¶ 48. (dissenting). I dissent. After reviewing the record in this case, I conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Diocese should have known that Clauder's placement as a hospital chaplain was likely to result in harm to a third party. I also conclude that the majority has unnecessarily reached and erroneously resolved the First Amendment issue presented in this case.
¶ 49. For L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim1 to survive the Diocese's motion for summary judgment, the record must support the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the following issues: 1) that Clauder was an employee of the Diocese at all relevant times; 2) that Clauder engaged in sexually harmful behavior toward T.E., and later used his position as a hospital chaplain to sexually exploit L.L.N.; 3) that Hebl knew or should have known that Clauder engaged in sexually harmful behavior toward T.E.; and 4) that Hebl's knowledge is imputable to the Diocese. The majority reverses the court of appeals and reinstates the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that the record is devoid of facts or inferences *706from facts tending to establish that the Diocese was on notice of Clauder's alleged tendency to sexually exploit women. I disagree.
¶ 50. If the record supported only the proposition that the Diocese was on notice that Clauder had broken his vow of celibacy, the Diocese would be entitled to summary judgment. While Clauder failed to abstain from sex, such a strictly ecclesiastical indiscretion is a stranger to the secular law. There are, however, other facts and inferences from facts in the record which raise a genuine issue of material fact on the notice element of L.L.N.'s claim.
¶ 51. One evening around 9:00 p.m., Hebl entered Clauder's living quarters after hearing Clauder cry for help. Upon entering, Hebl observed the following: Clauder was straddling T.E.; T.E.'s blouse was torn; and Clauder's hand was bleeding from a bite wound.
¶ 52. Critical to the majority's analysis of summary judgment is its narrow view of the facts and its characterization of the T.E. incident as a "consensual sexual relationship." The majority concludes that "[t]hese undisputed facts demonstrate that Clauder, a single man, engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with an adult. ..." Majority op. at 695. I submit that encountering Clauder, who was bleeding at the wrist from a bite, and was straddling T.E. while she was lying on her back on the floor with a ripped blouse, can lead to a reasonable inference that this is something other than a "consensual sexual relationship." It can lead to a reasonable inference that Clauder was engaged in sexually assaultive behavior.
¶ 53. Hebl knew T.E. as a woman who had on prior occasions visited Clauder at the rectory. He knew that Clauder had traveled to Japan to spend time with *707her. He even acknowledged that at the time of the encounter he thought that something sexual might have been going on between Clauder and T.E. Later, after L.L.N. notified the Diocese of her alleged injuries, he reported this encounter to the auxiliary bishop and described it as "suspicious."
¶ 54. However, at the time of the incident he asked no questions and made no reports. Why? As explained by Hebl: "This was such a disappointment to me, I just wanted to forget about it."
¶ 55. Two expert witnesses for the plaintiff opined that the incident should have triggered an awareness by Hebl and the Diocese that Clauder might have a tendency to engage in inappropriate behavior with women and such awareness should have led to an evaluation. Dr. Gonsiorek stated:
In this situation, it was negligent of the Diocese of Madison to continue to place Reverend Clauder as a hospital chaplain without such evaluation. In that placement, the Diocese should have known that Reverend Clauder would have close personal contact as a counselor with adult women, some of whom would be vulnerable because of the severe emotional difficulties they were experiencing as part of their hospitalization.
¶ 56. On a motion for summary judgment, a court takes as true all facts pleaded by the plaintiff and all inferences reasonably derived from those facts. Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 747, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991). Here, the affidavits and other proof must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lisa's Style Shop, Inc. v. Hagen Ins. Agency, 181 Wis. 2d 565, 569, 511 N.W.2d 849 (1994). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must *708be resolved against the moving party, here the Diocese. Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 462, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989). The incident witnessed by Hebl may have been, as the majority asserts, "a consensual sexual relationship" between adults. However, considering Clauder's straddling of T.E. on the floor, the ripped blouse, and the bloody bite on Clauder's wrist, it is also reasonable to infer that this was sexually assaultive behavior. I conclude that the reasonable inference from these facts, together with the affidavits of the plaintiffs experts, support the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
¶ 57. The majority confuses the use of the entire record with the use of hyperbole. It declines to acknowledge excerpts and inferences from the record which are inconsistent with its conclusion, and labels the use of such excerpts and inferences as hyperbolic or excessive. I submit that at this summary judgment stage it is not excessive, indeed it is required, that we review the entire record, including excerpts of depositions and affidavits which may give rise to alternative inferences.
