(dissenting). I dissent.
Plaintiff Willie Johnson initiated this action as representative of a class of similarly situated property owners subject to a special assessment levied by the City of Inkster to finance a portion of its share of the cost of widening Middlebelt Road. The assessment district consisted of nonabutting interior residential property on each side of the improved portion of the road, extending approximately halfway to the next major north-south street parallel to Middlebelt.
The distinguished trial judge, James Montante, sustained the assessment, finding it to be not in contravention of law, and that decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Johnson v Inkster, 56 Mich App 581; 224 NW2d 664 (1974).
I
The trial court found that the improvement to Middlebelt Road conferred a special benefit on the assessed interior properties, a finding affirmed by the Court of Appeals. My colleagues reverse, finding "[t]here has been no enhancement” and, in justification thereof announce a standard for measuring "special benefit” which is heretofore unknown in the law1 and without logical basis. I cannot agree.
The City of Inkster, as a home-rule city, pos*273sesses the authority by virtue of § 4d(l) of the home rule cities act and its own charter to levy special assessments on specially benefited districts to finance the cost of public improvements. MCLA 117.4d(l); MSA 5.2077(1). The power to levy special assessments is derived from the power to tax. Williams v Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich 560 (1853). We have repeatedly said that the establishment of special assessment districts and the determination of the amount to be assessed on a particular property are legislative acts. In re Petition of Macomb County Drain Comm’r, 369 Mich 641; 120 NW2d 789 (1963); Crampton v Royal Oak, 362 Mich 503; 108 NW2d 16 (1961); Cummings v Garner, 213 Mich 408; 182 NW 9 (1921); Voigt v Detroit, 123 Mich 547; 82 NW 253 (1900). We do not review the exercise of the legislative power to tax solely on grounds of unwisdom or our own view of public policy. Ford Motor Co v State Tax Commission, 400 Mich 499; 255 NW2d 608 (1977).
Our role in this type of case is a limited one.
The proper inquiry for our review is whether the trial court was clearly in error in finding that the property of plaintiff and similarly situated property owners was specially benefited. GCR 1963, 517. In chancery cases the scope of review has also been stated as being "de novo”, but in Papin v Demski, 383 Mich 561; 177 NW2d 166 (1970), we said that GCR 1963, 517 did not alter an appellate court’s power of review in those cases.
The trial court correctly stated that the assessment should be upheld where there are special benefits to the property specially assessed, such as an increase in value, relief from a burden or a special adaptability in the land. Soncoff v Inkster, 22 Mich App 358; 177 NW2d 243 (1970). Where the legislative body has correctly determined that spe*274cial benefits exist, the courts will ordinarily not disturb its judgment as to the inclusion or exclusion of specific property in the special assessment district or the proper amount of individual assessments. These are questions concerning which reasonable people may widely and honestly differ. In the absence of fraud or bad faith, or the following of a plan incapable of producing reasonable equality, the legislative judgment will be presumed to be valid. Crampton v Royal Oak, supra; Marks v Detroit, 246 Mich 517; 224 NW2d 619 (1929).
The trial court found that properties in the assessment district were specially benefited as a result of the improvements to Middlebelt through: improved access; elimination of hazardous traffic, deteriorated road conditions, and open ditches and swales; stabilization of the neighborhood; and enhancement of the value of assessed property.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the finding of the trial court that the assessed properties did receive substantial, not merely incidental, benefits beyond those enjoyed by members of the general public. The testimony of experts in the areas of property appraisal and municipal finance supports the conclusion that the project would appreciably improve the surrounding neighborhood. I do not conclude I would have arrived at a different result had I been in the position of the trial judge. Papin v Demski, supra; Christine Building Co v Troy, 367 Mich 508; 116 NW2d 816 (1962).
Moreover, I do not agree that the fact that the improvement to Middlebelt conferred a substantial benefit on the general public in any way affects the validity of these special assessments. The county taxpayers and the taxpayers of the City of Inkster have assumed a substantial share of the *275burden. The County of Wayne assumed 60% of the cost of the improvement and the City of Inkster assumed slightly more than 20%. The assessed property was itself specially benefited. I cannot say plaintiff class was asked to pay for benefits received by the general public or that the share of the cost imposed on them exceeded the benefits received and, therefore, I perceive no denial of due process. See Detroit v Judge of Recorder’s Court, 112 Mich 588; 70 NW 149 (1897).
