Because I do not agree with the majority of the Panel that the lien was perfected outside the applicable time period for the enabling loan exception, I respectfully dissent.
Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee to avoid certain transfers of interests of the debtor in property that occur within ninety days prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, unless the transfer falls within one of the exceptions specified at section’547(c). BB & T relies upon the so-called enabling loan exception, which provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer—
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor—
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was—
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property.1
*46811 U.S.C.A. § 547. The creation of a security interest is a transfer for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(A). The security interest of BB & T was created when it attached on February 8, 2005. The question raised by this appeal is whether it was perfected on February 22, as asserted by BB & T, or on March 7, as asserted by the Trustee.
Perfection for purposes of section 547 occurs “when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee” under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B). Kentucky law specifies that notation upon the certificate of title is the only method for perfecting a security interest in a motor vehicle. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 186A.190(1). Notation is initiated by the submission of a properly completed title lien statement and application for first title together with the required fee to the county clerk. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 186A.190(6). The county clerk is then required to enter the information provided by the secured party in the Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS), and forward the application to the Department of Vehicle Regulation no later than 3:00 p.m. on the next business day after the application is received. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 186A.195(1); 186A.165. Kentucky law further provides that, Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 186A.195(5)(emphasis added).
The security interest noted on the certificate of title shall be deemed perfected at the time the security interest attaches (KRS 355.9-203) if the secured party tenders the required fees and submits a properly completed title lien statement and application for first title ... within twenty (20) days of attachment. Otherwise, the security interest shall be deemed perfected at the time that such fees are tendered and such documents are submitted to the appropriate county clerk.
As noted, it is stipulated that the security interest here attached on February 8, 2005, and that the county clerk received the required documents and fee by certified mail on February 22, 2007, within twenty days of attachment. It is further stipulated that, notwithstanding this fact, the clerk did not stamp the documents as received or upload them into the AVIS system until March 7, 2007. The certificate of title was not issued until March 25, 2005, but it was issued prior to the filing of the Debtor’s petition in bankruptcy. The certificate of title correctly notes the lien of BB & T, but notes the date of the lien as March 7, 2005.
The question presented in this appeal appears to be one of first impression. The Kentucky Supreme Court has not determined when perfection of a lien on a motor vehicle occurs if the applicant completes all acts required for perfection within the time specified by statute, but the county clerk processes the application outside of that time period. The Trustee and the majority of the Panel take the position that, notwithstanding Kentucky Revised Statute § 186A.195(5), at least in the context of a bankruptcy case, perfection does not occur until the lien is actually noted on the certificate of title. It is unclear whether their position is that relation back is never permitted, or that relation back is only permitted when the lien is actually noted on the certificate of title within twenty days after attachment. The Trustee makes essentially two arguments: (1) the period between the mailing of documents to the county clerk and notation on the certificate of title creates a “no man’s land,” during which a hypothetical judgment lien creditor could obtain a superior position to that of the secured lender; and (2) “strict compliance” with the Kentucky *469statutes requires actual notation of the lien within twenty days after attachment. I will consider the Trustee’s arguments in turn.
A. The Distinction Between Mailing and Tender is Irrelevant to the Outcome in this Case
The Trustee argues that notwithstanding the language of the Kentucky statute, which permits perfection to be deemed to have occurred at a point in time earlier than notation of the lien on the title, where a creditor merely mails documents to the county clerk, there is a gap period during which a creditor on a simple contract could obtain a judicial lien superior to that of the transferee. The Trustee maintains that mailing is not equivalent to tender under Kentucky law.
In support of her position, the Trustee relies upon Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211, 118 S.Ct. 651, 139 L.Ed.2d 571 (1998). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a creditor may not invoke the enabling loan exception if it performs the acts necessary to perfect its security interest more than twenty days after the debtor receives the property but within a relation back or grace period that exceeds twenty days provided by otherwise applicable state law. Fink, 522 U.S. at 221, 118 S.Ct. 651. In Fink, a creditor mailed the necessary documents to perfect its security interest to the Missouri Department of Revenue twenty-one days after the debtor took possession of a vehicle. Missouri law treated a lien as perfected if the creditor filed the necessary documents within thirty days after the debtor received possession of the collateral. The court held that the creditor could only invoke the enabling loan exception if its acts to obtain perfection occurred within the twenty-day period provided by the Bankruptcy Code, not any longer period provided by state law.
