(dissenting).
The fact that there may be serious problems in our society with abuse of alcohol by our youth does not warrant the imposition of a criminal conviction where there is no showing of knowledge or authorization of the crime by the employer/Hy Vee.
Discussing vicarious liability in the criminal arena, the court in Davis v. City of Peachtree City, 251 Ga. 219, 221-222, 304 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1983), stated:
In balancing this burden against the public’s interests, we find that a [criminal conviction] cannot be justified under the due process clauses of the Georgia or United States Constitutions, regardless of Peachtree City’s admittedly legitimate interests of deterring employers from allowing their employees to break the law and of facilitating the enforcement of these laws. This is especially true, when, as here, there are other, less onerous alternatives which sufficiently promote these interests. LaFave & Scott, [Handbook on Criminal Law, § 20, at 141 (1972) ]. The Model Penal Code recommends that civil violations providing civil penalties such as fines or revocation of licenses be used for offenses for which the individual was not morally blameworthy and does not deserve the social condemnation ‘implicit in the concept “crime”.’ ... The availability of such sanctions renders the use of criminal sanctions in vicarious liability cases unjustifiable. ... Id.
Similarly, commentators LaFave and Scott have written in opposition to criminal sanctions based on vicarious liability:
[I]t must be recognized that the imposition of criminal liability for faultless conduct is contrary to the basic Anglo-American premise of criminal justice that crime requires personal fault on the part of the accused. Perhaps the answer should be *152the same as the answer proposed in the case of stricfc-liabihty crimes: it is proper for the legislature to single out some special areas of human activity and impose vicarious liability on employers who are without fault, but the matter should not be called a ‘crime’.... As the law now stands, however, in almost all jurisdictions imprisonment and the word ‘criminal’ may be visited upon perfectly innocent employers for the sins of their employees.
LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 32 at 228.
Adopting this vicarious liability/respondent superior theory to brand a corporation/employer as a criminal, does not comport with the precept of criminal jurisprudence that guilt is personal and individual. Whether or not one should be so branded, should not rest on whether an employee commits a mistake in judgment. Even the court, which found Hy Vee guilty, understood the fact that employees can make mistakes and will intentionally violate the law notwithstanding the store policy on training and handling mistaken sale of alcohol to underage persons.
In this ease, as in others, there are appropriate mechanisms to civilly deal with liquor-sale violations if a license holder violates the law; namely, regulatory revocation or suspension of the license under SDCL 35-10-9 and 35-2-10.
I would reverse this conviction.