In this appeal of right, plaintiffs, elected members of the State Board of Education (hereafter the board), challenge, as being in excess of the authority vested in the Governor by Const 1963, art 5, § 2, and as being in derogation of the board’s inherent constitutional prerogatives under Const 1963, art 8, § 3, the actions of the Governor in promulgating Executive Order Nos. 1996-11 and 1996-12. These orders transfer various powers of the board to the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Ingham Circuit Court agreed with plaintiffs’ contentions, and, on cross-motions for summary disposition, MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), issued a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against the implementation of these orders. We reverse.
1. FACTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The facts in this matter are not in dispute. On December 19, 1996, the Governor issued Executive Order No. 1996-11, which transferred “all of the administrative statutory powers, duties, functions and responsibilities” of the board to the superintendent by *225a “Type II transfer.”1 In effect, Executive Order No. 1996-11 made the superintendent, rather than the board, the administrative head of the Department of Education. This order was to become effective March 10, 1997.
Also on December 19, 1996, the Governor issued Executive Order No. 1996-12. Section 1 of this order transferred “all of the administrative statutory powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities” of the board, as set forth in approximately one hundred different sections of the Michigan Compiled Laws, to the superintendent by a “Type II transfer.” Section 2 transferred “[a]ll of the statutory rule making powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities” of the board, as set forth in an additional approximately thirty-nine sections of the Michigan Compiled Laws, to the superintendent by a “Type II transfer.” Section 3 stated that “all the statutory policy making powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities” of the board, as set forth in approximately thirty-six different sections of the Michigan Compiled Laws, “shall remain with the State Board of Education.” Executive Order No. 1996-12 was to become effective July 1, 1997.
Given the nature of the case before us, we must take note of the limits of judicial competence in such matters. We cannot serve as political overseers of the executive or legislative branches, weighing the costs and benefits of competing political ideas or the wisdom of the executive or legislative branches in taking certain actions, but may only determine whether some constitutional provision has been violated by an *226act (or omission) of the executive or legislative branch. As has been long recognized, when a court confronts a constitutional challenge it must determine the controversy “stripped of all digressive and impertinently heated veneer lest the Court enter — unnecessarily this time — another thorny and trackless bramblebush of politics.” Taylor v Dearborn Twp, 370 Mich 47, 50, 51-52; 120 NW2d 737 (1963) (Black, J., joined by Kavanagh, J.). Indeed, it is clear that issues of motive underlying the contested action are not justiciable. See also Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376; 71 S Ct 783; 95 L Ed 1019 (1951) (noting that it is “not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislatures”).
H. STANDING
As a threshold matter, we address plaintiffs’ standing to maintain this suit and our jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief against the Governor. Plaintiffs represent precisely one-half the membership of the State Board of Education. Voting as a bloc, plaintiffs have the ability to either determine the result of any matter coming before the board, by convincing one other member to join them, or to create an impasse if all other members of the board seek an opposite outcome. However, under Executive Order Nos. 1996-11 and 1996-12, plaintiffs’ ability to forestall action by the board in the exercise of statutorily delegated powers is limited because the superintendent may act unilaterally (unless a majority of the board directs otherwise). This arguable diminution in plaintiffs’ collective influence and official power suffices, in our view, to confer standing on them to pursue this challenge. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 *227Mich 547, 556; 495 NW2d 539 (1993); see also Raines v Byrd,_US_; 117 S Ct 2312, 2319; 138 L Ed 2d 849 (1997).
We would also note that, because a court at all times is required to question sua sponte its own jurisdiction (whether over a person, the subject matter of an action, or the limits on the relief it may afford), Fox v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 375 Mich 238, 242; 134 NW2d 146 (1965), we have some doubt with respect to the propriety of injunctive relief against the Governor. It is clear that separation of powers principles, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, preclude mandatory injunctive relief, mandamus, against the Governor. People ex rel Sutherland v Governor, 29 Mich 320; 18 Am Rep 89 (1874). Whether similar reasoning also puts prohibitory injunctive relief beyond the competence of the judiciary appears to be an open question that need not be resolved in this case. We do note that the Supreme Court has recently recognized that declaratory relief normally will suffice to induce the legislative and executive branches, the principal members of which have taken oaths of fealty to the constitution identical to that taken by the judiciary, Const 1963, art 11, § 1, to conform their actions to constitutional requirements or confine them within constitutional limits. Durant v Michigan, 456 Mich 175, 205; 566 NW2d 272 (1997). Only when declaratory relief has failed should the courts even begin to consider additional forms of relief in these situations. Id. at 206. The need for utmost delicacy on the part of the judiciary, and respect for the unique office of Governor, was similarly recognized in People ex rel Johnson v Coffey, 237 Mich 591, 602; 213 NW 460 (1927):
*228The governor holds an exalted office. To him, and to him alone, a sovereign people has committed the power and the right to determine the facts in the proceeding before us. His decision of disputed question of fact is final. His finding of fact, if it has evidence to support it, is conclusive on this court. It would be unbecoming in us to impugn his motives, and unseemly and unlawful to invade his discretion.