The present case is factually distinguishable from Fink. BB & T performed all the acts necessary to perfect its lien within twenty days after attachment of its security interest. Not only did BB & T mail the necessary documents to the county clerk, but, according to the stipulated facts, they were actually received within twenty days after attachment. BB & T is not relying upon a state-law period for perfection longer than that provided by bankruptcy law as was the case in Fink. Rather, it asserts that it did all that was necessary under Kentucky law to perfect its lien when it tendered the necessary documents and fee to the county clerk. BB & T does not assert that mere mailing is equivalent to tender, because it does not have to. The required documents and fee were in fact tendered (actually received and in the possession of the county clerk) fourteen days after the security interest attached. According to BB & T, Kentucky law specifies that when tender is accomplished within twenty days after attachment, perfection is deemed to have occurred when the security agreement attached, notwithstanding the intervening negligence of the clerk in failing to timely record the lien.
The Trustee counters by arguing that, as a matter of fact, the lien was not perfected at the time the bankruptcy case was filed because it had not been actually noted on the title within twenty days after attachment. (Brief of Appellant, at 3-4.) The Trustee points out that the mere mailing of documents to the court clerk cannot provide notice of the type that would defeat her position as an “ideal judgement lien creditor without knowledge.” (Brief of Appellant, at 3) (citing Kaye v. Williams (In re Munzenreider), 34 B.R. 82 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1983).) The Trustee asserts that mail delivery is not the same as tender. The majority of the Panel adopts this position. I do not believe that it is necessary to decide whether mail delivery is suffi*470cient for tender, however, because in this case, the parties have stipulated that the documents were not only mailed, but were actually received by the county clerk within twenty days after the debtor received possession of the collateral. The appropriate documents and fee were received by the county clerk fourteen days after the debtor received possession of the collateral, well in advance of the twenty-day deadline. Given these facts, the Trustee’s argument that creditors cannot “wait until the very last days allowed to submit application by mail,” is inapposite. The county clerk is under a statutory duty to enter the information in the electronic recording system before 3:00 p.m. on the next business day following tender. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 186A.195G); 186A.165. But for the breach of this duty by the county clerk, the lien of BB & T would have been noted on the title within twenty days after its security interest attached.
More to the point, the hen of BB & T was actually noted on the title prior to the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition. The lien was perfected, under any theory, no later than March 25, 2005. The bankruptcy petition was not filed until May 11, 2005. The Trustee’s status as hypothetical judgment lien creditor is determined as of the date of filing. As of May 11, 2005, without question, the Trustee had notice of the lien of BB & T. The lien of BB & T was perfected as of the time of filing. The better argument is that the lien may be avoided because it was noted on the title within the ninety-day preference period but not within twenty days after attachment. This is the thrust of the Trustee’s second argument.
B. “Strict Compliance” with the Requirement of Notation on a Certificate of Title does not Resolve the Question of Time of Perfection
The Trustee argues that “strict compliance” is necessary for perfection under Kentucky law. Again, the majority appears to adopt this position. The Trustee and the majority assert that a lien must actually be noted on the certificate of title before perfection can occur. This point is actually not in dispute, however. While it is beyond question that Kentucky law requires notation upon the certificate of title to perfect a lien in property for which a certificate of title is required, this does not resolve the question of when perfection occurs when a lien is in fact noted. The lien of BB & T was perfected no later than March 25, 2005. The real question raised in this appeal is whether, pursuant to Kentucky law, it was perfected earlier than that, on February 22, 2005, when BB & T completed the acts necessary for perfection, i.e., it tendered the required documents and fee to the county clerk.
The Trustee relies upon a number of decisions to support her argument, all of which are factually distinguishable from the present case. The first ease relied upon by the Trustee is Westenhoefer v. Nat’l City Bank (In re Reagan), Case No. 96-60353, Adv. Proc. No. 96-6022 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1993), an unreported decision. In Reagan, the parties stipulated that the proper documents and fees were tendered to the county clerk forty-five days after the security interest attached. The certificate of title was issued twenty-four days thereafter, but the bank’s lien was not noted on the certificate. The bankruptcy case was filed almost seventeen months thereafter and even then, the bank’s lien was not noted on the title. Under these facts, not surprisingly, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 544, the bankruptcy court held that the lien was not perfected at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy case.
