JUDGMENT
PER CURIAM.Both appellants were owners of real property in the District of Columbia, which *40properties were deeded by the District to Mr. and Mrs. Scheve subsequent to the failure of appellants to redeem these properties after incurring tax arrearages. At trial, appellants sought to set aside these deeds from the District to the Scheves and to clear title to their respective property. Their actions were based on the claim that the notice provisions of D.C.Code 1973, §§ 47-1001 and 47-1001a, were not reasonably calculated to notify them that they were in danger of losing title to their properties, and, accordingly, that the conveyance from the District to the Scheves constituted a taking without due process. In both cases appellants conceded that the District had complied with the above statutory notice requirements.1 On the records before us we need not, and therefore should not,2 address this constitutional issue 3 since we affirm the trial judges’ findings that in each case the appellant was in fact effectively notified of the pending conveyance of the property.
In Dodson’s case, the court found that Mr. Dodson, an attorney, had been delinquent 14 times within recent years in the payment of his real estate taxes, but that he had always managed (except on the instant occasion) to pay his tax bill in time to avoid the loss of his property. The court also found that the District did mail to him a final notice of delinquency announcing that further nonpayment would result in sale, although Dodson denied receiving that letter. The court further found that the District (according to apparent administrative custom, although not statutorily required) had sent a letter to Mr. Dodson by certified or registered mail notifying him that his redemption period was soon to expire. Receipt of that letter was acknowledged by one Maureen Brent, an employee in the building where Dodson worked. Although he customarily had his mail delivered by her, Mr. Dodson denied the actual receipt of that letter. The fact that under these circumstances Mr. Dodson claims no actual notice does not prove that the efforts of the District to notify him were insufficient. As the Court stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), notice satisfies due process requirements if it is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” We affirm the trial court’s holding that the District’s efforts to notify Mr. Dodson were here so calculated. Cf. Nelson v. New York, 352 U.S. 103, 77 S.Ct. 195, 1 L.Ed.2d 171 (1956).
In Mrs. Hawkins’ case, appellant conceded receipt of a letter advising her that her opportunity to redeem was about to expire. She claimed, however, that by the time she received this letter (March 19, 1973) the District had already deeded the property to the Scheves (March 14, 1973). The letter was dated December 1, 1972, and a witness *41for the District stated that according to custom it “should have been mailed on December 1, 1972,” although this particular letter bore no date stamp which normally is printed on such mail by the Department of Finance and Revenue. See United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926).
It is apparent from the trial court’s ruling that it rejected the testimony of appellant Hawkins that she did not receive the District’s letter prior to conveyance of her property at the expiration of her redemption period. The court also found, as in the case of Mr. Dodson, that the District had mailed to her a final notice of delinquency prior to sale. Thus, the record can fairly be read to support a finding of actual notice of the sale and the expiring redemption period. In this connection, the trial judge also observed that on several previous occasions Mrs. Hawkins had successfully redeemed her property after falling into arrears on her taxes, leading him to state that “the lady is most proficient, in my view, so far as the knowledge of the procedure is concerned.” The court, therefore, found that “she had a knowledge of the debt and she had a knowledge of what the remedy [i. e., the District’s sale remedy] was.”
We hold that the respective records support the trial judges’ findings that both Mr. Dodson and Mrs. Hawkins were sufficiently notified of the forthcoming conveyance of their respective property due to a tax delinquency.
Accordingly, it is this 2nd day of June 1975,
Ordered and adjudged that the judgments in favor of the appellees, the Scheves and the District of Columbia, be, and hereby are, affirmed.
. Mrs. Hawkins urges that she was entitled to personal service or service by registered mail pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 47-903, since she was the occupant of a family dwelling. Section 47-905 clearly provides, however, that such service is required only after a taxpayer first files an affidavit establishing his status as an occupant of a family dwelling. Mrs. Hawkins made no showing of such a filing. Because of our disposition of the case, we need not address her contention that in order to comply with the legislative purpose behind § 47-903 the District is required to notify taxpayers (by means in addition to the Code) of the opportunity provided in § 47-905 to file an affidavit.
. See Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586, 590, 83 S.Ct. 922, 9 L.Ed.2a 958 (1963); Powell v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm’n, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 295, 466 F.2d 466 (1972).
. It is an argument of dubious validity under all the circumstances attendant to the collection of funds for the public treasury, ownership of realty, the universal knowledge of dire consequences for nonpayment of taxes, and the existence of a substantial period of redemption.