ffl. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is before us on cross-motions for summary disposition, MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de novo. G & A Inc v Nahra, 204 Mich App 329, 330; 514 NW2d 255 (1994). Indeed, summary disposition under either MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10) will always present an issue of law for our determination. Nahra, swpra at 330.
IV. ANALYSIS
When reviewing constitutional provisions, the objective of such review is to effectuate the intent of the people who adopted the constitution. Livingston Co v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 430 Mich 635, 641-642; 425 NW2d 65 (1988). The lodestar principle is that of “common understanding,” the sense of the words used that would have been most obvious to those who voted to adopt the constitution.2 House *229Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 577; 506 NW2d 190 (1993). Where, as here, there is a claim that two different provisions of the constitution collide, we must seek a construction that harmonizes them both. This is so because, both having been adopted simultaneously, neither can logically trump the other. Kunzig v Liquor Control Comm, 327 Mich 474, 480-481; 42 NW2d 247 (1950).
The Governor’s power under Const 1963, art 5, § 2, as has been noted, is nearly plenary.3 In the absence of a legislative veto within sixty days during a regular session (or a full regular session of shorter duration), the Governor, by executive order submitted to the Legislature, may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units that the Governor considers necessary for efficient administration. This power *230includes the authority to delegate, assign, or transfer existing power, responsibility, or authority within, among, or across not more than twenty principal departments. The Governor’s power is limited only by constitutional provisions that would inhibit the Legislature itself. House Speaker v Governor, supra at 578-579; Morris v Governor (On Remand, After Remand), 214 Mich App 604, 608; 543 NW2d 363 (1995). Because the Governor’s action has the status of enacted legislation, it is entitled to the same presumption of constitutionality that an equivalent statute would enjoy. Therefore, the judiciary should construe the executive orders as constitutional unless unconstitutionality clearly appears. Mahaffey v Attorney General, 222 Mich App 325, 344; 564 NW2d 104 (1997) (statutes should be construed as constitutional unless unconstitutionality is clearly apparent).
The board is a constitutional authority, empowered with “[leadership and general supervision over all public education, including adult education and instructional programs in state institutions, except as to institutions of higher education granting baccalaureate degrees.” Const 1963, art 8, § 3.4 The board serves “as the general planning and coordinating body *231for all public education, including higher education,” and as advisor to “the legislature as to the financial requirements in connection therewith.” Const 1963, art 8, § 3, cl 1. The board consists of eight members nominated by party conventions and elected at large for terms of eight years as prescribed by law. Id., § 3, cl 3. The superintendent is appointed by the board, serves as its chaiiperson, but without voting rights, and is imbued by the constitution with responsibility for execution of board policies. Id., § 3, cl 2. The Governor serves as an ex-officio member of the board, without the right to vote. Id., § 3, cl 3. As are all such administrative agencies, the board is part of the executive branch of government.5 Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist v Bay Co, 385 Mich 710, 727; 190 NW2d 219 (1971).
Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend that the board is not part of or within the executive branch. In this regard, we note that Const 1963, art 3, § 2 provides that the powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. In Federated Publications v Michigan State Univ Bd of Trustees, 221 Mich App 103, 113; 561 NW2d 433 (1997), we dealt with a somewhat similar argument, to the effect that the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 el seq.) MSA 4.1800(11) et seq., does not apply to public universi*232ties that were asserted to be “coequal branches of government.” We responded unequivocally:
We disagree. In In re 1976 PA 267 [400 Mich 660; 255 NW2d 635 (1977)], the Court noted that the powers of government were divided among three branches of government pursuant to Const 1963, art 3, § 2. It further noted that the separation of powers set forth in the constitution was “designed to preserve the independence of the three branches of government.” Id. at 662. Although various cases have stated that public universities are branches of government coequal with the Legislature, the constitution does not contain any provision that elevates them to a fourth branch of government. See Walker v Wolverine Fabricating Mfg Co, Inc, 425 Mich 586, 607; 391 NW2d 286 (1986). Because autonomous state universities have not achieved that status under the constitution, In re 1976 PA 267 is inapplicable to this case. [Federated Publications, supra at 113-114 (emphasis in original).]
