concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The issue decided by the trial courts in the instant case was whether the proposed cap amendments violate Article *251XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. The courts below answered that question in the affirmative, and this Court reverses that determination. I concur in Parts I through III of the Court’s opinion.
In Part IV, the majority coins the pejorative phrases— “roll backs” and “escape clauses”—and decides that roll backs as well as escape clauses violate a section of the Tax-Property Article and are therefore void. The majority goes on to rewrite the amendments petitioned for by over 20,000 registered voters, replaces them with the Court’s cap amendments, and incidentally performs the county councils’ function of drafting the form in which the amendments will be placed on the ballot. I respectfully dissent from this part of the Court’s opinion.
ROLL BACK
The majority holds that “roll backs” conflict with Maryland Code (1986, 1991 Cum.Supp.), Tax-Property Article, § 6-302(a) and are therefore invalid. Section 6-302(a) provides:
“(a) In general.—Except as otherwise provided in this section and after complying with § 6-305 of this subtitle, in each year after the date of finality and before the following July 1, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City or the governing body of each county annually shall set the tax rate for the next taxable year on all assessments of property subject to that county’s property tax.”
The majority states: “Section 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article requires that a county’s tax rate be set by the governing body of the county.” Majority Op. at 245. Obviously, the majority does not mean that § 6-302(a) grants a county council unlimited discretion to set the tax rate—if so the entire cap amendment would be in conflict with this public general law and, therefore, invalid. The majority must then recognize that the right of the governing body to set the tax rate can be limited through a charter amendment.
*252None of the cap provisions, including the roll back, purport to deprive the governing body of authority to set property tax rates; however, they do establish a ceiling on the governing body’s authority to set the property tax rates. If the right of taxpayers to establish a ceiling does not violate § 6-302(a), it is unclear why some ceilings {e.g., a rate based on revenues 2% over the 1990-91 fiscal year) are held permissible under § 6-302(a) and some ceilings {e.g., a rate based on revenues of the 1989-90 fiscal year or revenues of the 1988-89 fiscal year) are held impermissible under that section. I am sure the majority had the laudable purpose of assuring that the cap, if it went into effect, would not have too drastic an initial impact on tax revenues, but that benevolent purpose does not seem to be codified in § 6-302(a).
By implication, one vice of the “roll back” is the failure, in the first year that the cap would go into effect (tax year 1991-92), to allow the county councils the discretion to increase property tax revenues up to 2% in Baltimore County and up to 4.5% in Anne Arundel County. Although the petitioned amendments provide this discretion commencing the tax year 1992-93 and for all subsequent years, the majority’s order changes the petitioned amendments and inserts this discretion in the first year the cap amendments would go into effect.1
The second vice of the “roll back” is apparently the choice of the tax base year. The Baltimore County tax base year in the proposed charter amendment was 1989-90. The *253Anne Arundel County proposed charter amendment chose the tax base year of 1988-89. The majority strikes both of these chosen years, and substitutes in both Anne Arundel County and Baltimore County the tax base year 1990-91.
The majority does not explain why freezing the property tax revenues at those of the prior year violates § 6-302(a), “which mandates that the governing body of each county is to set the property tax rate for the next tax year,” Majority Op. at 244, but simply giving the council authority to increase those fixed property tax revenues by up to 2% makes the provision valid.2 Without any explanation of its reasoning, the majority also holds that it is improper under § 6-302(a) to freeze the 1991-92 property tax revenues, and all future tax revenues at no more than 2% per year above the 1989-90 tax year (1988-89 in Anne Arundel County), but it is perfectly all right to simply substitute 1990-91 for 1989-90 and freeze the 1991-92 property tax revenues and all future property tax revenues at no more than 2% per year above the 1990-91 tax year. This, the majority tells us, was the intent of the legislature when they enacted § 6-302(a). I respectfully am unable to read these complex distinctions into that very simple statute.
*254ESCAPE CLAUSE
The majority holds that the “escape clause” which allows the county council to increase the property tax revenues above the cap in any given year by referring the increase to the voters for approval is invalid. The reason why the “escape clause” is invalid, we are told by the majority, is again because “§ 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article requires .that a county’s tax rate be set by the governing body of the county.” Majority Op. at 245. The Court reasons that, if we allow voters the authority to ratify a council’s action in setting a tax rate above the cap in any given year, then “in essence, the voters would be setting the tax rate for that year.” Majority Op. at 245. Thus, the majority holds the voters can vote to establish a cap by charter amendment and, in doing so, they are not setting the tax rate, but the voters cannot vote to remove the cap in any given year because, in doing so, they are setting the tax rate. That could not be the General Assembly’s intent.
