(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
i
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff was only partially dependent upon her deceased husband because she received a substantial and reasonably regular source of income of her own. However, I would clarify the standard of review. The worker’s compensation statute provides:
The findings of fact made by the commission acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive. The court of appeals and the supreme court shall have the power to review questions of law involved with any final order of the commission, if application is made by the aggrieved party within 30 days after the order by any method permissible under the Michigan court rules. [MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14).]
I believe that the phrase "findings of fact” refers to such determinations as the source and the amount of the deceased employee’s income; the *704number of dependents and their relationship to the deceased employee; the facts surrounding the deceased employee’s death; the source, the amount, and the regularity of any dependent person’s income; and the amount of money necessary to maintain the household for the dependents. However, the conclusion to be drawn from those facts, that is, whether a person is wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased employee is a legal question that is not limited on review.1
ii
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the statutory formula for determining death benefits for partially dependent persons. When we are called on to interpret a statute, the rules of statutory construction are well defined:
The words of a statute, however, should not be construed in the void but must be read together to effectuate the intention of the legislature. People v Burns, 5 Mich 114 (1858). The general rule of statutory construction was stated by this Court in Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178 [189 NW 221] (1922):
"There seems to be no lack of harmony in the rules governing the interpretation of statutes. All are agreed that the primary one is to ascertain *705and give effect to the intention of the legislature. All others serve but as guides to assist the courts in determining such intent with a greater degree of certainty. If the language employed in a statute is plain, certain and unambiguous, a bare reading suffices and no interpretation is necessary. The rule is no less elementary that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section. To that end, the entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.” Id. at 182. [Dussia v Monroe Co Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244, 248; 191 NW2d 307 (1971).]
The worker’s compensation statute provides:
If death results from the personal injury of an employee, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, subject to § 375, in 1 of the methods provided in this section, to the dependents of the employee who were wholly dependent upon the employee’s earnings for support at the time of the injury, a weekly payment equal to 80% of the employee’s after-tax average weekly wage, subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the date of death. ... If the employee leaves dependents only partially dependent upon his or her earnings for support at the time of injury, the weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal to the same proportion of the weekly payments for the beneñt of persons wholly dependent as 80% of the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings of the deceased at the time of injury. [MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321). Emphasis added.]
To visualize what the Legislature set out to do, we need to consider the overall design of worker’s *706compensation death benefits. The Legislature provided that persons who were wholly dependent upon a deceased employee would receive death benefits that would total eighty percent of the deceased employee’s after-tax earnings.2 The Legislature logically provided that partially dependent persons each would receive a proportionate amount of the deceased employee’s after-tax earnings that reflected the extent of the dependency. Another provision of the worker’s compensation act expresses this concept a little more clearly:
In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the injury. .... . If there is no one wholly dependent . . ., and there is but 1 person partially dependent, such person shall be entitled to compensation according to the extent of his or her dependency; and if there is more than 1 person partially dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of their dependency. [MCL 418.331(b); MSA 17.237(331)(b). Emphasis added.]
A simple example will help to understand the overall intent of the Legislature. Setting the statutory limits aside, assume that a deceased employee had after-tax earnings of $50,000. For policy reasons, the Legislature determined that the most any employer would be liable for in death benefits is eighty percent of the employee’s earnings.3 Mr. Edward M. Welch describes this as the "total *707benefit available.” Welch, Worker’s Compensation in Michigan: Law & Practice (rev ed), § 15.21, p 15-20. He instructs that this total benefit amount is divided or prorated among the deceased employee’s dependents, as provided in §§ 321, 331, 335, and 341. Id., § 15.22, p 15-21. If that employee left dependents who were wholly dependent, then §§ 321 and 331 provide that the wholly dependent persons will divide between themselves a total amount of eighty percent of $50,000, or $40,000. By comparison, if the deceased employee left dependents who were partially dependent upon sixty percent of the deceased employee’s salary for support, it is only logical then, that § 321 provides that the dependents should receive eighty percent of the extent of the earnings that they were dependent upon. In other words, they would divide eighty percent of sixty percent of $50,000, or $24,000.