We apply the same reasoning here. The board is not a fourth branch of government. To so hold would be to directly contravene the plain meaning of Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Further, the board is not a part of the legislative or the judicial branch. Rather, the board is part of and within the executive branch, albeit as a constitutionally created entity with five specifically delineated, and therefore constitutionally inviolable, functions.6 In this regard, the constitutional location of the board’s functions within the executive branch is simi*233lar to that of the State Transportation Commission, under Const 1963, art 5, § 28, the Civil Rights Commission, under Const 1963, art 5, § 29, and the Civil Service Commission, under Const 1963, art 11, § 5.7
The constitution contains specific requirements relating to the Department of Education. Const 1963, art 8, § 3, cl 2 specifies that the superintendent “shall be the principal executive officer of a state department of education which shall have powers and duties provided by law.” This must be read as some limitation on the Governor’s generally plenary power under Const 1963, art 5, § 2, subject to veto by joint legislative resolution, to reorganize state government into not more than twenty principal departments. It may be logically concluded, given the fact that the Department of Education is specifically mentioned in the constitution, that the department is one of the twenty “principal departments.”
*234The parties do not suggest that the executive orders at issue engender a violation of the constitutional limitation to twenty principal departments. Similarly, the parties do not suggest that the Governor sought to implement such orders before the expiration of the constitutionally prescribed sixty regular legislative session days or a full regular session of shorter duration. Finally, the parties do not suggest that the Legislature, by concurrent resolution of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, disapproved either or both of the executive orders on the basis of a concern about the board’s constitutional prerogatives or authority.
The executive orders at issue transfer a variety of statutory powers, both administrative and regulatory, from the board to the superintendent. Both orders explicitly provide:
Nothing in this Executive Order should be construed to diminish the constitutional authority of the State Board of Education to provide leadership and general supervision over all public education, including adult education and instructional programs in state institutions, except as to institutions of higher education granting baccalaureate degrees, and its authority to serve as the general planning and coordinating body for all public education including higher education, and to advise the legislature as to the financial requirements in connection therewith. [Executive Order No. 1996-11, ¶ 2; Executive Order 1996-12, ¶ 5.]
Executive Order No. 1996-12 additionally specifies that the board “shall retain its policy making authority with regard to these statutory provisions by determining the policies, if any, on which the administration of these provisions shall be based.”
*235The first factor critical to our determination is that the executive orders address only the powers and duties that are conferred upon the board by statute. Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, the Governor did not transfer constitutionally granted functions from one executive branch agency, board, or entity to another. Const 1963, art 8, § 3 does not state that the board is to be the head of the Department of Education. Rather, this language is contained in § 301 of the Executive Organization Act of 1965, MCL 16.401; MSA 3.29(301).8 Similarly, the functions transferred by Executive Order Nos. 1996-11 and 1996-12 were created by the Legislature through enactment of the relevant statutes, not by the people directly through adoption of Const 1963, art 8, § 5.9
*236Therefore, the board is not constitutionally required, as part of its function of providing leadership and general supervision over all public education, to head the Department of Education. We believe it axiomatic that the Governor may, under Const 1963, art 5, § 2, cl 2, alter the current scheme and vest that function in the superintendent. Because the Legislature could have delegated such powers to the superintendent ab initio, the Governor is free to redistribute those powers within the Department of Education in any manner in which the Legislature could have assigned such authority originally or by amendment. See House Speaker, supra.
We note that plaintiffs’ counsel during oral argument appeared to concede that the Legislature could constitutionally repeal the sections of the statutes delineating the functions that Executive Order No. 1996-12 transferred. Counsel was unwilling to concede, however, that the Legislature could constitutionally transfer such functions away from the board. Clearly, plaintiffs are standing on unstable ground. Because the Legislature originally enacted these statutory provisions, there can be no constitutional bar to a later repeal. Equally clearly, such a repeal would not impinge upon the board’s constitutional function of leadership and general supervision over public education.
