal procedure to be followed in making such a record.
Krueger, 84 Wis. 2d at 281-82 (citations omitted).
¶ 39. The court clarified the law in State v. Livingston. The Krueger decision had made no reference to Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1). Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 568. However, the Livingston court explained that the court's "reasoning underlying Krueger and the legislature's reasoning in enacting sec. 972.02(1), Stats., are coextensive in relevant part. That is, what was said in Krueger with regard to waiver of trial by jury is directly applicable to sec. 972.02(1)." Id.
¶ 40. The court then quoted with approval a passage from State v. Moore, 97 Wis. 2d at 671-72: "Our *611supreme court and our legislature . . . have taken a strict per se position; that is, waiver must be in writing or by oral statement in open court. We must abide by that rule." Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 569.
¶ 41. Summing up, the Livingston court said that any waiver of the defendant's right to trial by jury must be made by an affirmative act of the defendant:
The defendant must act personally ... The affirmative act by the defendant, in order to constitute a personal waiver, must be such as to comply with at least one of the specific means of effecting a waiver provided in sec. 972.02(1).... If the defendant waives the jury "in writing" under the statute when accepting the written waiver, the judge still should question the defendant as to the voluntariness and understanding of his action.
Id. at 569-70 (emphasis added).
¶ 42. The Livingston court described the best practice to follow in addition to compliance with the statute. Now the majority goes beyond the articulation and urging of the best practice to mandate a new rule that conflicts with the statute.
II
¶ 43. Conceivably, this court could have held that the United States Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution requires a colloquy between a defendant and the court before the defendant may waive the right to jury trial. However, such a conclusion would not have been well founded and would have been embarrassingly inconsistent with many previous court pronouncements. Thus, the court did not pursue that path.
¶ 44. Alternatively, the court could have reasoned that the statute was sufficiently ambiguous that adding new requirements for an effective waiver would not *612conflict with the statutory text. But that position would not have been tenable because the statutory language is clear.
¶ 45. Finally, the court could have tried to rely upon its superintending authority contained in Article VII, Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution. But this court's superintending authority over all courts is case specific, contemplating the use of supervisory writs and individual relief. It does not empower this court to rewrite statutes in individual cases to effect some judicial objective.1 The supreme court may modify or suspend a statute relating to pleading, practice, and procedure when the court promulgates a rule pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 751.12.2 But that procedure is entirely *613different from supplementing statutes with judicial mandates whenever the court thinks it can do a better job than the legislature.
¶ 46. Hence, the majority simply mandates a new rule without explaining its source of authority:
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right.... As noted previously, this court has held that "[t]he right to a trial by jury is one of the rights that is 'so fundamental to the concept of fair and impartial decision making, that their relinquishment must meet the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).'" [State v.] Resio, [148 Wis. 2d 687, 694, 436 N.W.2d 603 (1989)]. The waiver of a jury trial therefore must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Id. While Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) establishes the procedure for waiving the right to a jury trial, the statutory requirements are not sufficient to determine whether a defendant's waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Therefore, based on our recognition that a jury trial involves a fundamental right, we mandate the use of a personal colloquy in every case where a criminal defendant seeks to waive his or her right to a jury trial.
Majority op. at ¶ 23.
*614¶ 47. In this passage, the majority seeks to draw a sharp distinction between the procedure for making a waiver (waiver "in writing" or waiver "by statement in open court") and a requirement that the waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In the process, it disregards Article I, Section 5, and it renders Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) meaningless.
¶ 48. In this new regimen, there is no presumption that a written waiver or a waiver by statement in open court by the defendant is adequate. Standing alone, neither is deemed adequate. In fact, a waiver "in writing" and a waiver by "statement in open court" together are inadequate because, according to the majority, "we mandate the use of a personal colloquy in every case." Majority op. at ¶ 23.
¶ 49. This holding elevates ritual over common sense. It places past convictions in jeopardy, and it creates landmines for future cases.
¶ 50. First, as noted, the decision makes Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) irrelevant because compliance with the statute means absolutely nothing. This is contrary to our decision in Livingston and other cases.
¶ 51. Second, the decision appears to change the law with respect to knowing and voluntary waiver of a jury trial. In State v. Resio, 148 Wis. 2d 687, 691, 436 N.W.2d 603 (1989), the court reviewed a case in which there was a colloquy with the defendant in connection with his waiver of a jury trial, but the defendant was not made aware of the requirement that a verdict in a jury trial must be unanimous. The court affirmed the waiver, saying:
We agree with the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072 (1984), that a *615defendant's waiver of the right to a trial by jury is valid when he or she understands the basic "purpose and function" of a jury trial... .
. . . [T]he key feature of the right to a jury trial is that the defendant's case is tried before a group of twelve fellow citizens in the community rather than by a single state judicial official. When a defendant waives the right to a jury trial understanding that his or her guilt or innocence will be determined by a single judge rather than by a group of twelve lay persons, that waiver is valid and effective.
