(dissenting).
In my opinion, where Hershey failed to propose findings of fact and conclusions of law, the circuit court did not commit reversible error in failing to enter them.
SDCL 15 — 6—52(a) provides in part:
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under § 15-6-12 or § 15-6-56 or any other motion except as provided in § 15 — 6— 41(b).
The majority relies on Grunewaldt v. Bisson, 494 N.W.2d 193 (S.D.1992), to support its determination that because Linard’s motion to modify child support “was closer to a hearing or a trial, than a motion,” the trial court was required to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the majority’s reliance is misplaced.
In Grunewaldt, this court held that, as a matter of settled law, there can be no deviation from the child support schedule unless there is an entry of specific findings regarding the limited statutory factors allowing deviation. Id., 494 N.W.2d at 195. Our holding in Grunewaldt was based on a long line of cases requiring that trial courts enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law when deviating from the mandatory statutory guidelines for child support. Kansas ex rel. Adams v. Adams, 455 N.W.2d 227, 231 (S.D.1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 451 N.W.2d 293, 296 (S.D.1990); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 444 N.W.2d 367, 371 (S.D.1989); Donohue v. Getman, 432 N.W.2d 281, 283 (S.D.1988); Bruning v. Jeffries, 422 N.W.2d 579, 582 (S.D.1988).
The majority’s expansion of the requirement of specific findings of fact, where a trial court is not deviating from the mandatory guidelines, places an unwarranted burden on the trial judges of this state and goes beyond what is required by SDCL 15-6-52(a). The trial court’s failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on Linard’s motion to modify child support was not reversible error. Therefore, I dissent.