Petitioners appeal as of right from the probate court’s denial of their petition to set aside releases of their parental rights subsequent to the court’s entry of an order terminating such rights pursuant to the Michigan Adoption Code, MCL 710.28, 710.29(6); MSA 27.3178(555.28), 27.3178(555.29X6). We affirm.
i
On September 1, 1986, petitioner Mary Beth *709Blankenship gave birth out of wedlock to Heather Marie Blankenship. The father, Charles Kindt, is also a petitioner herein. Early in her pregnancy, on February 11, 1986, Mary Beth contacted the director of respondent Christian Cradle, Inc., to choose adoptive parents for the expected child, maintaining that adoption was her only alternative. On April 18, Mary Beth gave Christian Cradle a letter to the adoptive parents, although Christian Cradle did not contact the potential parents until later, in case Mary Beth changed her mind. When Charles Kindt came into the adoption office on June 2, 1986, he discussed his unstable on-and-off relationship with Mary Beth and his feelings about not wanting to release the child, but indicated that Mary Beth insisted on the adoption.
The first scheduled court hearing was canceled because Mary Beth wanted the hearing to occur after the baby was with its adoptive parents. Mary Beth and Charles received extensive counseling from Christian Cradle, but insisted on the adoption except for one occasion. On that occasion they had gotten back together within a week of one of their break-ups which had coincided with their previous visit to Christian Cradle.
At the hearing held on September 19, 1986, Mary Beth and Charles both testified. The probate judge asked them if they understood that they did not have to release their child for adoption and, after explaining to them their parental rights, asked if they understood that they were giving up those rights. To these questions both Mary Beth and Charles answered that they understood. The judge then explained that after termination of their parental rights they could request a rehearing or appeal within twenty days and further explained to Mary Beth, upon noting her quizzical expression, that mere change of mind was not *710sufficient to set aside the releases unless Christian Cradle agreed and that the rehearing or appeal would have to be based on a legal mistake. Mary Beth acknowledged her understanding of this explanation.
The judge then read to petitioners the language on the release form. However, as petitioners approached the bench to sign the releases, the judge noticed that Mary Beth seemed hesitant and so granted a half-hour recess in order for petitioners to make a decision. Following the recess, petitioners said they wanted to sign the releases, each answering "no” individually when the judge asked if they had been forced, coerced or threatened to be made to sign the releases. The judge then ordered petitioners’ parental rights terminated and the child’s commitment to the custody of Christian Cradle for adoption pursuant to MCL 710.41(2); MSA 27.3178(555.41X2). The child was placed for adoption that same day.
Petitioners petitioned for a rehearing which was held on October 7, 1986, at which time they argued change of circumstances to revoke the releases previously given. Christian Cradle did not join in the petition for revocation. The judge noted that this case would be governed by the revocation of the adoption release provisions found in MCL 710.29(9), 710.64; MSA 27.3178(555.29)(9), 27.3178(555.64) and heard testimony from petitioners and the director of Christian Cradle. Charles maintained that when he signed the release he was unemployed but had subsequently obtained part-time work at Meijers, that he understood the nature of the release and that no one had coerced him into signing it, but that he had been concerned for Mary Beth’s well-being after the birth which had involved a Caesarean section and that he had talked Mary Beth into signing the release.
*711Mary Beth testified that she and Charles were now engaged, that she was in her junior year at Michigan State University with her college expenses being paid by the Veterans Administration, that she had a trust fund worth approximately $5,000, that she had gotten a job which did not conflict with Charles’ schedule, that some friends of hers had signed a letter in which they promised to provide support for child care, and that at the time she signed the release she was in a state of emotional turmoil and was taking Tylenol 3 with codeine which made her drowsy. However, she stated that she had understood the proceedings and the effect of the release.
After hearing all the evidence, the probate judge denied petitioners’ petition to revoke their releases, concluding that petitioners had merely changed their minds. The judge also found no evidence that the releases had been signed under fraud, duress or undue influence, but that they had been freely and voluntarily given.
ii
Petitioners first argue that Mary Beth had given her release involuntarily and that, therefore, the probate judge abused his discretion in denying revocation of the releases. We disagree.