Id. at 695-96 (emphasis added). The emphasized language in Resio cannot be viewed as a correct statement of law after today's decision.
¶ 52. Third, the majority's new rule is at odds with recent precedent. For example, in State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 230, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998), the court held that Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to a jury of 12 persons in all criminal cases, striking down a state statute that mandated six-person juries in misdemeanor cases. The court reversed Hansford's conviction for obstructing an officer because he had timely filed a motion for a 12-person jury. But then in State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 26, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727, the court held that a defendant waived his right to a 12-person jury because both the defendant and his counsel failed to request a 12-person jury or to object to a six-person jury. They took no affirmative action; their silence constituted waiver. Was the Huebner decision incorrect?
¶ 53. In another case, State v. Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 594 N.W.2d 799 (1999), this court considered the question whether Wis. Stat. § 972.13(1) requires that a *616defendant expressly and personally articulate a plea of guilty or no contest on the record in open court in order for a judgment of conviction to be entered on the plea. The record in Burns was clear that the defendant was never directly asked the question: "How do you plead?" and that he never stated his plea to the charged offense on the record. Id. Nonetheless, the court affirmed his conviction because it concluded that the only inference possible from the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record was that the defendant intended to plead no contest. Id. at 764.
¶ 54. The court spoke of its concerns about pleas:
[T]his court has deep and continuing concerns about affirming a conviction based on a plea of guilty or no contest when the defendant has not expressly and personally articulated the plea on the record in open court. Pleading guilty or no contest is a serious event, a "serious and sobering occasion." By entering such pleas, defendants relieve the state of the heavy burden of proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. They also give up important constitutional rights [such as trial by jury] ... A defendant expressly and personally pleading guilty or no contest on the record in open court is the best way for a circuit court to assure itself that the defendant has personally made the decision to so plead.
Id. at 764-65. Nonetheless, the Burns court did not rely on ritualistic words. It looked to the totality of the facts and circumstances to determine the defendant's intent to plead.3
¶ 55. In Burns, the court spoke of the best practice for the circuit court in taking a plea:
*617Recognizing the circuit courts' responsibility to do justice and to manage caseloads efficiently, this court urges circuit courts to follow the usual and strongly ■ preferred practice of asking defendants directly and personally in open court and on the record how they plead to the charged offenses and of entering the pleas on the record.
Id. at 765. The court offered a similar admonition on jury waivers in Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 570, as previously discussed in this dissent.
¶ 56. There are sound policy reasons for plea colloquies and jury waiver colloquies on the record in open court. This court is authorized to utilize the rule-making procedures in Wis. Stat. § 751.12 to require these colloquies as a matter of statutory law. That is very different, however, from overriding the terms of a statute in judicial opinions whenever the court is moved to do so.
¶ 57. In my view, this court ought to follow Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) by giving a presumption of validity to a jury waiver "in writing" or a jury waiver "by statement in open court." I agree with the proposition that a colloquy to determine whether the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is desirable and should be encouraged. But a defendant who waives the right to trial by jury "in writing" or "by statement in open court" while benefiting from the assistance of counsel — and then has a bench trial — should be required to make a prima facie showing that his or her waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary before he or she is entitled to a hearing. The defendant should not be given an automatic new trial, as was afforded in Hoffman.
*618Ill
¶ 58. The totality of facts and circumstances in this case leaves no doubt that Tyran Anderson's waiver of a jury trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Hence, no additional hearing is required. The circuit court's findings should be affirmed.
¶ 59. Anderson was charged with disorderly conduct on December 9,1998, for an incident that occurred the previous November 18. The charge was later amended to battery. From Anderson's initial appearance on December 9,1998, to November 10,1999, when Anderson's case was tried to the court, Anderson appeared in court at least 11 times. He was always represented by counsel.
¶ 60. The record reveals that the presiding judicial officers mentioned jury trial repeatedly during these appearances. On January 26, 1999, Anderson's attorney requested a jury trial date. The court scheduled jury trials for March 25, 1999, then June 23, 1999, then September 16, 1999, but all had to be rescheduled for various reasons, with discussion and explanation in the presence of the defendant.
¶ 61. On October 13, 1999, Circuit Judge Mary Kuhnmuench scheduled a jury trial for November 10, 1999. The court engaged in an extensive colloquy with the defendant. The following passages are part of that colloquy:
THE DEFENDANT: I am sorry the Court has to deal with something like this, even though it is fictitious... . I intend going to trial with it. Even if the case was reissued as a battery, I still intend on going on with the case to prove my innocence.... I haven't gathered everything I need yet. The conflicting statements that [the complainant] made in my revocation hearing, *619conflicting statements that she made on the police report, on the victim/witness report, and things like that.
