(dissenting).
When determining venue, trial courts are not to decide proper forum by a process of elimination. Rather, they are to look *858where venue has a statutory right to exist. See SDCL eh. 15-5. As cases are to be tried “where the cause, or some part thereof, arose,” the trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion in finding the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, home of this dispute, to be appropriate venue for this action. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Although the Seventh Judicial Circuit provided adequate venue for SDDS I and SDDS IV, the majority writing holds that such venue will not suffice in this case. Granted, Hughes County in the Sixth Judicial Circuit is appropriate for this action; however, it is not the only appropriate venue. Under our statutory provisions, venue may properly lie in more than one county. See SDCL 15-5-1, 15-5-2.
Venue in Fall River County may be established under SDCL 15-5-2(2) which provides:
Actions for the following causes, or upon the following instruments, must be tried in the county where the cause, or some part thereof, arose, or the forfeiture was declared, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial:
(2) Against a public officer, or a person specially appointed to execute his duties, or an act done by him in virtue of his office, or against a person, who, by his command or his aid, shall do anything touching the duties of such officer[.] (Emphasis supplied).
As the State, the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General áre public officers and named defendants herein, and their actions impacted and involved land in Fall River County, “the cause, or some part thereof, arose” there.
This Court has consistently held that the cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint; no other pleading is relevant to the issue. Kreager v. Blomstrom Oil Co., 298 N.W.2d 519 (S.D.1980); American Advertising Company v. State, 280 N.W.2d 93 (S.D.1979); McDonald v. State, 86 S.D. 570, 199 N.W.2d 583 (1972); Meihak v. Schreckenghaust, 67 S.D. 603, 297 N.W. 122 (1941). In its complaint, SDDS’ cause of action alleges in part:
★ Ownership of property in Fall River County;
★ Ownership of a permit to construct and operate a municipal solid waste disposal facility on that property;
★ $5 million in construction expenses for said facility;
★ State Initiative Measure No. 1 was enacted as SDCL 34A-6-53 to 34A-6-56 and required the shutdown of the facility;
★ Although the Legislature has since found the facility to comply with new laws, a pending Referendum on the November 3, 1992 ballot has prevented the facility from operating;
★ Loss of anticipated revenue.
Furthermore, SDDS asserts that because the initiative and referendum have prohibited the siting, construction and operation of the Lonetree facility, inverse condemnation has occurred. When condemnation is alleged, the proper venue is the county in which the land lies. 27 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 382 (1966). Where the issue involved is whether land has been taken or damaged by the state, venue properly lies in the county where the land is situated. State ex rel. Schmitt v. Hoffman, 233 Minn. 186, 46 N.W.2d 468 (1951). The judicial inquiry for the assessment of damages is held in the appropriate court of the county in which the land affected by the taking lies. 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 24.23 (rev. 3d ed. 1993). Under the complaint’s facts and allegations, the cause of action is centered in and around Fall River County. Because the key element for establishing venue is where part of the cause of action arose, venue under SDCL 15-5-2(2) is justified.
As Justice Sabers accurately illustrates in his dissent, application of the four-part venue test further supports Fall River County’s right to venue. Most specifically, the fourth element permits venue in the place where the facts “ creating] the necessity for bringing the action arose.” Though the referendum and initiative may have provided the catalyst initiating this lawsuit, make no mistake, these elections undeniably focused on Fall River County.
*859The referendum itself was a vote specifically concerning the Lonetree facility, situated in Fall River County.*
Due to its economic injuries, SDDS also alleges that SDCL 15-5-1(1) permits venue in Fall River County and provides in pertinent part:
Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial in the cases provided by the statute:
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, and ... for injuries to real property ...
(Emphasis supplied). With the complaint alleging damages to the Lonetree facility, venue is proper in Fall River County. To hold otherwise is to hold that this suit does not concern the Lonetree property and undermines the validity of SDDS’ claim before the case is tried. Today, this Court is asked only to resolve venue, not the underlying issue of inverse condemnation. The merits of the underlying issue must first be addressed by the trial court. Northwestern Engineering Company v. Thunderbolt Enterprises, 301 N.W.2d 421 (S.D. 1981); Weaver v. Boortz, 301 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1981). Part of the cause of action did arise in Fall River County and the trial court acted within its discretion in placing venue there.
Despite the majority’s interpretation that physical acts by the defendants must have taken place in the desired county in order for venue to exist, other jurisdictions have held contrary. Venue may appropriately lie in the county impacted by the actions of state officials, not necessarily where the official resides or acts. Priest Lake Coalition v. State ex rel. Evans, 111 Idaho 354, 723 P.2d 898 (1986); Brown v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 477, 208 Cal.Rptr. 724, 691 P.2d 272 (1984); Ford v. Montana Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 208 Mont. 132, 676 P.2d 207 (1984); Deaconess Hospital v. Washington State Highway Commission, 66 Wash.2d 378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965). See Erwin v. Perego, 93 F. 608 (8th Cir.1899) (cause of action concerning a mining claim arose in county where land was situated, not where application with government was filed).
An abuse of discretion occurs only if no “judicial mind in view of the law and circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.” Jensen v. Weyrens, 474 N.W.2d 261, 263 (S.D.1991); Matter of Estate of Pejsa, 459 N.W.2d 243, 245 (S.D.1990). Not only did part of this action arise in Fall River County, the circumstances surrounding the allegations have indeed impacted this area. Venue lies here.
Referred Law 1 read: "An act entitled to approve the siting, construction and operation of the Lonetree solid waste disposal facility."