The second case relied upon by the Trustee is Westenhoefer v. Navistar Fi*471nancial Corporation (In re Daulton), 155 B.R. 7 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1993). That case was also decided on a joint stipulation of facts. The debtors purchased a tractor-trailer. The purchase contract granted a security interest to the seller, who assigned the contract to Navistar. The vehicles were shipped to Arkansas for customization and then to Louisville where they were leased out. Although the debtors obtained an “Illinois Apportionment Identification Card,” the vehicles were never registered in any state. The certificates of origin assigned to the debtors contained notations of the lien of Navistar, but no financing statement was ever filed and no certificate of title was ever issued. The debtors filed a chapter 7 petition and the trustee sought to avoid the liens pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544. Again, not surprisingly, the bankruptcy court found that the liens were unperfected. The question before the court was whether notation of the liens on the certificates of origin were sufficient when the debtor/owner fails to apply for issuance of a certificate of title. Although the opinion contains strong language about the responsibility of lenders to see to the notation of their liens, it is in the referenced context, where the question was whether notation on the certificates of origin might be an alternative method of perfection.
The third case relied upon by the Trustee is Higgason v. Hyden Citizens Bank (In re Farmer), Adv. Proc. No. 89-0005, 1989 WL 306192 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. Nov.6, 1989). This is also an unreported decision. The case came before the bankruptcy court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Although the debtors purchased their vehicle on September 13, 1986, and the lender filed a financing statement with the county clerk on September 15, the lien was not noted on the certificate of title, which was issued October 13. The debtors filed their bankruptcy case more than two years later. The lender invoked a Kentucky statute not at issue in the present case, which permitted a lender to update certificates of title outstanding as of March 31, 1988, by having prior liens noted thereon. The statute provided for the relation back of these liens to the date of the financing statement. The lender obtained an updated certificate of title after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, which showed a lien date of September 15, 1986. The bankruptcy court held that the lien was unperfected on the date of the bankruptcy filing pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544. On that date, Kentucky law provided that the method of perfection of a lien upon a motor vehicle was by notation on the certificate of title. The court further held that, inasmuch as the bank’s right to have an updated certificate of title issued arose six months before the bankruptcy case was filed, its attempt to cure the defect after the filing was too late, and possibly in violation of the automatic stay. The enabling loan exception was not at issue in that case.
The fourth case relied upon by the Trustee is Richlands National Bank v. Smith, 34 B.R. 749 (W.D.Va.1983). That case was decided under Virginia law. The lender had obtained a security interest in two trucks, had noted this fact on the certificates of origin, but had failed to have the liens noted on the certificates of title prior to the filing of a bankruptcy case by the purchaser. The purchase occurred on November 2, 1982. The petition in bankruptcy was filed more than thirty days later, on December 14. At that time, neither certificate of origin had been sent to the Division of Motor Vehicles. The lender sought relief from the automatic stay in order to recover its collateral on the basis that it was not adequately protected (in part because the debtors had failed to timely apply for certificates of title). The debtors *472opposed the motion on the basis that the lender, without properly perfected liens, was not a secured creditor. The bankruptcy court agreed and the district court affirmed. Again, the enabling loan exception was not at issue.
The fifth case is Westenhoefer v. Conseco (In re Reynolds), Case No. 00-61289, Adv. Proc. No. 01-6009 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. Oct. 4, 2001), another unpublished decision. The case came before the bankruptcy court on cross motions for summary judgment and involved a mobile home, which was purchased by one of the debtors with the intention of having it affixed to real estate. The mobile home was not affixed to real estate, however, at the time of its purchase. The lender provided financing for the purchase of the land and mobile home. No new certificate of title was requested or issued after its purchase by the debtor. Thus, the certificate of title at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition showed the prior owners as owner and a prior lender as lienholder. The question presented to the bankruptcy court was whether the mobile home was property of the bankruptcy estate, notwithstanding the erroneous certificate of title. The court ruled that at the time of filing, the debtor had an equitable interest in the mobile home because he had the right to request the transfer of title to his name, but that, under the then applicable Kentucky law, the lien of the lender was unperfected because its lien was not noted on the certificate of title at the time of filing. Again, the case in no way implicates the enabling loan exception.
