(dissenting).
Fall River County is an appropriate venue for this action under SDCL 15-5-2(2). This is an action against the State and its public officers and “must be tried in the county where the cause, or some part thereof, arose[.]” It is clear to me that this cause, or some part thereof, arose in Fall River County. Almost all of the alleged damages occurred in Fall River County. Even assuming the initiative and referendum to be the turning point in this action, some part of both arose in Fall River County.
Even under the four part test of McDonald urged by the majority, at least one of the elements arose in Fall River County.
1. SDDS claims the right to compensation for damages sustained in Fall River County as a result of the initiative and referendum.
2. The wrong SDDS claims to have suffered is that they have been prohibited from siting, constructing or operating the Lonetree Facility in Fall River County.
3. The relief demanded by SDDS is for judgment against the state and its public officers for the compensation and *860damages referred to above in Fall River County.
4.As indicated above, even some of the facts resulting in the initiative and referendum which created the necessity for bringing the action arose in Fall River County.
McDonald, 86 S.D. at 576, 199 N.W.2d at 586. To establish proper venue in Fall River County, however, only one of the elements need arise there. Hills Materials, 316 N.W.2d at 648. Therefore, the majority errs.
As SDDS argues, SDCL 15-5-2(2) does not limit venue for all actions against public officials to Hughes County. Rather, it permits venue in actions against public officials in any county where all or any part of the cause of action arose. See, e.g., Hills Materials, 316 N.W.2d at 648 (venue proper under SDCL 15-5-2 in Pennington County when part of cause arose there and part arose in Hughes County); Meihak, 67 S.D. at 607, 297 N.W. at 123 (venue proper under predecessor to SDCL 15-5-2 in Pennington County when part of cause arose there and part arose in Meade County).