¶ 58. Curiously, the majority refuses to acknowledge that part of Hebl's testimony which supports the reasonable alternative inference of sexually assaultive behavior.2 For example, the majority emphasizes Hebl's statement that he "saw no visual signs, none *709whatsoever of any sexual attack or intimacy or behavior, none whatsoever." Majority op. at 703 (emphasis omitted). Yet, the majority attaches no significance to material on the very next page of Hebl's deposition:
Q: Now, even though you didn't accuse him of any sexual involvement with [T.E.], was that a thought that was in your mind as a possibility?
A: Oh, yeah, I think with the circumstances under which this happened, there could be that possibility, you know but, you know gee, I would never, never accuse him of it....
Q: I understand, but the main and only point I'm trying to talk about now is whether you remember when this happened, having the thought in your mind of whether something sexual had been going on between those two.
A: What I thought in my mind, you know, I said so many things so fast that I won't deny that I could have said, you know, to him in the course of my conversation, you know, "She could turn this whole thing around and accuse you of rape," or something like that....
¶ 59. Elsewhere in Hebl's deposition appears the following exchange, which the majority declines to acknowledge:
Q: And isn't, at least in the hypothetical realm of possibilities, another of the possibilities is that he may have attacked her?
A: That's why I didn't want to make any judgments as to who was at fault here. I was not pointing the finger at her or him.
*710Q: So are you accepting that it is equally possible that he attacked her as it is that she attacked him?
A: I would certainly not throw out that possibility. It's nothing that I myself would accuse him of.
Q: But it is a possibility?
A: Sure. I did not accuse her of anything. I did not accuse him of anything. I just simply wanted them separated and her out.
¶ 60. In yet another part of the record, Hebl makes the following statement:
No, I don't remember me saying to him, accusing him of anything, if that's what you're looking at by saying did the thought enter into my mind, maybe. That's the best I can give you. It could have, it could not have. I suppose we're reasonable people, and we would say this could be one of the possibilities but, you know, amongst many. . . . Let me just add to that, we could turn this around and say she attacked him, or she came on to him or something like that, and he was defending himself. Now, that's the other side of the coin....
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 61. The majority is unable to muster from Hebl's statements the reasonable inference that Hebl knew or should have known that the incident he witnessed between Clauder and T.E. was sexually assaultive in nature. Yet, far from the realm of "hyperbole," Hebl's own deposition testimony shows that reasonable people could draw such an inference. I do not deny that Hebl made other statements elsewhere in his deposition that are apparently at odds with those I have excerpted. However, the majority assumes a jury's role by choosing to credit some of Hebl's statements while discarding others. I conclude that in *711arriving at its determination that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, the majority declines to acknowledge adverse facts in the record, and thereby usurps the jury's function.
¶ 62. Instead of ending its inquiry with a finding of an absence of facts supporting L.L.N. on the notice element of her negligent supervision claim, the majority goes on to find that L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim is barred under the First Amendment because it would require excessive court entanglement in matters of ecclesiastical law and internal church policies. Majority op. at 693-94. It is by now well established that, as a basic rule of judicial decision making, a court should not reach a constitutional issue unless it is essential to the disposition of the case.3
¶ 63. I am perplexed. What prompts the majority to unnecessarily reach out to tackle a constitutional issue? I agree with the concurrence that since this case is decided on summary judgment grounds, the majority should refrain from reaching the First Amendment issue. Violating a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, the majority reaches beyond the purported factual deficiencies of L.L.N.'s claim to unnecessarily, and incorrectly, decide a constitutional issue.