Fluckey v Plymouth, 358 Mich 447; 100 NW2d 486 (1960), and Brill v Grand Rapids, 383 Mich 216; 174 NW2d 832 (1970), do not compel us to enjoin the assessment levied by the City of Inkster. Fluckey involved an assessment against residential property abutting a road improved from two lanes of blacktop road to a four-lane concrete highway. The Court said:
"It must be stressed that the facts before us do not involve a mere error in judgment on the part of assessing authorities. We do not trifle with such. Nor do they involve the substitution of the judgment of the court upon the worth of special benefits conferred. The assessors, not the court, weigh the benefits, if, in truth, there are benefits to be weighed. The point here is more fundamental: where, viewed in its entirety, no benefit upon abutting property owners has been conferred by the improvement, but rather a detriment suffered, a special assessment based upon the enhancement of the value of the property is a fraud in law upon such property owners.” 358 Mich 447, 454.
Brill relied on Fluckey and, like the latter, found a showing of detriment resulting from one’s home being within a few feet of a major thoroughfare. It applies to abutting residential property. The special assessment district we consider here contains no abutting residential property.
*276II
Plaintiff class further contends that the formula used to determine the amount of the special assessment and the perimeters of the special assessment district were arbitrarily and capriciously determined. I cannot agree.
First, it was not unreasonable to assume that property within a certain distance from the improvement would receive substantial benefits. Boundaries must be drawn. It was entirely reasonable to assume that properties closer to the next major north-south street would be likely to receive fewer benefits. Special assessments for road improvements need not be made only against abutting property. There is no reason to assume benefits cease at property lines. See Goodrich v Detroit, 123 Mich 559; 82 NW 255 (1900). The trial court was not clearly in error in finding that plaintiff had not shown the perimeters of the district were arbitrarily drawn.
Nor was the mode of assessment incapable of producing reasonable equality. See Crampton, supra.
The trial court found that the city assessor first estimated that the interior properties benefited by at least $150 and that he then adopted a "unit of benefit method” of apportionment ultimately resulting in an assessment on single-family dwellings in the amount of $109.80, and $219.60 on multiple-family dwellings.
This method of assessment is a far cry from the one found arbitrary and impermissible in I. H. Gingrich & Sons v Grand Rapids, 256 Mich 661; 239 NW 876 (1932), in which property on one side of the pavement was assessed more than twice as much as owners of equal frontage on the other *277side. In contrast, the assessments here in question were reasonably designed to achieve a fair exaction for benefits received. I would not disturb the presumptively valid determination of the Inkster City Council.
It is also argued that the assessments are invalid because the contract for construction between the County of Wayne and the city was made in violation of the city charter and special assessment ordinance.
The Inkster charter provides that contracts shall not be made for public works or improvements until provision is made for financing. The contract with Wayne County was entered into prior to the completion of arrangements for financing, but the city’s liability thereunder was made conditional on the successful acquisition of funds.
I concur in and adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.
That court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the agreement substantially complied with the applicable law. The city charter provision and special assessment ordinance relied on are designed to prevent the city from constructing improvements that it does not have the means to pay for. By making its liability conditional on successful financing, the city complied with the spirit and purpose of its ordinance provision. This case is distinguishable from Smith v Garden City, 372 Mich 189; 125 NW2d 269 (1963), where an improvement was completed three years prior to the levy of an assessment to pay for it, completely foreclosing a charter-guaranteed right to have a public hearing and opportunity to object to the improvement and assessment.
Plaintiff class’s final contention is totally without merit.
*278Ill
My colleagues would hereby remove from home-rule cities the authority to use special assessments against residential property to finance certain road improvements. The use of special assessments has long been an acceptable means for local governments to finance local improvements. This Court has traditionally deferred to those units and upheld their use of the special assessment mode of financing except where those bodies have abused their discretion. I would not decrease the flexibility available to cities of widely differing resources and needs by forever precluding them from making reasonable use of such special assessments to achieve an orderly plan to pay for a scheme of local road improvements.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Blair Moody, Jr., J., took no part in the decision of this case."We conclude that where an existing road is adequate for the use of local residents and businesses and its widening and improvement is designed to benefit primarily the public at large and to ameliorate conditions caused by its increased use of the road, there is no special benefit to residential owners warranting a special assessment.”