Concurring.
I join the majority opinion. Unlike the Justices in dissent, I read that opinion, not as rewriting, invalidating, or negating Section 1112-A(b)(S) of the Election Code, but rather, as applying the orderly rule of law established by the long-settled precedent of Appeal of James, 377 Pa. 405,105 A.2d 64 (1954), to construe the requirement of Section 1112 A(b)(3) as directory, and not mandatory, in the aftermath of an election.
In this regard, I note that Pennsylvania’s Election Code, no less than any other, is steeped with requirements phrased in the imperative, not only in terms of the technical requirements for ballot completion, but also in terms of the overall conduct of elections. See generally 25 Pa.C.S. §§ 2600-3595.501. It would be unreasonable to assume that the General Assembly thus intended that, unless each and every such requirement is strictly adhered to by those conducting the elections, election results must be deemed void.1 Indeed, it is widely accepted that most statutory provisions for the conduct of elections may be regarded as directory,2 and not mandatory, after the conduct of an election, unless the statute expressly declares that the particular requirement is essential to the validity of the election, or the violation as such impacts on the election result. *405See generally Norman J. Singer, 3A Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 73.8 (6th ed.2004); 26 Am.Jur.2d Elections § 317 (2003); 29 C.J.S. Elections § 67 (2003).
Once it is accepted that some provisions of election law that are phrased in the imperative really must be deemed directory in order for the legislative purposes (including, critically, the enfranchisement of the electorate) to be accomplished, it becomes clear that it is an inherent function of the interpreters of the law (the judiciary) to distinguish between the mandatory and the directory criteria. This is precisely what the Court did in Appeal of James in construing the statutory language at issue in this case, and it is what distinguishes James from Appeal of Yerger, 460 Pa. 537, 333 A.2d 902 (1975), the latter of which concerned a statute in which the Legislature did expressly choose to direct the consequence of disenfranchisement for nonobservance. See generally Flanagan v. Hynes, 75 Conn. 584, 54 A. 737, 738 (1903) (“If there is to be disenfranchisement, it should be because the legislature has seen fit to require it in the interest of an honest suffrage, and has expressed that requirement in unmistakable language.”).
On the actual merits of whether the particular election provision under review should be deemed mandatory or directory, I note that there are reasonable arguments to be made on both sides.3 But I feel strongly that the majority is correct to follow the decided precedent of Appeal of James. Certainly, there are legitimate and necessary exceptions to the principle of stare decisis. See generally Commonwealth v. Samuels, 566 Pa. 109, 141-42, 778 A.2d 638, 659 (2001) (Saylor, J., dissenting). But for purposes of stability and predictability *406that are essential to the rule of law, see Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the forceful inclination of courts should favor adherence to the general rule of abiding by that which has been settled. Moreover, stare decisis has “special force” in matters of statutory, as opposed to constitutional, construction, because in the statutory arena the legislative body is free to correct any errant interpretation of its intentions, whereas, on matters of constitutional dimension, the tripartite design of government calls for the courts to have the final word. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989).
Since Appeal of James is of a sufficiently reasoned character, and the matter of distinguishing between certain mandatory and directory provisions of election laws is a sufficiently subjective undertaking, I see little basis here for invoking the rare exception to stare decisis to disturb a long-settled matter of ordinary statutory construction.
. Accord 29 C.J.S. Elections § 7(4) (2003) ("Election laws are, as a general rule, considered to be merely directory, even though mandatory in form."); id. ("In the construction of election laws the courts may not lose sight of the fact that the regulations imposed are not conditions on compliance with which the right comes into being, but are regulations intended merely to regulate the exercise of the right in an orderly way, and the election laws should not be so interpreted as to defeat the very object of their enactment.”).
. Directory provisions are those which, while they are intended to be obeyed, and will be enforced if raised before or during an election, do not require invalidation of the election or disenfranchisement of electors where discovered in the election aftermath. See 29 C.J.S. Elections § 214(2) (2003).
. Indeed, I was able to concur in the result in the recent decision in Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003, General Election, 577 Pa. 231, 843 A.2d 1223 (2004), which did result in a disenfranchisement, because in that case I believed that the principles of statutory construction favored a mandatory reading of the statute under review, particularly as it involved absentee voting, an arena in which there is considerable opportunity for mischief. Accord Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 440 A.2d 261, 270 (1982). Additionally, in Canvass of Absentee Ballots, unlike the question presented here, the issue was of first impression, and therefore, one legitimately open for the Court’s consideration.