concurring.
In its discovery order, the district court allowed the certification of an out-of-state witness for purposes of obtaining a DNA sample from that witness. The purported authority for such order was the DNA Testing Act.1 Though! concur with the result reached by the majority that we are not presented with a final order, I write separately to comment upon the parameters of the DNA Testing Act.
This court has held that any rights conferred for postconviction DNA testing are statutory, not constitutional or from the common law.2 Thus, a criminal defendant’s right to such testing is limited to that which is provided for by statute. Section 29-4120(1) provides that a person in custody may request DNA testing of biological material only if the biological material
*826(a) [i]s related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in such judgment;
(b) [i]s in the actual or constructive possession or control of the state or is in the possession or control of others under circumstances likely to safeguard the integrity of the biological material’s original physical composition; and
(c) [w]as not previously subjected to DNA testing or can be subjected to retesting with more current DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results.
Absent a showing to the contrary, an appellate court will give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.3 Generally, the word “and,” used properly, is conjunctive.4 It is therefore clear that under § 29-4120, all three threshold requirements must be met; unless all three requirements are met, no testing is permitted.
It is also clear that the intent of the DNA Testing Act was to provide a mechanism for DNA testing of evidence retained from the original investigation and prosecution. Section 29-4120(1) (a) specifically provides that the material must be “related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in such judgment.” In its findings, the Legislature noted that “DNA testing has emerged as the most reliable forensic technique for identifying persons when biological material is found at a crime scene or transferred from the victim to the person responsible and transported from the crime scene.”5 The Legislature also found “a compelling need to ensure the preservation of biological material for postconviction DNA testing.”6
A review of the DNA Testing Act reveals no provision permitting the taking of depositions, as was requested by Pratt in the instant case. Nor does the act include any mechanism by which new evidence may be gathered and tested. There is no mention in the act of granting criminal defendants the ability to *827take genetic samples from victims or witnesses, or any indication that the definition of biological materials was intended to include anything other than those materials collected in connection with the original prosecution. As such, there was no statutory basis to support the granting of Pratt’s motion for certification of an out-of-state witness.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4116 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 2006).
See State v. El-Tabech, 259 Neb. 509, 610 N.W.2d 737 (2000).
City of Elkhorn v. City of Omaha, 272 Neb. 867, 725 N.W.2d 792 (2007).
See Baker’s Supermarkets v. State, 248 Neb. 984, 540 N.W.2d 574 (1995).
§ 29-4118(1) (emphasis supplied).
§ 29-4118(7) (emphasis supplied).