I intend on pursuing this case to the full extent, battery, disorderly or whatever....
THE COURT: All right. We will give you a jury trial date, and Mr. Connors remains as your attorney of record and will represent you in this matter at jury....
. . . [Y]ou are to have absolutely no contact with [the complainant]... until this case is resolved through either a jury trial or with a guilty or not guilty verdict.
... If you violate that, don't come back to me and say, "I didn't understand what you meant, Judge." You seem to be an articulate and intelligent man. You understand fully what I am saying to you here....
THE DEFENDANT: No contact will be made.
THE COURT: All right. Very good. We will give you a jury trial date.
¶ 62. On the date set for jury trial, all parties appeared before Judge Kuhnmuench. Attorney Scott Connors had been given additional time to confer with the defendant before the pre-trial hearing. Attorney Connors said he expected to call the defendant in his own defense, necessitating a discussion of the defendant's criminal record in relation to anticipated impeachment before the jury. Anderson had two convictions for robbery, two convictions for burglary, a conviction for receiving stolen property, and a felony conviction for intimidation of a witness. There was no dispute about the *620number of convictions, which Connors said he had discussed with the defendant. Counsel also discussed jury instructions.
¶ 63. Then, in the presence of the defendant, the following exchange occurred:
ATTORNEY CONNORS: One quick matter. There is— I've discussed the possibility with Mr. Anderson of having a bench trial instead of a jury trial, and it's my understanding there's a very good possibility at 1:00 that we could have a bench trial. Would that be a problem?
THE COURT: Not at all, but I'm bringing the jury up anyway, and I'm going to require you to have a waiver of the jury trial form in the file (emphasis added).
¶ 64. After a recess, court reconvened. The defendant had submitted a signed form that read as follows:
And now comes the above named defendant, and in his own proper person hereby expressly waives trial by a jury and consents to immediate trial before the court without a jury.
I will be giving up my right to have my case decided by 12 people sitting as a jury; I understand that all 12 of those people would have to agree in order to reach a verdict.
¶ 65. In the presence of Tyran Anderson and his attorney, the court then stated:
The Court is in receipt of a waiver of trial by jury that is signed and dated today's date. The court will receive it and enter it in the trial as a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. We will proceed with a bench trial at. 1:30 this afternoon. Are there any questions of the court ? (Emphasis added.)
*621¶ 66. There were no questions or protestations. After a lunch break, the case went to trial before the court.
¶ 67. The defendant now argues to this court that although he complied with the requirements of the jury waiver statute, his actions did not satisfy the minimum requirements of other law. The majority responds that it cannot tell on this record whether Anderson's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Ironically, it makes this statement at the same time it concludes that by silently going forward, the state clearly demonstrated its consent to waive a jury trial.
¶ 68. I disagree with the majority's conclusion. Tyran Anderson was an experienced participant in the criminal justice system with six criminal convictions and a revocation of probation. After his eleventh court appearance in this case, with counsel at his side through every step of the proceedings, Anderson signed an explicit jury waiver form that had been developed for use in the courts of Milwaukee County in compliance with Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) and case law. His counsel represented on the record to the court that he and the defendant had discussed the possibility of waiving a jury trial. Anderson never disputed that assertion. On the contrary, he affirmed his attorney's statement by signing the form. Thereafter, in the defendant's presence, the circuit court found the waiver knowing and voluntary. The defendant was asked if he had questions and he had none. One likely motive for the defendant's jury waiver was his intent to testify, recognizing that six criminal convictions would tend to undercut the credibility of his testimony before a jury.
¶ 69. The record in this case contains overwhelming evidence that Tyran Anderson made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury *622trial. See Resio, 148 Wis. 2d at 695-96. Because the majority reaches a different conclusion and because the majority initiates other actions that I cannot support, I respectfully dissent.
Article VII, Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution states that "[t]he supreme court shall have superintending and administrative authority over all courts." This language is based in large part upon the same section of the 1848 constitution: "The supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same." Wis. Const, art. VII, § 3 (1849). See Revised Statutes of Wisconsin (1849) at 28-29.
Neither the old constitutional language nor the new constitutional language empowers this court, as part of its superintending authority, to rewrite statutes in individual decisions. The superintending authority over all courts embodies authority "to control the course of ordinary litigation" in inferior courts, State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 613, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899); it does not authorize the court to erase a valid exercise of legislative power in an opinion.
Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12, Rules of pleading and practice, provides in relevant part:
*613The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant.... Ml statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure may be modified or suspended by rules promulgated under this section. No rule modifying or suspending such statutes may he adopted until the court has held a public hearing with reference to the rule.
Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (emphasis added).
As here, the defendant in Burns had a competent attorney at his side during the relevant proceedings. That is one of the facts and circumstances that ought to be considered.