The sixth case relied upon by the Trustee is the unreported decision of Westenhoefer v. Bank of McCreary County (In re Sumner), Case No. 02-60897, Adv. Proc. No. 02-06415 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. Apr. 28, 2003). The question presented, according to the bankruptcy court, was “whether the equitable principles of equitable subrogation and de facto assignment prevail over the ‘Strong Arm’ powers of a bankruptcy trustee, granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544, when a refinancing creditor fails to note its lien on the certificate of title to a mobile home, as required by Kentucky law, but the purchasing lien is noted.” The court then restated the question as follows, “[I]f the only means of perfecting a security interest in a mobile home under state law is by notation on the certificate of title, and notation is not made by the refinancing creditor but the security interest of the original creditor has not been released, can the bankruptcy trustee prevail?” The court’s answer was “yes.” Although the order contains very few facts, it is clear that the case did not involve a question concerning the enabling loan exception (because it was a question concerning a refinancing lender).
The seventh case relied upon by the Trustee is another unreported decision, In re Raines, Case No. 89-01606 (Bankr. E.D.Ky.1989). The case involved the purchase of a pickup truck. Although the lender was noted as the secured party in a filed financing statement, its lien was not noted on the certificate of title when it was issued. The lender argued that it had done all that was required pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute § 186A.010, when it submitted proper documents to the county clerk together with the required fee for recording the lien notice. Raines turns upon whether notation on the certificate of title is the sole means of perfecting a security interest in property for which a certificate of title is required. The court states that the filing of a financing statement is a means of notifying the public prior to the issuance of a certificate of title, but that after the certificate of title is issued, it is the sole means of perfection. While not explicitly stated, it seems clear that the only thing that the secured credi*473tor did was to file the financing statement. It never sought or obtained the issuance of a corrected certificate of title with its lien noted. Again, the case does not involve the enabling loan exception.
None of the bankruptcy cases relied upon by the Trustee involves the enabling loan exception. None of them involves facts in which a lender performed the acts required to have its lien noted on a certificate of title within the statutory period. None of them involves negligence in noting the lien by a county clerk. Other than an occasional citation to Dcmlton for the proposition that secured creditors are charged with responsibility to perfect their liens, none of the cases supports the Trustee’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s decision in this case is inconsistent with prior case law.
The Trustee then lists three Kentucky decisions, none of which involves the statute at issue in this case. Laferty v. Wickes Lumber Co., 708 S.W.2d 107 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) raised the question of whether the filing of a complaint satisfied a statutory requirement for separate, pre-filing notice to the homeowner prior to the establishment of a mechanic’s lien. The case is not analogous to the present ease because in the present case, BB & T did all that was statutorily required to perfect it lien. The creditor in Laferty failed to do so.
The Trustee asserts that Middletown Engineering Co. v. Main Street Realty, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 274 (Ky.1992) requires strict adherence to the statutory provisions for perfecting a lien. Again, the issue presented was the notice required to secure a subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien against the owner of real property. In Middletown, the plaintiff-subcontractor failed to give the required pre-lien notice to the property owner. The Kentucky Supreme Court stated that: “The [mechanic’s] lien law confers a right in derogation of common law and all steps prescribed by statute to perfect such lien must be followed .... ” Middletown Eng’g, 839 S.W.2d at 277. Assuming that this strict compliance standard applies to the requirements for perfection of a lien on an automobile, the record establishes that BB & T strictly complied with the applicable statute.
The Trustee also argues that Jim Skaggs, Inc. v. Smith, 799 S.W.2d 585 (Ky.Ct.App.1990) is persuasive. In Jim Skaggs, the question was whether a general contractor was precluded from contesting a payment made by a property owner to a subcontractor pursuant to a lien filed by the subcontractor, where the general contractor failed to object to the lien when it was filed. The general contractor filed its objection two days after the statutory deadline, and the court determined that compliance with the requirement of the statute was a “condition precedent” to the raising of an objection. Other than providing another example of “strict compliance,” this case does not address an instance where there is strict compliance by the general contractor followed by an official’s negligence in noting that compliance.