We also believe it clear that the Legislature could constitutionally transfer functions that it had previously vested in the board. Indeed, we see no functional difference between a repeal of such functions *237and a transfer of such functions. Here, the transfers in question were accomplished by executive order rather than legislative action but, as noted above, under House Speaker, supra, and Morris, supra, when the Legislature allocates a function, the Governor may thereafter change that allocation through the exercise of the Governor’s reorganization powers under Const 1963, art 5, § 2, cl 2. As House Speaker, supra at 579, specifically held:
The constitution, then, specifically recognizes that, where the Governor feels compelled to make certain changes within the executive branch, he has authority, through the executive order procedure, in effect, to enact laws to carry out those changes. The only way to preclude such changes is through a properly supported legislative veto. In other words, after the initial executive branch organization, the Governor’s reorganization powers are equal to the Legislature’s initial and subsequent reorganization powers. [Emphasis added.] [10]
Simply put, and as argued by the Governor, if the Legislature can place a statutory function within an executive branch agency, board, or entity, the Governor by executive order may transfer the function to another executive branch agency, board, or entity.* 11
*238Plaintiffs also argue that contemporaneous legislative (i.e., the enactment of § 301 of the Executive Organization Act of 1965) and gubernatorial (i.e., the issuance of Executive Order No. 1965-9) actions constitute “understandings” that Const 1963, art 8, § 3 should be read as requiring the board to be the head of the Department of Education. We disagree. Rather, we regard these actions not as signaling a contemporaneous understanding that the constitution requires such an outcome but rather as expressing a policy determination that such an outcome was then desirable. Under Const 1963, art 3, § 2, we do not function as reviewers of such policy determinations, whether they are made by the legislative or executive branch, and we therefore express no opinion with respect to the wisdom, or lack thereof, of making the superintendent the head of the Department of Education. Rather, we hold that the constitution does not require that the board function in this capacity.12
By expressly declaring that the board may continue to set policies pursuant to which the superintendent shall carry out these various statutorily created responsibilities, the Governor has merely shifted legislatively delegated authority from the board to the *239superintendent. In no perceptible way does this facially infringe any of the board’s constitutional powers or prerogatives under Const 1963, art 8, § 3. Indeed, Executive Order No. 1996-12 specifically provides that the board shall retain its statutory policy-making powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities. Because the Governor has protected the ultimate authority of the board with apparent fidelity to Const 1963, art 8, § 3, no improper transfer of its powers or diminution of its ultimate responsibilities has occurred. See Bays v Dep’t of State Police, 119 Mich App 719, 721-722; 326 NW2d 620 (1982) (no improper delegation of decision-making power of the Civil Service Commission where it retained “ultimate power over those decisions with which it is charged”).
Our second major area of analysis concerns whether the Governor’s actions divest the board of “control” over the system of public education in Michigan. We do not believe that the Governor has divested the board of ultimate control or that the Governor’s actions limit that control in violation of Const 1963, art 8, § 3.
The party challenging the facial constitutionality of an act “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid. The fact that the . . . [a]ct might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient . . . .” United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987). Further, “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [an act], the existence of the state of facts at the time the law [or, here, an executive order] was enacted must be assumed.” 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 218, p 642. In addition, “[a] statute [or, *240here, an executive order] may be constitutional although it lacks provisions which meet constitutional requirements, if it has terms not excluding such requirements, and in this situation the court is justified in holding that the statute was intended to be subject to such requirements, and that those requirements are to be considered as embodied in the statute.” Id., § 225, p 659.13
Here, Executive Order No. 1996-11 states that nothing within it is to be construed to diminish the constitutional authority of the board to provide leadership and general supervision over all public education. Thus, the terms of the executive order specifically include the requirements of Const 1963, art 8, § 3. Additionally, we can easily conceive of a state of facts in which the superintendent exercises the administrative functions of the head of the Department of Education while the board continues to exercise its leadership and general supervision over public education. Indeed, construing Executive Order No. 1996-11 in its entirety, we conclude that this is what the Governor intended. Executive Order No. 1996-11 basically involves the internal organization of the Department of Education and, as such, would have minimal effect on the functioning of the board. It would also appear to be exactly the type of transfer envisioned by Const 1963, art 5, § 2 and House Speaker, supra. We do not discount the fact that the superintendent, or his successors), could, conceivably and at some time in the future, encroach upon the board’s constitutionally granted functions. However, *241unless and until such an encroachment actually occurs, the issue is not ripe for adjudication. General Motors Corp v Attorney General, 294 Mich 558, 568; 293 NW 751 (1940).
