dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I find no fault whatever with the majority decision as applied to a Nebraska resident. However, the defendant was a resident of the State of Missouri and had a valid Missouri driver’s license, and the specific period of revocation of his Nebraska driver’s license had expired.
Section 60-430.05, R. R. S. 1943, refers only to “* * * reinstatement of his license or issuance of a new license, * * *” without reference to the state of issuance, while *856the city ordinance under which he was prosecuted, based on that statute, specifically reads: “* * * reinstatement of his: license or issuance of a new Nebraska license.” (Emphasis ours.)
Section 60-418, R. R. S. 1943, set out in full in the majority opinion forbids any resident or nonresident whose license has been suspended or revoked, to “operate a motor vehicle in this state under a license, permit or registration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspension or after such revocation, until a new license is obtained when and if permitted under this act.” It will be noted again that this statute specifically refers to both residents and nonresidents and does not refer to a Nebraska license, but only to* a license obtained when and if permitted under the Motor Vehicle Operators’ License Act.
The defendant’s license here was revoked for a period of 1 year under section 39-7,128, R. S. Supp., 1965. The notice of revocation specifically read: “Any operation of a motor vehicle by you after the date of this notice, will constitute a violation of Nebraska Law for the duration of the revocation or thereafter, until proof of financial responsibility is furnished, as provided by law.”
Section 39-7,133, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “It shall be unlawful to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways after revocation of an operator’s license or privilege revoked under the provisions, of sections 39-7,128 to 39-7,133. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished as provided in sections 60-430.01 and 60-430.02. Any license, revoked under the provisions of sections 39-7,128 to 39-7,133, shall remain revoked for one year and at the expiration thereof such person shall give and maintain for three years proof of financial responsibility, as required by section 60-525.”
Section 60-531, R. R. S. 1943, provides in part: “The nonresident owner of a motor vehicle not registered in this state may give proof of financial responsibility by filing with the department a written certificate or cer*857tificates of an insurance carrier authorized to transact business in the state in which the motor vehicle or motor vehicles described in such certificate is registered or, if such nonresident does not own a motor vehicle, in the state in which the insured resides, * *
It would seem quite clear from this section that while proof of financial responsibility is required of residents and nonresidents alike under the statute, the “new license” referred to in section 60-418, R. R. S. 1943, would necessarily and properly be a license from the state of residence of the individual involved. The fact that an operator’s license and the furnishing of proof of financial responsibility are two* separate and distinct things is quite apparent from section 39-7,133, R. R. S. 1943, as well as section 60-531, R. R. S. 1943.
Section 60-410, R. S. Supp., 1965, which is part of the same Motor Vehicle Operators’ License Act states in part: “Nothing herein contained shall prevent a nonresident of this state from operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state during the period within which he may lawfully operate such motor vehicle in this state under the provisions of the general motor vehicle laws of this state * * * Provided, that such nonresident motor vehicle operator is duly licensed under the laws of the state of his residence, or has complied with the laws of the state of his residence relating to the registration or licensing of motor vehicles and conformed to the laws of such state of residence in relation to the operators of motor vehicles; * *
It is quite clear that section 60-418, R. R. S. 1943, bars operation of a motor vehicle in Nebraska under any license from any state during the specific period for which the defendant’s license has been suspended or revoked in all cases. It also' forbids operation after such period of revocation until a new license has been obtained. The state of residence of the defendant at the time a specific period of revocation ended would, or *858should be, the state to issue the license “permitted under this act.”
The “new license” referred to1 in section 60-418, R. R. S. 1943, as to a nonresident of Nebraska and after the period for which his Nebraska license was specifically revoked has passed, should be interpreted as a license validly and legally obtained in the state of which the individual is then a resident, and the protection of section 60-410, R. S. Supp., 1965, should be extended to such a nonresident and the validity of such license recognized where proof of financial responsibility has been filed as required.
In this case, there is no proof whatever that the defendant did not file proof of financial responsibility under section 60-531, R. R. S. 1943. The evidence from the Department of Motor Vehicles was only that his Nebraska license had not been reinstated or a new Nebraska license issued as of the date of the arrest. Yet the crime involved a mandatory jail sentence.
Under the majority opinion, the revocation of a Nebraska motor vehicle operator’s license for a specific period of 1 year becomes a permanent revocation as to anyone who has become a resident of another state, whether he has furnished evidence of financial responsibility or not and the validity of his new license from the state of his residence provided for by section 60-410, R. S. Supp., 1965, is destroyed. We do not believe the Legislature had any such intention.
Not only did the court refuse to admit the Missouri driver’s license into evidence, but it instructed the jury that under the ordinances of the City of Lincoln, it was unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle after suspension or revocation and before reinstatement of his license or issuance of a new Nebraska license. Such an interpretation would seem to directly involve the due process and the privileges and immunities clauses of the United States Constitution, as to a resident of Missouri.
*859In any event, under the unusual factual circumstances here, a 30-day jail sentence was unjust and unreasonable.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.