concurring.
The majority opinion in this case represents only a part of the opinion as originally drafted. Obviously, I concur in the part of the original opinion that has been adopted by the majority of the court as the opinion in this case. However, I believe that much more must be said with reference to certain aspects of the case not now referred to in the opinion.
The Lincoln city council, at its January 25, 1977, meeting voted unanimously to adopt the proposed comprehensive plan. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Cook’s vote was disqualified because of a conflict of interest, I do not believe it would necessitate a reversal of this case. We would, how*169ever, be faced with a question of first impression in this state, which is whether a disqualifying vote will void the city council’s proceedings where that vote is not necessary to pass on the issue. On this point there is a division of authority.
New York, New Jersey, and Iowa have all held that the vote of a municipal officer, who is disqualified to vote because of a conflict in interest, renders the proceedings void or voidable, although his vote was not necessary to pass the issue. Baker v. Marley, 8 N. Y. 2d 365, 208 N. Y. S. 2d 449, 170 N. E. 2d 900 (1960); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N. J. Super. 495, 127 A. 2d 190 (1956); Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N. W. 2d 813 (Iowa, 1969).
The rationale of this rule is enunciated in the case of Piggott v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N. J. Super. 106, 91 A. 2d 667 (1952), where the court stated: “[T]he concurrence of an interested member in the action taken by the body taints it with illegality. * * * The infection of the concurrence of the interested person spreads, so that the action of the whole body is voidable. * * * This is the general rule. * * * It is supported by a twofold reason, viz.: First, the participation of the disqualified member in the discussion may have influenced the opinion of the other members; and, secondly, such participation may cast suspicion on the impartiality of the decision. * * * It being impossible to determine whether the virus of self-interest affected the result, it must needs be assumed that it dominated the body’s deliberations, and that the judgment was its product.”
The states which have held that the vote of a disqualified municipal officer does not vitiate the proceedings where his vote was unnecessary to pass the issue have rejected this argument on the basis that the “illegal” vote does not affect the “legal” votes, particularly when there are multiple votes, only one of which is illegal. Singewald v. Minneapolis Gas Company, 274 Minn. 556, 142 N. W. 2d 739 (1966); *170Eways v. Reading Parking Authority, 385 Pa. 592, 124 A. 2d 92 (1956); Marshall v. Ellwood City Borough, 180 Pa. 348, 41 A. 994 (1899).
The most recent case to which my attention has been directed is Anderson v. City of Parsons, 209 Kan. 337, 496 P. 2d 1333 (1972). In that case the Supreme Court of Kansas held that two city officials who owned property within an urban renewal area, but not within the specific project, and who voted for the project, did not invalidate the majority vote where their interest was general or of a minor character. See, also, Beale v. City of Santa Barbara, 32 Cal. App. 235, 162 P. 657 (1917); Corliss v. Village of Highland Park, 132 Mich. 152, 93 N. W. 254 (1903), affm’d on rehearing, 132 Mich. 152, 95 N. W. 416 (1903).
I believe the above line of cases represents the better authority and that the rule should be that where a required majority exists without the vote of a disqualified council member, his presence and vote will not invalidate the result.
In the instant case, there were six other city council members, all of whom voted to adopt the proposed comprehensive plan submitted to them by the planning commission at the January 25, 1977, city council meeting. The other six members were all fully apprised of Cook’s interest in the designation of his property as a regional shopping center in the comprehensive plan. It appears that Cook on many occasions attempted to, and did, make his interest fully known to the other city council members.
It is clear that since the inception of the plan, about the year 1970, an enormous amount of time, energy, careful thought, and taxpayer funds were put into the development of the comprehensive plan before it was submitted to the city council for adoption. The designation in the comprehensive plan of Cook’s property for a proposed regional shopping center site was just one element in the total compre*171hensive plan for the development of Lincoln and Lancaster County to the year 2000. At the January 25, 1977, council meeting, Cook abstained from voting or participating in the discussion on councilman Robinson’s motion to substitute plaintiffs property for Cook’s property in the plan as the site for a regional shopping center. I believe that even if Cook’s vote were to be considered invalid because of a conflict of interest, the plan, as adopted, should not be adjudged invalid nor voided. To do so would needlessly deprive the citizens of the City of Lincoln and Lancaster County of the undoubted benefits of the comprehensive plan brought to fruition after years of labor on the part of their public officials, and experts employed by them. This would foe a needless and unwarranted waste of resources, and would result in further delay and expense, were we to hold that a disqualified vote invalidates the entire comprehensive plan. This, I submit, should not be done in this or any similar situations arising in the future.