C. The Outcome in the Case Does not Turn on the Question of Mailing versus Tender (Reprise)
The third argument advanced by the Trustee is actually a reprise of her first argument. The Trustee’s brief contains summaries of various decisions in which the issue was whether “mailing” a document was tantamount to “filing” it or “tendering” it. Her argument is that the decision of the bankruptcy court is inconsistent with rules of statutory construction. Again, even if the Panel were to accept the distinction between mailing and filing or tendering, it does not affect the outcome in this case. The position of BB & T is not that the documents were tendered when they were deposited in the mail, but rather *474that they were tendered when they were received, by the county clerk. The authority cited by the Trustee supports the conclusion that actual receipt of the document satisfies the filing requirement. According to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, “until such time as the document actually arrives at the appropriate office, it has not been ‘filed’ for purposes of a statute mandating its filing.” Revenue Cabinet v. JRS Data Sys., Inc., 738 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky.Ct.App.1987). Of course, the statute at issue does not require filing but “tender” which, because it is undefined by the statute or Kentucky case law, may be ascribed its ordinary plain meaning, “to present for acceptance.” Merriam-Webster Online, (last visited June 26, 2007); see Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 446.080.
D. The Real Issue in this Case
The real issue in this case is: When is a lien on a motor vehicle “perfected” under Kentucky law for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code? Under the facts of this case, there are four possibilities: (1) the lien was perfected on February 8, 2005, because Kentucky Revised Statute § 186A.195(5) provides that perfection is deemed to have occurred at attachment if the appropriate documents and fee are tendered to the county clerk within twenty days after attachment; (2) the lien was perfected on February 22, 2005, because the Bankruptcy Code requires that all acts necessary for perfection be accomplished within twenty days after attachment, and such acts are completed by tender; (3) the lien was perfected on March 7, 2005, because that is the date that the county clerk acknowledges that it received the necessary documents and fee and uploaded them into the appropriate database; or (4) the lien was perfected on March 25, 2005, when the certificate of title was actually issued with the lien notation on the title.
Had the bankruptcy case not been filed, the lien would have been deemed perfected as of February 8, 2005. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 186A.195(5). Nothing in the Kentucky statutes or case law mandates to the contrary. Nothing in Kentucky law is made to hinge upon the date documents are processed by the county clerk or upon the date of issuance of the certificate of title. Under Kentucky Revised Statute § 186A.195(5), either perfection is deemed to occur as of the date of attachment (if the appropriate documents and fees are tendered within twenty days of attachment) or perfection is deemed to occur at tender (if this occurs outside that twenty-day period). No other date for perfection is required under Kentucky law. No court has held that another date governs when the secured creditor has completed all steps necessary for perfection. Under Kentucky law, if the appropriate documents and fee are tendered within twenty days, then perfection relates back to the date of attachment. Absent the requisite tender within twenty days, there is no relation back. The use of the term “deemed” in both instances does not indicate that under either possibility, perfection is “deemed” to occur at a time earlier than it actually occurs. The notation of the date of the lien, March 7, 2005, upon the certificate of title issued by the county clerk would normally constitute the date of tender. However, the record establishes, based upon the return receipt, that the tender occurred on February 22, 2005. The tender was within twenty days of attachment. Thus, under Kentucky law, the lien of BB & T is deemed perfected on February 8, 2005, the date of attachment.
Because a bankruptcy case was filed, the Panel must examine the possible impact of 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(c)(3) and 547(e)(1)(B), and the Supreme Court’s decision in Fink. The issue in Fink was whether a secured creditor may utilize a state law relation *475back provision to satisfy the so-called enabling loan exception. The Court said, “no.” Fink, 522 U.S. at 221, 118 S.Ct. 651. Federal law does not always override applicable state law to establish a different date for perfection when a bankruptcy case is filed. If a lien is perfected under state law before a bankruptcy case is filed, it is perfected for purposes of the bankruptcy case. The Trustee’s “strong arm” powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544 do not permit the Trustee to avoid a lien perfected prior to the bankruptcy filing. The question of whether a lien may be avoided under the strong-arm provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 544 or whether the lien may be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 547 are different inquiries. The Trustee (and, I would respectfully submit, the majority) has confused the question of whether a lien is perfected with the question of whether a perfected lien may be avoided as a preferential transfer. Because BB & T’s lien was perfected before the bankruptcy filing, the proper analysis is only focused upon 11 U.S.C. § 547.