The fundamental nature of parental rights is a liberty protected by the due process clause of the United State Constitution. In re Kozak, 92 Mich App 579, 582; 285 NW2d 378 (1979); Lassiter v Dep’t of Social Services of Durham Co, North Carolina, 452 US 18; 101 S Ct 2153; 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981), reh den 453 US 927 (1981); In re Myers, 131 Mich App 160, 165; 345 NW2d 663 (1983). In Michigan, a parental release is not to be executed "until after such investigation as the court deems *712proper” and the court has fully explained to the parent his or her legal rights and the voluntary and permanent nature of the relinquishment. MCL 710.29(5); MSA 27.3178(555.29)(5).
In this case, the parental releases were not executed until after the court’s careful investigation and its full explanation to Mary Beth and Charles of their legal rights and the voluntary and permanent nature of relinquishing all parental rights to their child. Even if Mary Beth had been in a state of emotional turmoil at the time of relinquishment, the record is devoid of any evidence that her ability to make an informed, voluntary decision was ever impaired. The judge ordered a special recess to give her more time to think about her decision, after which she decided to sign the papers. Although she may have been on medication, Mary Beth said at the first hearing and again at the rehearing that she understood the proceedings and the effect of the release. We find it difficult to believe her assertion that she was vulnerable to the suggestions of others, since she more than Charles had been the one determined, beginning early in the pregnancy, to give up the child for adoption. Even if Charles had encouraged her to sign the release, by her own admission no one forced her to sign. Because the consequences and final nature of her decision had been explained to her, there is no reason to believe that the release was given other than freely and knowingly. Myers, supra at 164; In re Kenneth Jackson, Jr, 115 Mich App 40, 51-52; 320 NW2d 285 (1982). Therefore the probate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying petitioners’ petition to revoke the releases of their parental rights. In re Koroly, 145 Mich App 79, 87; 377 NW2d 346 (1985).
Petitioners’ argument that the probate court *713should have advised them of a right to seek private counsel is without merit. It is well established that there is no right to appointed counsel in a voluntary adoption matter. Jackson, supra at 51-52; Koroly, supra at 88. There is no authority for the proposition that the court must recite that there is a right to privately retained counsel. That the right to such recitation does not exist and should not be created is to us self-evident in cases such as this where the petitioners themselves initiated a proceeding in which, unlike a criminal proceeding, the power of the state was not brought against them. See Lassiter, supra, 452 US 26.
hi
Petitioners next argue that the probate court abused its discretion in failing to investigate fully the reasons for releasing the child and in failing to allow revocation. We disagree.
The probate court had wide discretion to allow revocation after considering all of the evidence. MCL 710.29(9), 710.64(1); MSA 27.3178(555.29)0), 27.3178(555.64)(1). After petitioners voluntarily released their child for adoption, they did not have an absolute right to revoke the release for a mere change of heart; the release could be set aside only in the sound discretion of the probate judge, based on the best interests of the child. DeBoer v Child & Family Services of Michigan, Inc, 76 Mich App 641, 645; 257 NW2d 200 (1977); Koroly, supra at 87-88.
After considering the testimony at both hearings, the probate judge denied the requests for revocation based on the exercise of his discretion in light of the best interests of the child, noting that this case presented insufficient evidence for revocation. It does not escape our attention that *714during the time of the pregnancy (from at least February of 1986 through September of 1986) the petitioners broke up and got back together, and between the time of signing the release and the time of rehearing (September 19 to October 7, 1986) petitioners again broke up and got back together, sure indicators of an instability in their relationship which was not in the best interests of the child. In the same vein we also find it significant that at oral arguments held in May of 1987, petitioners’ counsel indicated that petitioners, though engaged, were not yet married. Although the probate court did not expressly rule on whether there had been a change of circumstance, he did say that all the evidence indicated nothing more than a change of mind. Because the only clear evidence of changed circumstance appears to be that Charles had gotten a part-time job, any change in circumstance was slight. See Jackson, supra.
As for petitioners’ contention that the probate judge’s investigation was inadequate to comply with the statutory requirement of MCL 710.29; MSA 27.3178(555.29), such investigation is left to the sound discretion of the probate court. Gonzales v Toma, 330 Mich 35, 38; 46 NW2d 453 (1951). In this case, the probate court investigated thoroughly by asking petitioners if they understood the nature and consequences of a release of parental rights, by suggesting a half-hour recess, and then by questioning petitioners as to whether they were forced, coerced or threatened into signing the releases. The judge was not required to seek expert testimony regarding capacity of the parties to give a release. The probate court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
*715M. J. Kelly, J. concurred.