(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s well-reasoned conclusion that the union will not prevail on the merits of this claim. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Secretary of State’s emergency rules are substantively valid. For these reasons, I conclude that the lower court should not have issued injunctions against enforcement of the Secretary of State’s declaratory rulings or properly promulgated emergency rules.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the emergency rules are procedurally invalid for lack of the prerequisite emergency. In so holding, the majority places its stamp of approval on a process that allows one of the largest political fundraising organizations in the state of Michigan, outside the major political parties, to ignore the law and operate by separate rules during an ongoing election cycle. This situation, in my view, is no different from allowing candidates favored by the AFL-CIO to stuff ballot boxes1 while those supported by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce could not, or vice versa. The circuit court, by its rash issuance of a preliminary injunction that threatens irrevocably to skew the political process, vividly demonstrates why the people confided the duty to preserve the purity of elections *27to the legislative, rather than the judicial, branch. The result constitutes a threat to the welfare of the community as a whole, because it represents a direct attack on the entire democratic process.
The primary shortcoming of the majority opinion is its conclusion that the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the determination of the executive branch that an emergency existed. The Legislature has delegated, with appropriate standards, that power to the Governor and has invited neither oversight nor second-guessing by the judiciary. The issuance of a preliminary injunction under these circumstances violates the principle of separation of powers by way of judicial intrusion into an area constitutionally reserved for the other branches of government.
I further observe that the union brought this cause of action to the circuit court in the first instance without having first exhausted available administrative remedies. The court accordingly should have dismissed the case and allowed the administrative process to play itself out. But for this initial error, the instant controversy need not have escalated to involve the promulgation of the emergency rules and related controversies.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns a facial challenge to the validity of a declaratory ruling by the Secretary of State, and a challenge to emergency rules promulgated by the Secretary of State and approved by the Governor. In early 1997, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce requested a declaratory ruling and interpretative statement concerning the requirements of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA), MCL 169.201 et *28seq.; MSA 4.1703(1) et seq., as amended. The requests concerned the timing, manner, and effect of the “affirmative consent” that is required to initiate payroll deductions for campaign contributions under § 55(6) of the MCFA. On July 11, 1997, the Secretary of State issued a final response to the Chamber of Commerce and made the ruling available to the public.
On July 31, 1997, the AFL-CIO brought this action, seeking, inter alia, a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Secretary of State’s declaratory ruling. On August 28, 1997, a hearing on the union’s request took place in the circuit court. There were no factual disputes, and no testimony was presented. Ruling purely as a matter of law, the court granted the union’s motion, preliminarily enjoining the Secretary of State from applying and enforcing the declaratory ruling against “Plaintiff Michigan State AFL-CIO and its political committee and its affiliated organizations and their political committees.” Significantly, the August 28 injunction does not apply to any other political organization or labor union in Michigan. The court further held that the Secretary of State could enforce such interpretations of the mcfa only through formal rules promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act (apa).
The emergency rules at issue were adopted in response to this latter aspect of the circuit court’s holding. The section of the rules entitled “Finding of Emergency” notes that the “governor has indicated that an injunction which frustrates state policy adversely affects the public welfare and justifies the promulgation of emergency rules” and that the “department of state finds that preservation of the public welfare requires [their] promulgation.” This *29section also states that the delay inherent in utilizing the permanent apa rule-making process “could allow political contributions to be made in contravention of the current policy of the state of Michigan.” As required by § 48(1) of the apa, the Governor approved the rules and concurred “in the finding of the Michigan Department of State, that circumstances have created an emergency and the public interest requires the emergency promulgation of the rules pertaining to ‘Campaign Financing.’ ”2
On September 4, 1997, the union moved for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the emergency rules. On September 19, 1997, the Secretary of State moved for dismissal of the union’s complaint and requested that the August 28, 1997, preliminary injunction be vacated. On September 24, 1997, the circuit court heard arguments. The AFL-CIO argued that the court could review the declaration of emergency and that no emergency existed that would justify the Secretary of State’s promulgation of the new rules under MCL 24.248; MSA 3.560(148). The Secretary of State argued that an emergency had been created by the court’s previous injunction prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing its interpretations regarding § 55(6) of the mcfa against the union. The Secretary of State explained that because the injunction affected only the union, an unequal enforcement scheme had been *30created under which the union could exercise undue political influence.
