concurring.
State v. Smith, 181 Neb. 846, 152 N. W. 2d 16 (1967), in my opinion is distinguishable. It implies that the 1-year period of suspension ran prior to issuance of the Missouri license to Smith. It also implies that Smith failed to obtain an insurance policy. Under rules of stare decisis my going behind the fact basis of the majority opinion in Smith to reexamine records or briefs would be futile. See, County of Madison v. School District No. 2, 148 Neb. 218, 27 N. W. 2d 172 (1947); International Harvester Co. v. County of Douglas, 146 Neb. 555, 20 N. W. 2d 620 (1945).
In the present case the Colorado license was issued to Reeder subsequent to the 1-year period of suspension. *122He possessed an insurance policy with coverages equal in amount to those required by the financial responsibility law. See, Laws 1959, c. 299, § 1 (10), p. 1123; former § 60-501 (10), R. R. S. 1943.
I therefore concur with the Per Curiam opinion.
Clinton, J.These cases were tried, briefed, and argued together, and involve identical issues. The defendant was convicted in the district court for Platte County on two separate charges of driving while his motor vehicle operator’s license was under suspension. § 60-418, R. R. S. 1943. The cases were tried upon a stipulation of facts and present only a question of law.
On April 12, 1968, the defendant had been convicted of driving during suspension of his operator’s license and his 'driving privileges and license were suspended for a period of 1 year from that date. In August 1968 the defendant moved from Butler County, Nebraska, which was then his residence, to Arapahoe County in the State of Colorado where he resided until about January 1, 1970. On about April 12, 1969, the defendant was notified by the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of Nebraska that he was eligible to' have his driver’s license reinstated upon compliance with the financial responsibility laws and payment of the $25 reinstatement fee. On May 6, 1969, being then a resident of Colorado, he obtained a Colorado operator’s license by passing the required examination. It was stipulated that the license which he so procured was in full force and effect on February 12, 1970, and February 20, 1970, which are the pertinent dates in these prosecutions. At the time of the issuance of the Colorado license he had been issued and there was in effect a policy of liability insurance with limits of $10,000, $20,000, and $5,000. He never paid to Nebraska any reinstatement fee nor did he attempt to procure a Nebraska motor vehicle operator’s license.
When the defendant returned to Nebraska about Janu*123ary 1, 1970, he apparently stayed here continuously until the time of the offenses charged on February 12 and February 20, 1970.
The defendant was clearly guilty of a violation of section 60-410, R. S. Supp., 1969, which requires a nonresident to obtain upon a continuous residence in Nebraska for 30 days a Nebraska driver’s license and limits the privilege of operating on a foreign operator’s license to that 30-day period. The question is whether the defendant is under the facts guilty of violating section 60-418, R. R. S. 1943.
When the defendant procured a valid Colorado operator’s license the suspension in Nebraska had expired. In State v. Smith, 181 Neb. 846, 152 N. W. 2d 16, this court under a similar set of facts affirmed the conviction of a driver, a resident of Missouri, who was temporarily driving a motor vehicle in this state and had no residence herein. I conclude that State v. Smith, supra, was wrongly decided and insofar as inconsistent with this opinion ought to be overruled. The prosecutor who handled these cases in the court below is not subject to any criticism for having filed what I consider to be the wrong charges because he was entitled to rely upon our opinion in State v. Smith, supra.
The effect of State v. Smith, supra, was to say that á driver whose license has been suspended or revoked in Nebraska may never again drive in Nebraska until he has procured a Nebraska license and complied with the motor vehicle financial responsibility law, even though he may have established residence elsewhere and after the period of suspension procured a valid license under the laws of the state of his residence. In summary even though he might be passing through this state as a tourist 20 years, after the suspension he would still be guilty of violation of section 60-418, R. R. S. 1943. I have reexamined the pertinent Nebraska statutes and conclude they do not authorize or require such a result.
*124An examination of Chapter 60, article 4, R. R. S. 1943, clearly shows the statutes do not contemplate the issuance of a Nebraska license to nonresidents. § 60-403, R. R. S. 1943. It clearly contemplates that nonresidents may operate in Nebraska on their nonresident licenses until “a period of thirty days continuous residence” in this state has expired. § 60-410, R. S. Supp., 1969.
Nebraska may of course suspend a nonresident’s privilege of driving in this state, § 60-422, R. R. S'. 1943, and under the provisions of section 60-418, R. R. S. 1943, neither a “resident or nonresident whose operator’s license or right or privilege . . . has been suspended” in Nebraska may operate under a “license, permit ... issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise . . . until a new license is obtained when and if permitted under this act.” The only reasonable construction of this provision is to say that it contemplates as far as a nonresident is concerned issuance of a license to him in his own jurisdiction after the suspension period and which license is then valid in this state.
As already noted, I believe the statutes do not authorize or contemplate the issuance of Nebraska licenses to nonresidents until they have residence here and that residence continues or is intended to continue beyond 30 consecutive days. Statutes must be so construed if possible as to render them constitutional. If a nonresident, including a former resident of Nebraska who has become a nonresident, whose license or privilege has been suspended or revoked in Nebraska may not again drive upon the highways in Nebraska after the expiration of the suspension period until he again procures a Nebraska license, which license he cannot procure without again residing in Nebraska with the intention to stay more than 30 days, then Nebraska has in all probability placed an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. A construction of the statutes *125which gives this result is not justified by the language of the statute itself.
The construction this opinion would place upon the statute conforms to the administrative interpretation placed upon it by the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of Nebraska which is the agency charged with administering the statute. Weight should, be given to the construction placed upon the statute by the department even though such construction is not controlling. Allen v. Morsman, 46 F. 2d 891; Belitz v. City of Omaha, 172 Neb. 36, 108 N. W. 2d 421.
The construction I would place upon the statute is in accord with the construction placed upon similar statutes by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. State v. Kristofferson, 58 Wash. 2d 317, 362 P. 2d 596. It is also impliedly supported by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in District of Columbia v. Fred, 281 U. S. 49, 50 S. Ct. 163, 74 L. Ed. 694, where it was held that during the period of suspension the foreign license need not be recognized.