Mr. Welch illustrates this idea with a hypothetical example of a deceased employee who contributed ten percent of his salary to his partially dependent mother. Welch, § 15.22, p 15-22. He states that the mother would then be entitled to ten percent of the total benefit available, i.e., ten percent of eighty percent of the deceased employee’s net salary. Id.
Once we determine the amount that is logically expected, then we can determine whether the total amount of death benefits is within the statutory limits. The statutory limits reflect the Legislature’s intent to limit the risks that both business and labor would bear. This purpose flows from the compromise design of the worker’s compensation "no-fault” system.4 In exchange for automatic benefits, employees gave up unlimited tort recov*708ery. In exchange for limited liability, employers became required to at least minimally compensate employees, or their dependents, for work-related injuries or deaths, regardless of whether the employer was at fault.
in
I disagree with the majority that § 321 is so ambiguous that it can be ignored. A phrase-by-phrase interpretation of the § 321 statutory formula for death benefits for persons partially dependent upon a deceased employee is helpful.
As an introduction, the statute provides:
If the employee leaves dependents only partially dependent upon his or her earnings for support at the time of injury .... [Emphasis added.]
This is the triggering language. It identifies those dependents of the deceased employee who also receive substantial and reasonably regular income from other sources.5 The statute continues:
[T]he weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal to ... . [Emphasis added.]
This identifies the formula that follows.
The statutory formula is:
[Tjhe same proportion of the weekly payments for the beneñt of persons wholly dependent as 80% of the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings of the deceased at the time of injury. [Emphasis added.] _
*709In order to make it more readable, I will separate the factors of the formula. The statute identifies one factor as:
the annual earnings of the deceased at the time of injury.
This simply means the annual earnings of the deceased.
Another factor in the formula is:
the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents.
I interpret this as designating the extent of the partial dependency,6 in other words, that portion of the employee’s salary that was used to support the dependents. This factor would require a factual determination by the trier of fact. The trier of fact could start with the amount of the deceased employee’s salary and take proofs from the parties regarding the extent that the salary supported the partial dependents. In a given case, it may be easier for the trier of fact to start with such factors as the total household expenses7 and cost of living statistics, and then work backwards, by subtracting the income from the dependent person(s), to determine the amount of the deceased employee’s salary necessary to maintain the standard of living for the dependents.
Returning to the formula, the critical language is:_
*710 the same proportion of the weekly payments for the benefít of persons wholly dependent as 80%.
This language simply dictates that death benefits for partially dependent persons shall be determined by the same procedure that death benefits for wholly dependent persons are determined. Death benefits for wholly dependent persons are a direct function of the deceased employee’s after-tax average weekly wage. Consequently, death benefits for partially dependent persons likewise should be a direct function of the deceased employee’s after-tax average weekly wage. Further, the Legislature provided that the eighty percent limitation it provided in the wholly dependent person benefits computation also applies to death benefits for partially dependent persons.
Therefore, I conclude that the final factors in the statutory formula are the eighty percent multiplier and the deceased employee’s after-tax average weekly wage.
Accordingly, I find that the statutory formula reads as follows:
80%
X
amount contributed to partial dependent
annual earnings of the deceased
X
employee’s after-tax average weekly wage
This interpretation is derived directly from the statutory language and is consistent with the overall design. It will never result in an award to a partially dependent person that is greater than an award to a wholly dependent person, and it will almost always result in an award to a partially *711dependent person that is less than the corresponding award to a wholly dependent person.8
Once the first step of determining the § 321 death benefits is completed, the second step in the analysis is to compare the resulting amount to the statutory limits. If the resulting amount is greater or lesser than the statutory limitations, then, and only then, will the statutory limits be applied. This interpretation preserves the clear language of § 356. "In construing legislative intent it is mandatory, if possible, to construe an act as a whole, thus avoiding the construction of one provision in such a manner as to negate another.” Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590, 611; 274 NW2d 392 (1979) (citation omitted). Section 356 provides that "[t]he minimum weekly benefit for death under section 321 shall be 50% of the state average weekly wage as determined under section 355.” MCL 418.356(2); MSA 17.237(356)(2). There is no qualifying language that provides that the § 356 minimum only applies to death benefits for wholly dependent persons, as the majority is injecting into § 356. Section 356 unambiguously provides a minimum for § 321 death benefits. Death benefits for partially dependent persons are § 321 death benefits.
