(concurring). I write to suggest a broader interpretation of Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974). I do concur in the result reached by the majority but for the reason that the requested charge would have duplicated the breach of warranty charge.
The record discloses that during this extremely complex and well contested 14-day trial, the trial judge exhibited admirably the patience, diligence and competence that bring distinction to that office. I think plaintiff got a fair trial. The issues raised are thin. Three of plaintiff-appellant’s four citations of error concern rulings which required the exercise of discretion and which I believe could have gone either way. However, I think, no harm was done to the plaintiff’s case by any of these rulings and certainly none was crucial.
As to the fourth issue, contributory negligence, I believe the court erred. Although the requested instruction was not a complete statement of applicable law, the trial court should have instructed the jury that contributory negligence is not a defense where the defendants were under a duty to provide a proper, adequate and suitable safety *481device and failed, and this failure was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.
In Funk, the Supreme Court held that the breach of a common-law duty of care to provide safety equipment which is the cause in fact of injury precluded the assertion of the defense of contributory negligence. 392 Mich at 113-114. Defendants urge that Funk should apply only to the construction industry and then only to claims involving failure to supply safety equipment as opposed to negligence in design manufacture and testing. In other words, if General Motors had put a flimsy net up under Funk and he fell through it, the doctrine would be inapplicable. I do not agree with either suggested limitation. There is no reason to limit the safety equipment doctrine to the construction industry and there is no reason to exclude from its operation negligent design, testing and manufacture.
The majority says:
“Here, the allegation of plaintiff was not that defendants negligently failed to provide safety equipment, such as palm buttons.”
But it was — unless we are willing to say the safety equipment doctrine is limited in application to sins of omission and does not apply where the equipment was inadequate or defective. Plaintiff alleged in his amended complaint and at trial that defendants were negligent in failing to provide a safety device which would have prevented plaintiff’s injury. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that defendants were negligent in failing to use a switch with a barrier between the circuits in the palm button assembly and in failing to manufacture the palm button assembly according to their own specifica*482tions and Chrysler’s such that it would be "fail safe”.
No complaint is made about the trial court’s instruction on implied warranty. During that instruction the trial judge correctly stated:
"In understanding, of course, the nature of the liability of the manufacturer based on breach of an implied warranty, negligence and fault have no place in it and are not required to be proved.”
The main thrust of the defense in this case was abuse of the product and that aspect of the case was very ably argued by both sides. The breach of warranty instruction was approved by appellant and both defendants. Contributory negligence was not charged in connection with the breach of warranty. It is not a proper defense to such a claim. But the question of the misuse or abuse of the product as it related to breach of warranty is properly directed to the issue of proximate cause. Dooms v Stewart Bolling & Co, 68 Mich App 5, 17; 241 NW2d 738 (1976), lv den, 397 Mich 862 (1976).
In other words, plaintiff had the issue tried. He had a very good shot at convincing the jury that the defendants were guilty of a breach of implied warranty to which plaintiff’s alleged contributory negligence in reaching his hand toward the die was not a defense. The jury did not accept this theory. Since the effect of the breach of implied warranty issue was to present the plaintiff’s claim to the jury in the same light that the requested instruction would have presented, I agree that there was no manifest injustice.