*712¶ 64. L.L.N.'s claim is precluded by the First Amendment, according to the majority, because it cannot be resolved without two constitutionally impermissible judicial inquiries. First, in order to determine that the Diocese had constructive knowledge through Hebl of Clauder's sexual relationship with T.E., "a court would be required to consider church law, policies, or practices." Majority op. at 694. Second, "a court would be required to consider and interpret the vow of celibacy in order to determine whether the Diocese negligently supervised Clauder." Id. The majority errs on both grounds of its First Amendment ruling. That portion of the majority's holding dealing with the vow of celibacy is most easily disposed of, and I deal with it first.4
¶ 65. The majority concludes that knowledge of a clergyman's breach of a vow of celibacy cannot possibly give a religious organization notice that a clergyman is disposed to sexually harmful or deviant behavior. Majority op. at 701. I agree; Clauder's breach of his celibacy vow alone proves nothing of legal significance. It is therefore inconsistent for the majority to use the *713"necessity" of an inquiry into celibacy as a basis for barring the negligent supervision claim on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 694-96. Because the celibacy vow is irrelevant to a negligent clergy supervision claim, it simply cannot be that L.L.N.'s claim "required a court] to consider and interpret the vow of celibacy in order to determine whether the Diocese negligently supervised Clauder." Id. at 694.
¶ 66. It is axiomatic that a claim does not "require" consideration of a fact which fails to aid in proving the claim. Because proof of Clauder's disloyalty to his vow of celibacy adds nothing to L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim, a court has no occasion to consider or interpret the vow. The First Amendment is therefore not implicated.
¶ 67. The majority is incorrect in asserting that L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim against the Diocese is premised solely on Clauder's breach of his vow of celibacy with T.E. Majority op. at 696 n.20. To the contrary, the plaintiffs complaint makes only the general assertion that the Diocese breached its duty to "supervise and oversee all priests with respect to sexual improprieties." None of L.L.N.'s claims against the Diocese even mentions the word "celibacy."
¶ 68. The majority also erroneously states that this dissent is alone in asserting that the facts of this case give rise to an inference "that Clauder was engaged in 'sexually assaultive behavior' toward T.E." Majority op. at 703. Such an assertion is subsumed within L.L.N.'s allegation of "sexual impropriety."5 The affidavits of the plaintiffs expert witnesses also refer to *714the Diocese's constructive notice of Clauder's propensity to engage in inappropriate sexual behavior. Furthermore, Hebl conceded under questioning that sexually assaultive behavior by Clauder was one reasonable inference that could be drawn from the T.E. incident.
¶ 69. According to the majority, L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim also creates an unconstitutional requirement that a court ascertain the relationship between Clauder and the Diocese, Hebl and the Diocese, and Clauder and Hebl. The nature of Clauder's connection with the Diocese is relevant because L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim fails in the absence of a employer-employee relationship between Clauder and the Diocese. See Midwest Knitting Mills, Inc. v. United States, 950 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing negligent supervision liability of "masters" [employers] for acts of "servants" [employees]). The relationship between Hebl and the Diocese is also critical, because L.L.N. must be able to impute Hebl's asserted knowledge of Clauder's sexually exploi-*715tive tendencies to the Diocese. This can only be done if an agency relationship exists between Hebl and the Diocese. See Ivers & Pond Piano Co. v. Peckham, 29 Wis. 2d 364, 369, 139 N.W.2d 57 (1966).
¶ 70. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the Diocese may be charged with constructive notice through Hebl regardless of whether he supervised Clauder. Hebl's knowledge will be imputed to the Diocese so long as Hebl obtained the knowledge in the course of his employment and within the scope of bis authority. See Ivers & Pond Piano Co., 29 Wis. 2d at 369; 3 C.J.S. Agency § 432 (1973). The majority does not dispute that the Diocese placed Hebl and vested him with the authority to maintain order at St. Bernard's parish. Hebl's authority at St. Bernard's is demonstrated in his own deposition testimony, in which he stated that it was his policy that prevented nonfamily members from staying in priests' rooms, and it was he who informed each priest of the policy. There is no assertion that Hebl was acting outside of his authority when he investigated the cry for help and discovered T.E. in Clauder's room. Consideration of these facts in no way requires a court to stand in judgment of church policy or practice.