Additionally, in 1980 PA 357, the Legislature combined the minimum benefit levels from various provisions into a single provision, § 356.9 In the *712process, the Legislature specifically "eliminate[d] minimum weekly benefit rates (except for death or partial disability) . . . .” Senate Analysis, SB 1044 (Second Analysis), January 7, 1981 (emphasis added). Sections 321 and 331 demonstrate that the Legislature clearly knew how to distinguish wholly dependent persons from partially dependent persons. If the Legislature had intended that § 356 not apply to death benefits for partially dependent persons, it would have said so. This interpretation is also in line with our earlier holding that under the pre-1980 § 351, part-time employees were entitled to the same statutory minimum compensation as full-time employees where the Legislature did not expressly provide a distinction. Irvan v Borman’s, Inc, 412 Mich 496, 502; 315 NW2d 521 (1982). Therefore, the statutory minimum for death benefits applies to death benefits payable to partially dependent persons.10_
*713By the same measure, § 355 provides that "[t]he maximum weekly rate of compensation for injuries occurring within that year shall be established as 90% of the state average weekly wage . . . MCL 418.355(2); MSA 17.237(355)(2). This is a blanket limitation that applies to all benefits payable under the statute.
iv
I disagree with the majority’s injection of the dependent person’s income into the formula. Riley, J., ante at 696. There is absolutely no language in § 321 that would even remotely suggest that the amount of the dependent person’s income is a relevant factor in the statutory formula. The amount of the dependent person’s income is irrelevant; the only amount that is relevant is the amount of the deceased employee’s income that was provided to support the dependents. See Welch, § 15.22, p 15-22: "the percentage of the dependent’s income that came from the deceased worker is immaterial. The percentage of compen*714sation is based on the portion of the worker’s income that went to the dependent.”
Moreover, the majority has failed to recognize that a partially dependent person’s financial status is not tied to a wholly dependent person’s financial status. It is an independent and unrelated function. The' majority’s premise that a partially dependent person is automatically entitled to less money seems to be based on an erroneous belief that a family’s total household expenses are automatically lower when there are two incomes, as opposed to one. The sources of the incomes is irrelevant. The issue is how much income is required to maintain the household’s standard of living.
Under the well-defined rules of statutory construction, we must read § 331(b), "extent of their dependency,” in conjunction with § 321, "the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents.” The majority’s new formula totally negates the "amount contributed” language without explanation. The majority has created a new formula, which invents a new term designated as the total relevant family income, without even attempting to connect this concept to § 321. Riley, J., ante at 696. Section 321 provides the statutory formula, which expressly refers to an amount contributed by the deceased to the survivors. "Amount” means quantity.11 The ordinary dictionary definition of "contribute” is "to give (money, . . .) along with others to a common supply, fund, etc.”12 "Give” in turn means "to hand to someone”13 or to transfer something.14 The word *715"contribute” requires an act of giving. Therefore, I interpret §321 as providing that the relevant quantity is the actual dollars that the deceased employee gave to the dependents.
The majority states that the claimant’s partial dependency is the "fraction of the total relevant annual family income contributed by the deceased employee’s annual after-tax earnings.” Riley, J., ante at 696. While this idea sounds plausible, it is not found in § 321. Section 321 refers to the fraction of the deceased employee’s income that the employee gave, i.e., contributed, to the dependents —not the fraction of the common pool that came from the deceased employee. These are two very different concepts that the majority.is interchanging without a single reference to § 321.
Additionally, I believe that the majority’s formula will prove inflexible when faced with multiple households. In today’s society there is a very real possibility that the deceased employee had been supporting multiple relatives in multiple households, and § 331(b) makes references to children of former spouses living with the former spouse or guardian, and to parents, siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren. Indeed, in the instant case, the plaintiff argued that part of her husband’s salary was sent to the support of their grandchildren in another state.