Similarly, we find no constitutional bar prohibiting the transfer of functions effectuated by Executive Order No. 1996-12. As noted above, this order transfers the “administrative statutory powers, duties, functions and responsibilities” of the board to the superintendent. Plaintiffs argue that these transfers directly affect the authority of the board and are not “concerned with the organization and powers of the Department of Education.” However, plaintiffs have not established that there is no set of circumstances under which the transfers would be valid and we note that, as with Executive Order No. 1996-11, Executive Order No. 1996-12 states that nothing within it is to be construed to diminish the constitutional authority of the board to provide leadership and general supervision over all public education. Furthermore, as noted above, Executive Order No. 1996-12 explicitly provides that the board shall retain certain statutory policy-making powers and responsibilities.
In this respect, we note that there is no question that the board retains its constitutional authority to appoint the superintendent and to determine the superintendent’s term of office and, by implication, this language suggests that the board also retains the power to shorten the term of office of the superintendent. The board also retains its statutory policy-making powers and its ability to provide “leadership and general supervision.” These powers, retained by the board, certainly give the board authority over the superintendent and control over public education. We *242therefore, under the facts before us, find that ultimate control remains with the board.
In conclusion, we do not believe that either Executive Order No. 1996-11 or Executive Order No. 1996-12 facially14 infringes any of the board’s constitutional powers or prerogatives under Const 1963, art 8, § 3. Given that the Governor has protected the board’s ultimate authority over our educational system, we hold that the Governor has made no improper transfer of its powers or responsibilities. We further hold that the executive orders at issue are within the scope of the Governor’s authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2.
We reverse the decision of the circuit court and, pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(7), grant a judgment of no cause of action in favor of the defendant. We also give this decision immediate effect pursuant to MCR 7.215(E)(2). We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, a question of public significance being involved.
Whttbeck, J., concurred.Pursuant to MCL 16.103(b); MSA 3.29(3)(b), a “type n transfer” allows the transferring of an existing board to a principal department.
Both sides have cited portions of the “Address to the People” and the record of the Constitutional Convention, both of which may properly be considered in interpreting constitutional provisions. Bingo Coalition for Charity — Not Politics v Bd of State Canvassers, 215 Mich App 405, 410; 546 NW2d 637 (1996). However, nowhere was this precise issue considered or discussed, and what remains is too ambiguous and short-lived to serve as a reliable basis for resolution of the issue confronting us, particularly when the constitutional phraseology at issue is, in our view, straightforward in meaning and application on the record before us. See Doe v Dep’t of Social Services, 439 Mich 650, 672-674; 487 NW2d 166 (1992).
Const 1963, art 5, § 2 provides:
All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20 principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to mqjor purposes.
Subsequent to the initial allocation, the governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and submitted to the legislature. Thereafter the legislature shall have 60 calendar days of a regular session, or a full regular session if of shorter duration, to disapprove each executive order. Unless disapproved in both houses by a resolution concurred in by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, each order shall become effective at a date thereafter to be designated by the governor.
Const 1963, art 8, § 3 provides, in part:
Leadership and general supervision over all public education, including adult education and instructional programs in state institutions, except as to institutions of higher education granting baccalaureate degrees, is vested in a state board of education. It shall serve, as the general planning and coordinating body for all public education, including higher education, and shall advise the legislature as to the financial requirements in connection therewith.
The state board of education shall appoint a superintendent of public instruction whose term of office shall be determined by the board. He shall be the chairman of the board without the right to vote, and shall be responsible for the execution of its policies. He *231shall be the principal executive officer of a state department of education which shall have powers and duties provided by law.
Because members of the board are neither appointed nor directly overseen by the Legislature or the judiciary, the board must be part of the executive branch. There is no fourth branch of government. Walker v Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg, Inc, 425 Mich 586, 607; 391 NW2d 296 (1986); Civil Service Comm v Auditor General, 302 Mich 673, 682; 5 NW2d 536 (1942).
These functions are (1) to exercise “[(leadership and general supervision over all public education, including adult education and instructional programs in state institutions, except as to institutions of higher education granting baccalaureate degrees,” (2) to serve “as the general planning and coordinating body for all public education, including higher education, before” (3) to “advise the legislature as to the final requirements in connection therewith,” (4) to appoint the superintendent, and (5) to determine the term of office of the superintendent. Const 1963, art 8, § 3.