The pertinent issue in this appeal is whether BB & T’s perfected lien may be avoided by the Trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 547 notwithstanding the enabling loan safe harbor. Because the relation back provision does not exceed the federal time limitation, state law will govern. Fink, 522 U.S. at 213, 118 S.Ct. 651. Rather, notwithstanding the date when a lien is deemed perfected under state law, if federal bankruptcy law is to the contrary it will prevail. Fink states “that a creditor may invoke the enabling loan exception only by satisfying state-law perfection requirements within the 20-day period provided by [federal law].” Id. The Bankruptcy Code also specifies that, for purposes of the enabling loan exception, “a transfer of ... property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B). State law perfection under relation back statutes may be inconsistent with, and in derogation of, federal law. Congress uses “perfection” in at least two ways: (1) to indicate “a legal conclusion that for such purposes as calculating priorities [among liens,] perfection should be treated as if it had occurred on a particular date;” and (2) to indicate “the acts necessary to support that conclusion.” Fink, 522 U.S. at 215, 118 S.Ct. 651. Fink states that, for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B), Congress intended that “perfection” refer to acts. Id. at 216, 118 S.Ct. 651. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) states that the necessary “acts” are those that will prevent a creditor on a simple contract from acquiring a judicial lien superior to the interest of the transferee. In Fink, the Court is instructive: “In speaking below of acts necessary to perfect a security interest under state law, we mean whatever acts must be done to effect perfection under the terms of the applicable state statute, whether those be acts of a creditor or acts of a governmental employee delivering or responding to a creditor’s application.” Fink, 522 U.S. at 213 n. 1, 118 S.Ct. 651 (emphasis added).
Thus, utilizing applicable Kentucky law, this appeal presents the question of whether the submission by a secured creditor of the required documents and fee to the county clerk necessary to have its lien noted on the certificate of title prevents a creditor on a simple contract from acquiring a judicial lien superior to that of the secured creditor during the period between the secured creditor’s submission and the actual issuance of the certificate of title with the lien noted on it. As noted, the Kentucky Supreme Court has not answered this precise question. If there is no Kentucky Supreme Court opinion addressing the issue, a federal court must *476interpret and discern Kentucky law. This Panel is required to make the “best prediction, even in the absence of direct state precedent, of what the [state] Supreme Court would do if it were confronted with [the] question.” Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Managed Health Care Assocs., Inc. v. Kethan, 209 F.3d 923, 927 (6th Cir.2000)). To accomplish this end, this Panel “may rely upon analogous cases and relevant dicta in the decisional law of the State’s highest court, opinions of the State’s intermediate appellate courts to the extent they are persuasive indicia of State Supreme Court direction, and persuasive opinions from other jurisdictions.... ” Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir.1988); see also Baumgart v. Alam (In re Alam), 359 B.R. 142, 147 (6th Cir. BAP 2006).
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, the majority should have relied upon an analogous decision. In Fields Motor Co. v. Sturgill, 279 Ky. 47, 129 S.W.2d 1003 (1939), the court addressed the priority between a chattel mortgage and a judicial attachment levied upon an automobile. The automobile had been sold upon a conditional sales contract, with the seller retaining title as security for the purchase price. The seller mailed the conditional sales contract together with the requisite recording fee to the county clerk, requesting that its lien be recorded. After the contract was received by the county clerk, but before it was placed of record, other creditors of the purchaser issued an attachment to levy the automobile. The creditors asserted a superior lien because the seller’s conditional sales contract had not been recorded and the seller was es-topped from asserting priority to the creditors’ levy. At trial, the seller prevailed. Because the contract and fee were received by the county clerk before the creditors’ levy, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and held that the seller had complied with the perfection requirement. The court explained: “[The seller] had done all [it] could do. [It] had lodged the contract for record and it thereby became notice to purchasers and creditors.” Fields Motor, 129 S.W.2d at 1005.
Fields Motor relied upon Commonwealth v. O’Bryan, Utley & Company, 153 Ky. 406, 155 S.W. 1126, 1128 (1913), in which that court stated, “In modern times it is usually held that a paper is filed on behalf of the party who is required to file it when he has presented it at the proper office and left it with the person in charge thereof and paid the fees for filing, if any are required.” O’Bryan, Utley, 155 S.W. at 1128. O’Bryan held that simply placing the papers in the mail, without proof of actual receipt by the proper authority, was insufficient to establish that the paper was filed. Proof is required that the paper was actually delivered to the proper office in to the custody of one authorized to receive it. Id.