The majority has left unexplained which relevant family income will be counted. For instance, if the deceased employee had paid $100 per week for the support of a child to a former spouse, will the former spouse’s income be a factor in the formula, even though the amount contributed to the child was clearly $100 per week? If the child is sixteen years or older,15 the majority’s approach *716leaves the difficult specter of determining how much that child would have received if wholly dependent and what fraction of the former spouse’s household income came from the child support. I believe that the sounder approach is to preserve the flexibility that the statute contains, which provides that for those not conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent, the question of dependency is one of fact, § 331(b)- In such a scenario, the child was clearly dependent on all the $100 per week that was contributed to the child. Therefore, depending on how the total death benefits package is limited by the statutory limits, the child should theoretically be entitled to eighty percent of the $100.16 I do not believe that the majority’s approach would yield such a result.
We have previously stated that we are to construe the worker’s compensation act in a manner that advances the Legislature’s underlying policies:
The Workers’ Disability Compensation Act was designed to help relieve the social and economic difficulties faced by injured workers. As remedial legislation, it is liberally construed to grant rather than deny benefits. [Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 191; 312 NW2d 640 (1981). Citations omitted.]
This same rationale should apply to the amount of those benefits.
However, the majority’s creative use of the statutory maximum results in an artificial ceiling for death benefits below the statutory maximum in § 355. As explained above, I believe that partially dependent persons are entitled to eighty percent of *717the amount contributed by the deceased employee to them, with the total death benefits limited by the statutory maximum. In contrast, the majority limits the wage variable in its benefits formula to the statutory maximum, in spite of its admission that the statute is ambiguous. Contrary to the Bower spirit of liberally construing the remedial worker’s compensation act in favor of granting benefits, the majority is inappropriately restricting the full availability of statutorily provided benefits. I believe that the statutory maximum and minimum should be applied after determining the applicable death benefits for partially dependent persons.
v
Therefore, in the instant case, we do not have any findings regarding what portion of Mr. Weems’ salary was contributed to maintain the Weems household.
I would remand this case for a factual determination of the amount of Mr. Weems’ salary that was contributed to the support of Mrs. Weems.17 I *718concur with the majority with respect to its conclusion that Mrs. Weems was only partially dependent upon Mr. Weems. I dissent from the majority’s interpretation of the statutory formula in § 321 for worker’s compensation death benefits for partially dependent persons.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.See Garbutt v Stoll, 287 Mich 396; 283 NW 624 (1939). The Garbutt Court indicated that the conclusion of total dependency or partial dependency was a legal question:
[T]he question with which we are confronted is whether the rather substantial but temporary monthly payments voluntarily made to plaintiff by the telephone company for a year . . . changed her status from that of a total dependent to one of partial dependency. [Id. at 400. Emphasis added.]
See also Kimber v Michigan Light Co, 229 Mich 663, 668; 203 NW 110 (1925) (Where "the facts are undisputed, . . . dependency becomes a legal conclusion”).
MCL 418.331(b); MSA 17.237(331)(b), provides apportionment formulas for multiple dependents.
In 1980 PA 357, the Legislature increased the percent from two-thirds to eighty percent. The 1980 reform measures were the culmination of a compromise between business, which criticized the cost and inefficiency of the system, and labor, which criticized inadequate benefit levels. Senate Analysis, SB 1044 (Second Analysis), January 7, 1981.
See, generally, Welch, § 1, pp 1-1 to 1-2,1-7.
See, e.g., Rose v Paper Mills Trucking Co, 47 Mich App 1, 7; 209 NW2d 305 (1973).
See MCL 418.331(b); MSA 17.237(331)(b).
The dependent person(s) would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the household income that was necessary to maintain the standard of living. Such proof may include, but would riot be limited to, such items as: mortgage payments, utility bills, food and clothing allowances, car expenses, tuition funds, et cetera.
