(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Although MCR 6.610(E) does not provide a time limit for challenging a plea-based coriyiction, the particular circumstances of this case highlight the need for this Court to impose some restrictions. Here, defendant was represented by counsel when he pleaded guilty in February 1995 of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor, second offense (ouil 2d). He did not challenge his plea until over a year later when he was charged with ouil 3d and faced revocation of his probation, which would result in jail time. Although defendant is challenging his conviction by direct appeal rather than collateral attack, this *104appeal never would have been brought had defendant not been subsequently charged as a third offender. This Court has previously suggested that long-delayed direct attacks on plea-based district court convictions will be deemed collateral and therefore must surmount a high threshold before judicial relief will be considered. People v Erwin, 212 Mich App 55, 66; 536 NW2d 818 (1995). The present case involves precisely the sort of delayed direct attack that should be deemed collateral in the interest of “considerations of finality and administrative consequences [which] must become part of the process with which we assure the achievement of proceedings that are consistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” People v Ingram, 439 Mich 288, 293-294; 484 NW2d 241 (1992).
I agree with the majority that the district court should be mindful of the established procedures for taking pleas in OUIL cases. However, I am even more concerned with allowing a defendant who is represented by counsel an unlimited period during which to challenge an apparently voluntary guilty plea. If this is in fact permitted by the court rules, then I respectfully suggest that the Supreme Court consider amending the court rules to impose a time limit on direct challenges to plea-based convictions in the district court.