(dissenting). The majority holds that stacking of uninsured motorist coverage is not only permissible but required by sec. 631.43(1), Stats. The court rules that the section of the statute is clear and unambiguous and that it reflects the legislature’s intention to prohibit “other insurance in the company” reducing clauses. The sentence that is allegedly clear is the first sentence of sec. 631.43 (1) and reads:
“When 2 or more policies promise to indemnify an insured against the same loss, no ‘other insurance’ provisions of the policy may reduce the aggregate protection of the insured below the lesser of the actual insured loss suffered by the insured or the total indemnification promised by the policies if there were no ‘other insurance’ provisions.”
This is hardly a clear and unambiguous statement. In addition, the statutory sentence as interpreted by the majority ignores a following subsection 631.43 (3), Stats., which states: “Subsection (1) does not affect the rights of insurers to exclude coverages under s. 632.32(5) (b) and (c).” The reference to 632.32(5) requires consideration of sec. 632.32(5) (a)1 which allows for limiting cov*170erage that is done with the permission of the named insured.
An insured may waive the statutory requirement that an automobile policy include uninsured motorist coverage. Consistent with that legislative policy, sec. 682.32 (5) (e)2 provides for exclusions not prohibited by sub-sec. (6) of the same statute. Subsection (6) does not prohibit a drive other car exclusion for uninsured motorist coverage and Vidmar v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 2d 360, 369, 312 N.W.2d 129 (1981) approves such exclusion if clearly written so that the insured is on notice of the limitation.
What the majority holds is a clear and unambiguous statement of policy in sec. 631.43(1), Stats., is really a confusing statement and by ignoring other provisions of sec. 632.32 has declared public policy by judicial fiat to be that “stacking” of uninsured motorist coverage of multiple policies with the same insurance company is required.
1 dissent from the court’s setting public policy and establishing the law of uninsured motorist by interpreting a part of the statute while ignoring other provisions. The public policy established is not unfair, but it should be established by the legislature. Until now the rates for uninsured motorist coverage have been very low recognizing the limit of exposure to cover the risks of the individual policy. That will now have to change to some *171degree so that all insureds will share the risk of stacking to compensate for the acts of those persons in society who do not recognize or honor their civic, if not legal, duty to carry liability insurance on their vehicles. This problem should be considered and dealt with by the legislature.
Uninsured motorist coverage is a creature of the legislature as a substitute for mandatory automobile insurance in this state and its development should be determined exclusively by the legislature. The majority places its desired meaning on a statutory provision which is hardly clear and unambiguous. This meaning may be in conformity with the development of the uninsured motorist coverage law in other states which allow stacking. However, in those states, there is mandatory automobile liability insurance, contrary to Wisconsin, so that the risk of being injured by an uninsured motorist is slight and stacking therefore is of no great exposure for insurers.
Section 632.32(5) (a), Stats., provides:
“(5) Permissible provisions, (a) A policy may limit coverage to use that is with the permission of the named insured *170or, if the insured is an individal, to use that is with the permission of the named insured or an adult member of that insured’s household other than a chauffeur or domestic servant. The permission is effective even if it violates s. 343.45(2) and even if the use is not authorized by law.”
Section 632.32(5) (e), Stats., provides:
“(e) A policy may provide for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other applicable law. Such exclusions are effective even if incidentally to their main purpose they exclude persons, uses or coverages that could not be directly excluded under sub. (6) (b).”