(dissenting). We may, in an appropriate case, interpolate, reject and transpose words in a statute to render a legislative enactment capable of being given a sensible effect in accordance with the purpose of the lawmakers. NCR Corp. v. Revenue Dept., 128 Wis. 2d 442, 457, 384 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Ct. App. 1986). However, “[u]nless an interpretation of a statute would lead to ludicrous or plainly unintended results, our function is not to rewrite the statute.” In Interest of G. & L.P., 119 Wis. 2d 349, 355, 349 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, in this case we cannot know, but only suspect that when the legislature amended sec. 814.29(1), Stats., it dropped a stitch.
I agree with Judge Learned Hand that, “There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally_” Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d *585Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring), quoted in Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128, 138 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). We are admonished, however, that if the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we are to read it as written and not resort to extrinsic aids, such as the legislative history, for the purpose of statutory construction. St. ex rel. Smith v. Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 798, 407 N.W.2d 901, 905 (1987).1 What the majority does, however, is to take a perfectly clear statute, find it ambiguous and amend it by judicial construction. The majority may be correct that the legislature did not intend the result compelled by the plain language of the statute, but it is highly dangerous for courts to amend a statute by judicial construction on the assumption that the legislature did not mean what it said.
By ch. 317, Laws of 1981, secs. 85vg through 85vy, the legislature collected, revised and reenacted statutes relating to court costs and fees. Many of these sections had been scattered throughout the statutes. In the process, the legislature struck from sec. 814.29(1), Stats., “clerk’s” and “or suit tax.” The resulting statute permits waiver of “any service or fee.“ The majority *586concludes that the legislature could not have intended to apply sec. 814.29(1) to fees of court reporters for transcripts under sec. 814.69. This conclusion is not, however, based upon the plain language of the statute as amended but upon the statute as it existed prior to the amendment.
Presumably, clerk’s fees will still be waivable. If not, the statute is meaningless. To achieve that result, however, the majority restores a word to the statute which the legislature purposively deleted. I believe we should give the word “fee” in sec. 814.29(1), Stats., its plain meaning and allow the legislature to pick up the dropped stitch. I respectfully dissent.
The majority suggests that the vast number of cases holding as does Smith have been overruled sub silentio by County of Milwaukee v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 805, 818, 407 N.W.2d 908, 913 (1987), and K.L. v. Hinickle, 144 Wis. 2d 102, 109, 423 N.W.2d 528, 531 (1988). The court in those cases merely noted that the parties disagreed as to the meaning of a statute. Even where the parties agree that a statute is ambiguous, we are not bound by that agreement. Rev. Dept. u. EAA Aviation Foundation, 143 Wis. 2d 681, 684, 422 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Ct. App. 1988). I refuse to accept that the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the cited cases intended, without discussion, to overrule a canon of statutory construction firmly implanted in the jurisprudence of all states and all federal jurisdictions.