dissenting.
When construing a statute, we ascertain the Legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the actual language used. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex.2002). When the Legislature employs a term in one part of a statute and excludes it in another, we presume the Legislature had a reason for doing so. Fireman’s Fund County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hidi, 13 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex.2000). We do not invent a remedy the Legislature could have, but did not, specify. State v. Roland, 973 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.1998). Thus, it is not our function to revise the Legislature’s policy choices, even where a party is unfairly deprived of a remedy. Fireman’s Fund, 13 S.W.3d at 769.
The scope of relief available under section 273.081 is specific and unambiguous: “A person who is being harmed or is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened violation of this code is entitled to appropriate injunctive relief to prevent the violation from continuing or occurring.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 273.081 (Vernon 1986) (emphases added). Section 273.081 thus applies to stop current violations and prevent future violations, but not to retract or reverse past violations which *410have ceased,1 or to prevent harm from past violations from occurring or continuing.2 See id. Moreover, a complainant lacks standing to assert, and a trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain, an injunction proceeding where no present or future violation is alleged.3
In this case, the only violation of the Election Code alleged or proved was the untimeliness of the party election official’s review of Judge Gamble’s primary ballot application, ie., the official’s failure to review it as soon as practicable. This violation occurred and was completed well before Judge Gamble learned of it or had any opportunity to seek an injunction to prevent it from occurring or continuing. All of the party official’s actions after discovering the discrepancy between the application and attached petitions were as section 141.032 prescribed. The official notified Judge Gamble, rejected his application, and planned to remove his name from the candidate list. The Election Code afforded the party official no other alternative. Thus, by each of the times Judge Gamble’s injunction suit was subsequently filed and refiled, there were no Election Code violations to be stopped or prevented and thus none subject to injunctive relief under section 273.081. Because Judge Gamble therefore had no standing to assert, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain, this injunction action, I would vacate the trial court’s judgment and order the case dismissed.
. The general inapplicability of injunctive relief to past violations is well recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952).
. Section 273.081 could have been written so as to allow injunctive relief to prevent the harm from continuing, but was instead written to prevent the violation from continuing. We must presume that the Legislature's use of the distinct terms "harm” and "violation” in the respective portions of the statute was intentional, and we may not disregard the difference in meaning between those terms or fashion a remedy that is beyond the unambiguous scope of this provision. See Fireman’s Fund, 13 S.W.3d at 769; Roland, 973 S.W.2d at 666.
.See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109-110, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (holding that respondent lacked standing to maintain the injunction action, and that lower courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain it, and ordering its dismissal, where respondent alleged only past infractions, and not a continuing or likely future violation); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex.2001) (holding that former inmates lacked standing to pursue claims for injunctive relief, and those claims were moot, with regard to past unconstitutional conduct which the former inmates no longer faced). A lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See, e.g., Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex.2000).