¶ 71. Religious organizations, like any nonhuman entity, can "act" only through their agents and employees. Accordingly, respondeat superior and negligent supervision claims, which are predicated on an employer-employee relationship, are perhaps the only means of imposing tort liability on a church or similar institution. If courts were not permitted to determine the legal relationship between religious organizations and their clerics, religious organizations would be effectively immunized from tort liability.
*716¶ 72. The First Amendment does not imbue religious organizations with blanket immunity from tort liability. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 314 (Colo. 1993). A court is free to apply "neutral principles" of state law to religious organizations without implicating the First Amendment. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) ("[t]he neutral-principles approach cannot be said to 'inhibit' the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods").6 In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between a religious institution and its clerics, a court does not implicate First Amendment considerations so long as the question may be decided without "determining questions of church law and policies." Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 328, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).
¶ 73. While Pritzlaff announced that negligent supervision claims would be barred in the overwhelming majority of cases, the court did not create an across-the-board proscription on such claims. Critically, negligent supervision claims are precluded only when they *717would require an inquiry into church policies and doctrine. In that sense, Pritzlaff is consistent with those jurisdictions holding that negligent supervision claims are not necessarily precluded on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1995); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Moses, 863 P.2d 310.
¶ 74. The First Amendment does not prevent a court from determining whether an agency or employer-employee relationship exists between a religious organization and its clerics. Such an inquiry does not focus on the commission of an act which is "rooted in religious belief." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). The question also does not embroil the judiciary in a church's internal dispute over matters of ecclesiastical policy and procedure. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
¶ 75. I agree with the court of appeals that to ascertain the nature of the relationship between Clauder and the Diocese, and between Hebl and the Diocese, the circuit court need only apply the neutral rules of agency to the Diocese in the same manner as it would to a secular entity. The court would not be required to resolve disputed issues of religious doctrine or practice. I therefore conclude that such an inquiry is permissible under the First Amendment.
¶ 76. The majority's reasoning that the First Amendment bars consideration of the relationship between a religious organization and its clergy has implications far beyond cases dealing with sexual intercourse between clergy and adult parishioners. If courts cannot take notice of the relationship between a church and a cleric, then respondeat superior and neg*718ligent supervision claims can never be maintained against a religious organization, regardless of prior notice or the degree of sexual deviation.7
¶ 77. For example, suppose that a church knows with certainty that one of its priests is inclined to sexually molest children. The church places the priest in a situation where the priest has regular, unsupervised access to children. The priest molests a child. Under the majority's view, a negligent supervision claim is precluded because the claim requires a court to ascertain whether an employment relationship exists between the priest and the church.
¶ 78. Why should a diocesan decision to let a known pedophile work unsupervised with children enjoy ecclesiastical protection? Is the answer to be, as the majority opinion suggests, that "due to [a] strong belief in redemption, a bishop may determine that a wayward priest can be sufficiently reprimanded through counseling and prayer," and that "mercy and forgiveness . . . are interwoven in the institution's norms and practices"? Majority op. at 690. This reasoning, which stretches the fabric of the First Amendment *719to provide blanket protection to the Diocese in all cases, is erroneous.
¶ 79. If after this case the Diocese were to reinstate Clauder as a hospital chaplain, and Clauder were to use that position to obtain sexual gratification from patients, I cannot accept that the First Amendment would act to bar a negligent supervision claim against the Diocese. The "mercy and forgiveness" of a religious organization toward a known sexually exploitive clergyman does not excuse the organization from responding in damages when the cleric uses his position to procure his next victim. No secular entity enjoys such a broad immunity from tort liability. If a secular employer fails to supervise a servant with known dangerous inclinations, that employer faces liability when the servant uses his or her position with the employer to commit a tortious act. So should it be when a religious organization fails to supervise a cleric known to commit sexually harmful or exploitive acts.