The trial court enjoined the general application of the emergency rules, finding that the harm resulting from its refusal to issue the requested injunction would outweigh any harm resulting from its grant of the injunction, and that the union had a high likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the rules were in violation of the APA. Because the emergency rules reflected the earlier declarations and interpretations that the trial court had made in conjunction with the August 28, 1997, injunction, the court “adopt[ed] [its] previous comments in this matter and [its] previous ruling.” As a result, the concerns underlying the promulgation of emergency rules— namely, the unequal enforcement scheme — again became problematic.
n. THE EMERGENCY RULES
This is an issue of first impression in Michigan. Since this Court affirmed the finding of an emergency in Michigan Petroleum Ass’n v State Fire Safety Bd, 124 Mich App 187; 333 NW2d 506 (1983), it has had no occasion to consider seriously whether review of emergency rules lies within the sphere of judicial competence. However, now that the majority has opined in this case that no emergency has been factually established sufficient to invoke the rule-making powers conferred on the Secretary of State by § 48 of the APA, I believe it necessary to investigate the reasoning by which it purports to make that determination.
Section 48 of the apa requires that any finding of an emergency be endorsed by the Governor before emer*31gency rules can be promulgated. It has long been the rule in this state that when a statute confers such authority upon the Governor, “reasons of a conclusive nature must be presumed to have been found, requiring the particular authority to be confided to the chief executive as one properly and peculiarly, if not exclusively pertaining to the department which he represents.” People ex rel Sutherland v Governor, 29 Mich 320, 329; 18 Am Rep 89 (1874). Under such circumstances, when a factual question is submitted to the Governor’s judgment or discretion, such judgment or discretion cannot be judicially coerced, and the judicial branch is without jurisdiction or authority to review the executive actions of the Governor or the manner in which the Governor fulfills such duties. Id. at 322-323. See also People ex rel Ayres v Bd of State Auditors, 42 Mich 422, 426; 4 NW 274 (1880) (“we cannot interfere with the discretion of the chief executive of the State or subordinate him to our process”).
This conclusion is consistent with the principle of separation of powers, which forms “the fundamental framework of our system of government.” O’Donnell v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 541-542; 273 NW2d 829 (1979). As a general rule, the principle recognizes the distinct provinces of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government, and mandates that no one branch attempt to “control, direct or restrain the action” of another. Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447, 488; 43 S Ct 597; 67 L Ed 1078 (1923). This principle is expressly embedded into our state constitution: “No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as *32expressly provided in this constitution.” Const 1963, art 3, § 2. As our Supreme Court has noted, a purpose of the separation of powers is “to make certain that the judiciary does not substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to what is best or what is wisest.” O’Donnell, supra at 542. This principle is likewise offended when the judiciary attempts to substitute its judgment for that of the executive branch.
Separation of powers principles suggest that a gubernatorial declaration of emergency is conclusive on the judicial branch. See Moyer v Peabody, 212 US 78, 83; 29 S Ct 235; 53 L Ed 410 (1909). In Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217; 82 S Ct 691; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962), the United States Supreme Court observed as follows:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Several of these formulations are applicable in the instant case. First, courts are ill-equipped to make *33such detenuinations as the one at issue. See Idaho State AFL-CIO v Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 695; 718 P2d 1129 (1986) (“The decision that a legislative bill is so urgently and immediately needed as to justify a declaration of emergency is a decision-making function that is uniquely legislative. The courts are ill equipped to make such policy decisions.”). There is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the problem of what events must exist to constitute a sufficient emergency such that legislation directed to alleviate that emergency can justifiably become immediately effective. For a court to undertake its own independent resolution of such policy determinations creates the potential for “embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by different branches of government on one question.” Baker, supra at 217. Additionally, although our state constitution does not commit the power to declare an emergency to any single branch of government, it does grant the Legislature the power to make all laws necessary to guarantee “the purify of elections” and to “guard against abuses of the elective franchise.” Const 1963, art 2, § 4. As this Court has noted, “The judiciary must be careful to respect the principle of separation of powers in these election situations.” Gracey v Grosse Pointe Farms Clerk, 182 Mich App 193, 205; 452 NW2d 471 (1989).
Although in the instant case the Legislature has delegated certain rule-making powers to an administrative agency within the executive branch, that delegation does not obviate separation of powers concerns regarding the trial court’s actions. First, the Legislature’s power to delegate rule-making authority to an administrative agency for purposes of giving effect to *34legislation is not a matter of dispute. Coffman v State Bd of Examiners in Optometry, 331 Mich 582; 50 NW2d 322 (1951). Such a delegation is constitutionally valid if the Legislature prescribes “standards . . . as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits.” Osius v St Clair Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25 (1956). The lawfulness of this delegation as concerns the instant case is not questioned by the parties or the majority opinion. Second, the Legislature has made the Governor’s concurrence necessary for the promulgation of emergency rules. This provision undoubtedly recognizes the need for expediency in emergency situations — a need more easily fulfilled by requiring the consent of one individual than by requiring a vote in the House and Senate. Finally, the trial court’s actions in this case effectively prevent the Legislature from enforcing § 55(6) of the mcfa. The actions condoned by the majority opinion ultimately prevent the Legislature from carrying out its constitutionally prescribed function of assuring “the purity of elections.” Const 1963, art 2, § 4.