Based upon these decisions, I believe that the Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that more is required than mere mailing, but less is required than actual recor-dation. This is consistent with the Kentucky statute that states that perfection of a lien upon a motor vehicle occurs upon “tender” of the appropriate application and the requisite fee rather than upon issuance of the certificate of title or some other event.
Other jurisdictions are consonant with this interpretation. Huennekens v. Abruzzese (In re Abruzzese), 252 B.R. 341 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1999) is instructive. In Abruzzese, the trustee sought to avoid a lien upon a motor vehicle as a preferential transfer. Application for title and notation of its lien was made by the secured credi*477tor within thirty days after the debtor took possession of the vehicle, but the title was not issued until almost three months thereafter, twenty-nine days prior to the filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition. The enabling loan exception was not at issue in the case. Rather, the only question was whether the transfer of the security interest occurred within the ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing, rendering it a preferential transfer. The trustee maintained that the lien was not perfected until the title was actually issued which noted the creditor’s lien. Virginia law provided that the creditor’s security interest would relate back to the date of purchase if the application for title was made within thirty days of the purchase. Relying upon Fink, the bankruptcy court determined that the security interest was not perfected under federal law until the application was filed, because the application was filed outside the federal limitation. Id. at 344 n. 2. While Virginia law provided that a security interest in a motor vehicle not displayed on the certificate of title was not perfected against third parties, Abruzzese determined that this did not address the question of whether or when a security interest might be perfected prior to the issuance of a certificate of title. That court stated that where Virginia law specified the date for perfection, the date of application, rather than the date of issuance of the certificate of title, governed. Id. at 344-45. Therefore, Abruzzese held that the security interest was perfected on the date that application was made by the secured creditor. Id. The Kentucky statutes are analogous to the Virginia statutes described in Abruzzese. In Kentucky, perfection is not always measured by the issuance of a certificate of title.2
Another analogous decision is Hepner v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (In re Baker), 338 B.R. 470 (Bankr.D.Colo.2005), aff'd, 345 B.R. 261 (D.Colo.2006). In Hepner, the bankruptcy court held that, under Colorado law, a secured creditor could not rely upon the enabling loan exception where, although its application was submitted within twenty days after purchase, the application was not “filed” until more than twenty days thereafter. The applicable Colorado law required that in order for a lien upon a motor vehicle to be effective as a valid lien, it must have been filed for public record. Id. at 475; see Colo.Rev.Stat. § 42-6-120 (2004). Colorado defined the word “file” in the statutes dealing with liens upon motor vehicles as “the creation of or addition to an electronic record maintained for a certificate of title by the director [of the Division of Motor Vehicles] or an authorized agent ...” Id.; Colo.Rev.Stat. § 42-6-102(4.4) (2004). Reading these statutes together, the court concluded that the lien was not “filed” until it had been reviewed and accepted for filing by the appropriate official and entered into the appropriate database. Because the review and filing occurred more than twenty days after the purchase, the *478enabling loan exception was inapplicable. Colorado law provides an example, envisioned by the Supreme Court in Fink, in which the acts necessary to perfect a security interest under state law include acts of a governmental employee. In contrast, Kentucky law does not require “filing,” but merely “tender,” and does not define tender, meaning that it may be taken to have its ordinary dictionary meaning, “to present for acceptance.” Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/ dietionary(last visited June 26, 2007).
I conclude that the lien of BB & T was perfected for purposes of federal bankruptcy law on February 22, 2005, the date when its application and fee were actually received by (i.e., tendered to) the Letcher County Clerk. Because tender occurred within twenty days after the Debtor received possession of the vehicle, February 8, 2005, the enabling loan exception applies. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court.
. BAPCPA extended this period from twenty to thirty days.
. Although Kentucky Revised Statute 186A. 190(1) provides that perfection and discharge of such liens shall be by notation on the certificate of title and “shall remain effective from the date on which the security interest is noted on the ... title for a period of seven (7) years, or ... until discharged. That section also mandates that perfection by notation “shall be in accordance” with chapter 186A of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. As discussed, Chapter 186A includes section 186A. 195(5) which directs that once the certificate of title bearing the lien notation is issued, perfection is measured from the document tender date without mention of whether or not that is the lien notation date. Accordingly, the former section provides a time limit for duration of the lien's perfection after the title bearing the lien notation is issued while section 186A.195(5) establishes the time of perfection.