(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The definition of a pistol under the statutory scheme is "a firearm, loaded or unloaded, 30 inches or less in length, or any firearm, loaded or unloaded, which by its construction and appearance conceals it as a firearm.” MCL 750.222(a); MSA 28.419(a).
The word "firearm” is defined in MCL 8.3t; MSA 2.212(20):
The word "firearm,” except as otherwise specifically defined in the statutes, shall be construed to include any weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled by using explosives, .... [Emphasis added.]
The statutory definition does not require that the weapon, i.e., pistol, must be capable of propelling some dangerous projectile.
The majority opinion in People v Sanchez, 98 Mich App 562; 296 NW2d 312 (1980), held the distinction "meaningless” between an inoperable and an unloaded firearm and found an inoperable firearm to be a pistol within the meaning of the statute. The Sanchez majority agreed with People v Jiminez, 27 Mich App 633; 183 NW2d 853 (1970), which also held that an inoperable pistol does not prevent conviction under the statute. This interpretation of the concealed weapons statute is not too broad. Accidentally and intentionally, the discharge of concealed weapons maims and kills students, shopkeepers, pedestrians, and law enforcement officers everyday in our state. Even the dissenting opinion in Sanchez does not advocate adopting a bright-line rule precluding a conviction for carrying a concealed pistol when the pistol is *808inoperable. The instant case may be distinguished from In re Vaughn, 160 Mich App 236; 408 NW2d 85 (1987), lv den 428 Mich 922 (1987). In Vaughn, the Court held that where several boys each carried a piece of a disassembled short-barreled shotgun, none could be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. However, the Court left open the possibility of charging conspiracy to carry a concealed weapon. The completely disassembled state of the weapon in Vaughn made it readily apparent that no weapon had been concealed.
In the instant case, it appears that the pistol was inoperable only because the hammer had broken off. It is undisputed that defendant’s pistol, a nine-millimeter Parabellum SWD Cobray semiautomatic pistol, had been fired shortly before defendant’s arrest.
Consistent with the holdings in Sanchez and Jiminez, I would affirm.