The case before us is “political” in much the same manner that Baker v Carr was a “political case.” As Baker indicates, the decision to classify a situation as an “emergency” in order to get legislation put into immediate effect is a decision best left to the legislative and executive branches of government. Baker, supra at 217. If we allow the judiciary to second-guess this nonjusticiable political decision, the result could become largely dependent on the personal beliefs, understandings, and allegiances of particular trial court judges. In the interest of comity between the branches, such a result should be avoided.
*35In this respect, I take guidance from the analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court in Diefendorf v Gallet, 51 Idaho 619; 10 P2d 307 (1932) (later superseded by statute as stated in John Hancock Mut Life Ins Co v Neill, 79 Idaho 385; 319 P2d 195 [1957]). In Diefendorf, the court found that the judiciary could not second-guess the governor’s determination that a sufficient emergency existed to justify convening an extraordinary session of the legislature.
The detemiination as to whether facts exist such as to constitute “an extraordinary occasion” is for [the governor] alone to determine. The responsibility and the discretion are his, not to be interfered with by any other co-ordinate branch of the government.
“It would be an unprecedented proceeding for the court to entertain a controversy wherein proof is offered to ascertain judicially whether an extraordinary occasion existed of sufficient gravity to authorize the governor to convene the legislature in extra session .... [A] review of such a discretionary act of the governor should not be done by the courts.” [Diefendorf, supra at 638, quoting Utah Power & Light Co v Pfost, 52 F2d 226, 231 (CA DC, 1931).]
The court continued, “ ‘The motives which prompted the governor . . . to . . . make such determination are not proper subjects of judicial inquiry. Such inquiry would be opposed both to the plainest principles of public policy and the freedom of action by the executive within the constitutional authority of that department of government.’ ” Diefendorf, supra at 639, quoting In re Moyer, 12 Idaho 250, 257; 85 P 897 (1906). See also Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 372; 71 S Ct 783; 95 L Ed 1019 (1951).
I further note that current case law casts doubt upon the propriety of granting injunctive relief against the Governor and that the cases instead suggest that *36the constitutional separation of powers precludes mandatory injunctive relief (mandamus) against the Governor. See, e.g., Musselman v Governor, 448 Mich 503, 524; 533 NW2d 237 (1995). As our Supreme Court recently recognized, declaratory relief generally will induce the legislative and executive branches to conform their actions to constitutional requirements or confine them within constitutional limits. Durant v Michigan, 456 Mich 175, 205; 566 NW2d 272 (1997). Only when declaratory relief has failed should courts consider more drastic forms of relief. Id. at 206. Indeed, Michigan case law over the past century recognizes the need for utmost delicacy on the part of the judiciary when the executive branch makes findings of fact or decides a “disputed question.” See, e.g., People ex rel Johnson v Coffey, 237 Mich 591, 602; 213 NW 460 (1927); Ayres, supra.3
Whether an emergency exists is a manifestly political question, which accordingly lies beyond the power of the judiciary to reconsider. If the Governor has abused the power statutorily reposed in him— which I do not suggest is the case — the remedy is to be found in the political process. Those dissatisfied by the executive’s actions may seek recall, Const 1963, art 2, § 8, campaign for impeachment, Const 1963, art 11, § 7, or propose legislation that would confer the power at issue on an inferior officer whose *37exercise of discretion may properly be subjected to judicial review. Gubernatorial action of the kind in question, however, does not lend itself to judicial review or interference.4
Here, not only has the Governor made a finding that an emergency exists, but the Secretary of State, an inferior constitutional officer, initially made the identical finding. Further, the Secretary of State’s involvement does not itself invite judicial review of the finding at issue. “When the head of a department acts as the mere assistant or agent of the executive in the performance of a political or discretionary act, [s]he is no more subject to the control of the courts than the chief executive himself . . . .” Sutherland, supra at 327. Hence, because the Secretary of State must obtain the Governor’s imprimatur before promulgating emergency rules, such action is that of the governor and is beyond the proper scope of judicial intermeddling.