One exception that could arise would be the situation where the deceased employee contributed one hundred percent of his income to persons who were partially dependent. Such a situation is unlikely, because the trier of fact will likely find that the deceased employee retained at least a minute portion of his income for his own personal expenses. Another exception would be where determinations for both wholly and partially dependent persons would yield the statutory maximum.
The legislative history of 1980 PA 357, which added § 356, explained the effect on statutory minimum benefits:
*712After December 31, 1981 the weekly benefit for death or total disability will be set at 80 percent of an employee’s after-tax average weekly wage, subject to a maximum weekly benefit rate equal to 90 percent of the state average weekly wage as of June 30 of the previous calendar year. The maximum will be adjusted each January 1 to equal 90 percent of the state average weekly wage for the previous June 30 rounded up to the next dollar. A minimum weekly death beneñt will be set at one-half of the applicable state average weekly wage. The minimum benefit level for total disability will be eliminated . . . . [Senate Analysis, SB 1044 (Second Analysis), January 7, 1981.]
Moreover, in §321, following the language regarding wholly dependent persons, the specific language provides:
[S]ubject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the date of death. [MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321).]
The majority focuses on the Legislature’s failure to repeat the "subject to” language after the sentence that determines death benefits for partially dependent persons. Riley, J., ante at 701. The majority has failed to recognize that the Legislature likewise did not repeat the five-hundred-week limitation. The sentence in § 321 that connects the *713wholly dependent person sentence to the partially dependent person sentence provides:
If at the expiration of the 500-week period any such wholly or partially dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a hearing referee or worker’s compensation magistrate, as applicable, may order the employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation or some portion thereof until such wholly or partially dependent person reaches the age of 21. [MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321). Emphasis added.]
Even though the Legislature did not repeat the five-hundred-week period in the sentence regarding partially dependent persons, it clearly evidenced its intent that partially dependent persons were subject to the five-hundred-week limitation in the previous sentence. Likewise, this corresponding omission of the "subject to” language underscores the fact that the Legislature intended that death benefits for partially dependent persons be determined by the same two-step procedure used to determine death benefits for wholly dependent persons.
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 83.
The Random House College Dictionary (rev ed), p 293. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, p 328: "[t]o . . . give something.”
Random House Dictionary, supra, p 558.
Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, p 689.
So that the child is not wholly dependent as provided in § 331(b).
If the total death benefits due to all the deceased employee’s dependents exceeds the statutory maximum, then § 331(b) would apportion the statutory maximum among the qualifying dependents.
For illustrative purposes only, I offer some hypothetical results using the assumptions that Mr. Weems’ after-tax average weekly wage was $822.91 and that his annual earnings were $42,791. For instance, we can say that Mr. Weems kept twenty-five percent of his income for his own personal usage. The other seventy-five percent was contributed to paying household expenses. Therefore, as applied to the instant facts, assuming that seventy-five percent of Mr. Weems’ after-tax earnings was contributed to Mrs. Weems, the formula yields:
80% X $32,093 X $822.91 = $494 $42,791
Then, turning to § 355(2), which limits maximum weekly benefits, the payable death benefits would be $374. It is noteworthy that even at this level, Mrs. Weems would experience hardship. Her total household income would be $29,648 (her pension, $10,200 plus $374 for fifty-two weeks); while her standard of living would correspond to her income level plus the extent of her former dependency on Mr. Weems: *718$10,200 plus $32,093 (seventy-five percent of $42,791), which equals $42,293.
If, for instance, fifty percent of Mr. Weems’ after-tax earnings were contributed to Mrs. Weems, the formula yields:
80% X $21,395 X $822.91 = $329.16 $42,791
In the instant case, the payable death benefits would fall within the statutory maximum and minimum limits.
To the other extreme, if, for instance, twenty percent of Mr. Weems’ after-tax earnings were contributed to Mrs. Weems, the formula yields:
80% X $ 8,558 X $822.91 = $131.66 $42,791
However, applying § 356, which sets the statutory minimum for death benefits, the payable death benefit would be $207.35, the applicable minimum rate for these parties.