We note that the Civil Service Commission’s functions are not set out in the article of Const 1963 dealing with the executive branch but in the article dealing with public officers and employment. However, in Reed v Civil Service Comm, 301 Mich 137, 152; 3 NW2d 41 (1942), the Michigan Supreme Court, in construing the 1941 amendment of Const 1908 that created the Civil Service Commission as a constitutional rather than a statutory entity, referred to “rights . . . affected by the arbitrary or unreasonable action of an administrative agency.” (Emphasis supplied.) The logical repository for administrative, as compared to legislative or judicial, functions is in the executive branch. But see the concurrence of Chandler, C.J., joined by Bdshnell, J:
Unquestionably the civil service commission is a constitutional body possessing plenary power. In its acts it is not subject to control or regulation by either [sic] the executive, legislative or judicial branch of our State government. [Reed, supra, at 163.]
See also Viculin v Dep’t of Civil Service, 386 Mich 375, 385-386, n 11; 192 NW2d 449 (1971) (boards and commissions created throughout the constitution are administrative bodies); Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist, supra at 727 (administrative agencies are part of the executive branch of government.).
As noted by plaintiffs, Lieutenant and Acting Governor William Milliken in Executive Order No. 1965-19 (1) established the Department of Education in the executive branch, (2) established the state board as the head of the Department of Education, (3) established the superintendent as the principal executive officer of the Department of Education, and (4) stated that, “[T]he state board of education is hereafter responsible for carrying out file functions, duties, and responsibilities of the department of education in accordance with the constitution and the statutes of this state.” As noted in House Speaker, supra, at 579, when the Governor makes changes within the executive branch through the executive order procedure, he has the authority, in effect, to enact laws to carry out those changes. See also Morris, supra at 612, quoting House Speaker to the effect that the Governor’s reorganization powers are equal to the Legislature’s initial and subsequent reorganization powers. Thus, we consider Lieutenant and Acting Governor William Milliken’s actions in Executive Order No. 1965-19 to be equivalent to the Legislature’s actions in § 301 of the Executive Organization Act of 1965.
Executive Order No. 1996-11 transfers “administrative statutory powers, duties, functions and responsibilities” of the board. These “statutory powers” are found in MCL 16.401; MSA 3.29(301), MCL 16.107(a); MSA 3.29(7)(a), and MCL 16.109; MSA 3.29(9). Section 1 of Executive Order No. 1996-12 transfers approximately one hundred “administrative statutory powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities” of the board, as found in the relevant provisions of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Section 2 transfers the board’s “statutory rule making powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities” as found in approximately thirty-nine provisions of the *236Michigan Compiled Laws. The statutory sections cited in Executive Order No. 1996-12 are simply too numerous to cite in this opinion.
See also Morris, supra at 609:
[T]he Governor’s reorganization powers are equal to the Legislature’s initial as well as subsequent reorganization powers. In other words, when the Governor acts under this constitutional provision by means of an executive order, and that order is not overturned by the Legislature, it is as if the Legislature had acted. [First emphasis in original; second emphasis supplied.]
The affidavits that plaintiffs Kathleen Straus and Barbara Roberts Mason submitted to the lower court do not alter our conclusion. We first note that these affidavits contain a mixture of fact and opinion. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, while these affidavits describe the current *238process by which the board carries out its legislatively derived functions, it does not logically follow that such functions are inherent to, and therefore inseparable from, the board’s constitutionally derived functions. Therefore, we do not agree that these affidavits support a finding, advanced by plaintiffs, that the executive orders transferred “all powers which are a necessary incident of the Board’s overarching power or duty to exercise leadership and general supervision of all public education in Michigan.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In this regard, we note that the Address to the People accompanying Const 1963, art 8, § 3 stated that “The superintendent would be considered as administrative head of a state department of education and as such would be a staff officer to the governor and on his administrative board.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Quoted with approval in Council of Organizations v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 568-569; 566 NW2d 208 (1997).
We are not blind to the possibility that the superintendent could exceed these boundaries. However, we have no reason to anticipate that such a public officer will engage in ultra vires actions. Furthermore, on proper complaint, the judiciary will inquire into the matter and, if the board’s constitutional prerogatives have been invaded, redress the infringement. Until such time, no such issue is ripe for adjudication. United Public Workers of America (CIO) v Mitchell, 330 US 75, 89-91; 67 S Ct 556; 91 L Ed 754 (1947); General Motors, supra at 568. Where a constitutional question is presented anticipatorily, the Court is required by the limits on its authority to decline to rule. Sullivan v Bd of Dentistry, 268 Mich 427, 429-430; 256 NW 471 (1934).