In any event, even if the judiciary could review the factual basis for a gubernatorial declaration of emer*38gency, the facts amply support that determination. This conclusion may be reached under the majority’s confabulated standard of review or any other. The majority opines that “we fail to perceive how preservation of the political interests of the whole community is threatened where the secretary is generally free to attempt to enforce its [sic, her] interpretation of § 55(6) of the MCFA except against the limited class of the political committees of the union and its affiliated organizations.” Ante at 24. This statement fails to consider that the union and affiliated political action committees (pacs) benefiting from the first injunction compose one of the largest political fund-raising organizations in this state outside the major political parties. That the circuit court’s preliminary injunction creates disparate classes of political players for the next election cycle — the AFL-CIO unfettered in cadging its employees for political donations, the Chamber of Commerce having to abide by the declaratory ruling of the Secretary of State, and other similar organizations remaining in limbo concerning how best to comply with the MCFA — presents a clear and present danger to the integrity of the political process.
The executive branch has determined that validly adopted public policy cannot be effectively carried out in the absence of administrative rules on the subject. That determination is supported by the facts and should not be revisited by this Court. As a result of the August 28, 1997, injunction, the Chamber of Commerce remains obliged to follow the dictates of § 55(6) of the MCFA as interpreted by the Secretary of State, and most unions and political organizations will likely feel obliged to comply as well; the AFL-CIO, however, has license from the circuit court to collect *39funds from its members for political advocacy with less stringent safeguards in place to ensure compliance with the requirements of the MCFA. If the August 28, 1997, order remains in effect, and if the emergency rules are not enforced, the union and its affiliates will have the opportunity to purchase, through paid advertising in all media, a grossly disproportionate and unfair influence in the upcoming elections. Moreover, because of the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism for the statutory prohibition of passive contribution systems, the rights of many individuals who do not wish to contribute to political campaigns are not adequately protected. This result of the judiciary’s intrusion into nonjusticiable subject matter does violence to the spirit and intent of the mcfa.
m. DECLARATORY RULING
This comedy of errors began when the circuit court allowed the AFL-CIO to present its case before it had exhausted available administrative remedies. It is only when a party has exhausted all administrative remedies available within an agency, and is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, that the agency’s decision is subject to review by the courts. MCL 24.301; MSA 3.560(201).5 The exhaustion requirement enables the parties and the agency to develop the facts and produce a complete record for review, to allow the agency to apply its expertise and correct its *40own errors, and to promote judicial economy by preventing unnecessary resort to the courts. See Compton Sand & Gravel Co v Dryden Twp, 125 Mich App 383, 397; 336 NW2d 810 (1983), citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, § 595, p 428; Abbott Laboratories v Gardner, 387 US 136, 149-152; 87 S Ct 1507; 18 L Ed 2d 681 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc v Gardner, 387 US 158, 165-166, 87 S Ct 1520; 18 L Ed 2d 697 (1967). When the union initially appeared in court to contest the validity of the declaratory ruling, it had neither exhausted administrative remedies nor been aggrieved by the Secretary of State’s decision.
The Secretary of State maintained the posture that the declaratory rulings at issue simply put into words certain dictates inherent in the MCFA itself and that the general applicability of the declaratory rulings stemmed from the general applicability of the statute. The circuit court apparently believed that the declaratory rulings themselves could trigger sanctions against the union for failure to abide by them, citing the criminal penalties of § 55(7) of the mcfa. However, this concern was premature.
The Administrative Procedures Act and the mcfa itself prescribe the processes under which a party may object to the Secretary of State’s decisions and under which sanctions may come to bear on a noncomplying party. MCL 24.263; MSA 3.560(163) establishes that declaratoiy rulings are binding only on the parties requesting them and the agencies issuing them. Because in the instant case neither plaintiff requested the rulings at issue, neither was bound. Although “[a] declaratory ruling is subject to judicial review in the same manner as an agency final decision or order in a contested case,” id., a party who is *41bound by neither a declaratory ruling nor a final decision presents no controversy for a court to entertain and resolve.
If the AFL-CIO believed its own procedures for obtaining its members’ affirmative consent in each calendar year to the union’s automatic extraction from its members of contributions for affiliated pacs to be fully in compliance with § 55(6) of the MCFA, the union was at liberty to present its schemes to the Secretary of State for its own declaratory ruling. Once a party to a declaratory ruling, by virtue of having requested it, MCL 24.263; MSA 3.560(163), the union would have satisfied the statutory criteria for seeking judicial review.