¶ 80. In conclusion, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Diocese should have known that Clauder's placement as a hospital chaplain would likely subject a third party to an unreasonable risk of harm. The Diocese is therefore not entitled to summary judgment on L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim. Furthermore, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim is barred by First Amendment considerations of excessive court entanglement in religious affairs. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*720¶ 81. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson joins this opinion.
Like the majority, I assume without deciding that Wisconsin recognizes a claim for negligent supervision.
In disputing the inference of sexually assaultive behavior, the majority notes that Clauder and T.E. had a "relatively long and consensual relationship," and that the two attended social events, traveled, and dined together. Majority op. at 703.1 am not sure what relevance these facts have to a determination of whether a reasonable inference exists that Hebl knew or should have known of sexually assaultive conduct by Clauder on the evening in question. General evidence of good times together *709does not negate a specific incident of sexually assaultive behavior.
See, e.g., City of Franklin v. Crystal Ridge, Inc., 180 Wis. 2d 561, 573 n.8, 509 N.W.2d 730 (1994); Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 612, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987); S.B. v. Racine County, 138 Wis. 2d 409, 412, 406 N.W.2d 408 (1987); Labor and Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984); Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981); State v. State Fair Park, Inc., 21 Wis. 2d 451, 453, 124 N.W.2d 612 (1963); Witek v. State, 2 Wis. 2d 404, 407, 86 N.W.2d 442 (1957); Smith v. Journal Co., 271 Wis. 384, 390, 73 N.W.2d 429 (1955); State ex rel. Rosenhein v. Frear, 138 Wis. 173, 176, 119 N.W. 894 (1909).
For purposes of considering the First Amendment issue, I take as a given, as I must in a motion for summary judgment, the existence of facts necessary to support L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim. Thus, I assume the following: 1) Clauder was an employee of the Diocese at all relevant times; 2) Clauder engaged in sexually harmful behavior toward T.E., and later used his position as a hospital chaplain to sexually exploit L.L.N.; 3) Hebl knew or should have known that Clauder sexually harmed T.E.; and 4) Hebl was an employee of the Diocese, and his knowledge was thereby imputable to the Diocese. These facts must be assumed because in their absence, there is no negligent supervision claim, and therefore no First Amendment defense.
The majority incorrectly relies on the following exchange at oral argument for the proposition that there is no reasonable inference that Clauder engaged in sexually assaultive conduct toward T.E.:
*714Justice Geske: "Is there any evidence of sexual assault in this case?"
Mr. McFarland (L.L.N.'s attorney): "Not in this case, but there was certainly some physical contact with T.E."
Majority op. at 704, n. 23. It is unclear from the phrase, "Not in this case," whether Attorney McFarland was stating that there is no evidence of sexually assaultive conduct toward L.L.N. alone, or that there is no evidence of sexually assaultive conduct toward either T.E. or L.L.N. Only the latter interpretation would provide support for the majority's ultimate conclusion. I submit that it is unlikely that Attorney McFarland abandoned in oral argument a legal theory subsumed in L.L.N.'s assertion of "sexual impropriety," pursued vigorously in the deposition of Hebl, and supported by the facts in the record. See supra at 709-10.
See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (stating that "a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice"); Employment Div,, Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition").
The majority does not attempt to explain, because it cannot, why an inquiry into Clauder and Hebl's employment relationship with the Diocese is constitutionally barred in this case, but "may be" constitutionally permissible in other cases. Majority op. at 694 n. 18. An inquiry into the existence of a cleric's employment relationship precedes and is independent of an inquiry into the nature of the alleged tortious conduct; the analysis is the same in every case. There is therefore no basis for the majority's statement that its decision might allow a court in a future case to determine the nature of a cleric's employment relationship with a religious organization. In truth, the majority's reasoning operates in every instance as an absolute bar to an inquiry into the existence of a cleric's employment relationship.