concurring specially. I concur in the result the majority reaches. I write separately, however, because I believe that this appeal is resolved by applying RSA 21:2 (2000), and because, in my view, the majority has decided issues that are not squarely before us.
RSA 21:2 governs our statutory interpretation. It provides: ‘Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”
RSA 567-A:l (2007) provides: “A person who is aggrieved by a decree, order, appointment, grant or denial of a judge of probate which may conclude that person’s interest in a matter before the court may appeal therefrom to the supreme court on questions of law in accordance with rules of the supreme court.” Our construction of the phrase “person . . . aggrieved” is well-settled and long-standing. See, e.g., Johnson v. Town of Wolfeboro Planning Bd., 157 N.H. 94, 99 (2007) (to be a “person[] aggrieved” under RSA 677:15 (2008), “a litigant must have a direct definite interest in the outcome of the proceedings”); In re Estate of Kelly, 130 N.H. 773, 777 (1988) (to be a “person . . . aggrieved” under RSA 567-A:l, in the context of a will contest, a person must have a “direct pecuniary interest” in the testator’s estate (quotation omitted)); Hutchins v. Brown, 77 N.H. 105, 106 (1913) (to be a “person ... aggrieved” under predecessor to RSA 567-A:l, in the context of proceeding to appoint guardian for minor child, person must have “some private right which is affected thereby” (quotation and brackets omitted)); cf. Appeal of Richards, 134 N.H. 148,154 (to be a person “directly affected” by an administrative agency decision and, thus, to have standing under RSA 541:3 (2007) to appeal that decision, person must show that “he has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact” (quotation omitted)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991); Weeks Restaurant Corp. v. City of Dover, 119 N.H. 541, 543 (1979) (“There is no significant distinction *332between ‘persons directly affected,’ and ‘persons aggrieved.’ ” (citations omitted)). “[T]he legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words it chooses and to use those words advisedly.” State v. Njogu, 156 N.H. 551, 554 (2007).
Applying this well-settled definition of “person . . . aggrieved” to the present case, I agree with the majority that the appellant, Diane Williams Galebach, has failed to demonstrate that she has a direct, definite interest in the guardianship proceedings concerning her brother. Accordingly, she is not a “person... aggrieved” within the meaning of RSA 567-A:l, and, thus, lacks standing to pursue this appeal.
In my opinion, the majority addresses issues that are not before us. For instance, the majority states: “Had the probate court either denied the [appellant’s] petition or granted lesser protections than what she had sought, she would be ‘a person ... aggrieved’ under RSA 567-A:l and have standing to appeal.” Similarly, the majority states: “[W]e do not question that the person whose interests are protected under the guardianship statute — the proposed ward — could appeal the imposition of a guardianship as an aggrieved person, whether a guardianship petition was granted in full or not.” Additionally, the majority rules that the ward’s siblings “would have the right to appeal if the guardianship were not granted, or if the probate court imposed fewer restrictions on the ward’s liberties than those requested in the petition.” The majority also construes RSA 464-A:40 (2004), which governs the termination of a guardianship, a provision that is not at issue in this appeal. As these issues are not before us, I believe we should not yet opine upon them. “This court. . . decides actual cases, not hypothetical ones.” In the Matter of Jacobson & Tierney, 150 N.H. 513, 519 (2004) (Nadeau, J., dissenting).