Alternatively, the union simply could have complied with § 55(6) of the mcfa according to its own judgment of the proper construction of the statute and waited for the Secretary of State to initiate proceedings. Section 15(5) of the act provides that where the Secretary of State has reason to believe that a violation has occurred, the Secretary of State should respond with informal methods to obtain compliance, including trying to reach conciliation agreements. That section further provides that if the Secretary of State fails to correct the violation through informal means, the Secretary of State may commence a hearing or refer the matter to the Attorney General for prosecution.
In the latter situation, the union would be free to urge its interpretations of § 55(6) on the trial court, which would rule on the matter de novo, affording the Secretary of State’s interpretation only such persuasive sway as the underlying reasoning of the Secretary of State might be found to warrant.
*42In the event of an administrative hearing, § 15(6) of the MCFA provides for its conduct and decrees that if the Secretary of State determines afterward that a violation has occurred, the Secretary of State may assess a civil fine of up to $1,000 for each violation. Only then does the statute provide for recourse to the courts, providing that a “final decision and order” from the Secretary of State is subject to judicial review as provided by the apa.
Clearly, the AFL-CIO had not availed itself of all the available adtministrative procedures concerning its compliance with § 55(6) when it initially appeared before the circuit court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. For these reasons, the court should have dismissed the cause of action. If the initial controversy in this case had been fully developed through proper administrative processes, the courts could have avoided the vexing problems that have arisen subsequently.
Had the circuit court recognized the union’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies when considering the motion for the initial injunction, or had this Court granted leave to appeal the injunction and then taken that opportunity to reverse on that ground, this Court would have avoided the issue whether an emergency existed and the concomitant and colossal error of substituting its judgment for that of the executive branch of government. Finally, it would have avoided the absurd conclusion that it is acceptable to allow the stronger players in an election cycle to operate under rules more lenient than those under which the weaker players operate.
*43IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court should not have agreed to review the decision of the Governor concerning whether, given the circumstances, emergency rules were proper, let alone substituted its judgment for that of the executive branch regarding the existence of an emergency. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusions that the judiciary possesses the jurisdictional competence to review the Governor’s finding of an emergency and that such finding is not supported by the acknowledged facts, as well as from the ultimate conclusion that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. Given that the AFL-CIO did not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court, that the union is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the subsequent emergency rules are substantively invalid, and given that I believe not only that the trial court should not have reviewed the executive branch’s finding of emergency, but also that the facts support a finding of emergency, I would reverse the decision of the trial court and dissolve both injunctions.
Whether the ballot boxes are stuffed with improper votes, or honest votes are bought through expenditures of “soft money,” the detrimental effect on the fairness of the democratic process is the same. Indeed, the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (mofa), MCL 169.201 et seq.-, MSA 4.1703(1) et seq., has been recognized as serving, in this respect, a compelling state interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 660; 110 S Ct 1391; 108 L Ed 2d 652 (1990).
The proper avenue to dispute the emergency rules is not through the courts but through the process set forth in the applicable legislation, which provides that the “Legislature by a concurrent resolution may rescind an emergency rule promulgated pursuant to this section.” MCL 24.248(3); MSA 3.560(148)(3). That a method for checking the appropriateness of a finding of emergency is provided for in the statute by itself suggests that the role of the courts is limited.
Although the emergency in the present case is of a political nature, the situation may be compared to a declaration of emergency prompted by mass rioting. If the Governor declared a state of emergency and requested military assistance to quell the rioting, it would be absurd to suggest that a rioter could go to court and ask for an injunction in order to prevent military involvement. However, by allowing review of the declaration of emergency, the majority apparently approves of such maneuvering.
Nor can it ever be said that any gubernatorial duty is merely ministerial:
[I]t is not customary in our republican government to confer upon the governor duties merely ministerial, and in the performance of which he is to be left to no discretion whatever; and the presumption in all cases must be, where a duty is devolved upon the chief executive of the State rather than upon an inferior officer, that it is so because his superior judgment, discretion, and sense of responsibility were confided in for a more accurate, faithful, and discreet performance than could be relied upon if the duty were devolved upon an officer chosen for inferior duties. And if we concede that cases may be pointed out in which it is manifest that the governor is left to no discretion, the present is certainly not among them, for here, by the law, he is required to . . . give his certificate on his own judgment, and not on that of any other person, officer or department. [Sutherland, supra at 323.]
Because there was no development of the question of exhaustion in the proceedings below, the record does not provide a conclusive basis on which to consider potential exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, e.g., futility, administrative delay, or inadequate relief. However, these facts appear to give rise to no legitimate claim of futility or inadequacy of relief, and, where the agency was given no opportunity to pass on the union’s method, delay cannot be charged to the administrative process.