I believe that, if § 6-302(a) allows the voters to establish a cap, then § 6-302(a) allows the voters to remove the cap either permanently or for any given year by ratifying the council’s action in setting a rate above the cap. Interestingly enough, the majority recognizes that there are times when the cap might hamper the basic functioning of government, but instead of allowing the voters to grant relief in such a situation, the majority says, we the courts, not the voters, can abrogate the cap. The majority states:
“If it is subsequently demonstrated in a particular case that a local limitation on property tax revenues so hampers a county government that it cannot perform the duties required under state law, a tax limitation charter provision may well be found to be invalid as applied.”
Majority Op. at 244. If the courts have the power to abrogate the tax cap when it so “hampers a county government that it cannot perform the duties required under state law,” surely the voters should have the same power. In enacting § 6-302(a), the legislature could not have intended that although the voters have the power to establish a cap, *255only the courts, not the voters, have the power to abrogate the cap if it is necessary in any given year.
The Court interprets the simple language of § 6-302(a) that “the governing body of each county annually shall set the tax rate” as 1) allowing the voters to establish a cap; 2) requiring that the cap be based on revenues from the most recent tax year; 3) requiring that the cap authorize at least a 2% per year increase; and 4) prohibiting the voters from granting temporary relief from the cap through an escape clause. The Court reads all this into the statute without the benefit of a single word of legislative history and without any explanation of its interpretive reasoning. In interpreting a statute, courts should use a magnifying glass, not a shoehorn. I am afraid that the Court is not reading from § 6-302(a) the cap requirements created by the General Assembly; it is instead reading into § 6-302(a) the cap requirements created by the Court.
REWRITING THE PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENTS
The majority states, “We wish to point out that the Court did not rewrite, to suit itself, the proposed amendments ... we simply deleted the portions of the amendments which we found to be invalid [which] ... necessitated changing some of the dates specified in the proposed amendments____” Majority Op. at 246 n. 16. The Court apparently acknowledges rewriting the proposed amendments, but denies doing so “to suit itself.” The changes made by the Court were so substantial that it felt compelled to order that the Court’s rewritten amendments be placed on the ballot in substitution for the petitioned amendments endorsed by over 20,000 voters in Anne Arundel County and Baltimore County. What the majority is in effect saying is that they know over 20,000 voters in two counties wanted some tax cap amendment. The amendments petitioned for had invalid provisions, used a wrong tax base year, and failed to provide for county council discretion the first year of operation. The majority did not simply say the petitions were invalid; it *256drafted new statutorily permissible cap amendments acknowledging they were substantially different from the petitioned amendments, and ordered the Court’s amendments be placed on the ballot. This benevolent paternalistic assumption of judicial authority is, to say the least, unprecedented.
The fiscal effect of the Court’s changes is substantial. The Baltimore County Charter Amendment petition signed by over 10,000 voters used the known previously determined property tax revenues realized for the tax year 1989-90 as the property tax base. The Court’s amendment used the unascertained 1990-91 property tax revenues as a base. For the tax year 1991-92, instead of the property tax revenues being no more than the 1989-90 revenues, the property tax revenues can be as high as 2% above the 1990-91 revenues. The estimated difference is over 53 million dollars per year in increased property taxes.
In Anne Arundel County, the Charter Amendment petition signed by over 10,000 voters used the known previously determined 1988-89 property tax revenues as the property tax base. The Court’s amendment used the unascertained 1990- 91 property tax revenues as a base. For the tax year 1991- 92, instead of the property tax revenues being no more than the 1988-89 revenues, the property tax revenues can be as high as 4.5% above the 1990-91 revenues. The estimated difference is over 30 million dollars per year in increased property taxes. Consequently, “changing some of the dates” substantially alters the proposed amendments in that each county could collect significantly more property taxes.
Even if the majority had only ordered deletions from the petitioned form of the charter amendments and had not ordered its other changes, the Court would still be totally disregarding its carefully reasoned analysis in Schneider v. Lansdale, 191 Md. 317, 61 A.2d 671 (1948), the seminal case in Maryland on enjoining submission of petitioned amendments. In Schneider, there was a suit to enjoin the Board of Supervisors of Elections from submitting to the voters *257the proposed Montgomery County Charter. The circuit court had determined that two provisions were invalid “but not so inseparable from the other part of the charter as to prevent the remainder from being submitted to the voters.” Id. at 321, 61 A.2d at 672. The circuit court filed a decree deleting the invalidated provisions and directing the President of the County Commissioners to publish the charter as deleted and the Supervisors of Elections to submit it as deleted at the November election. This Court began its analysis by admonishing circuit court chancellors against doing the same thing the majority does in the instant case— deleting part of an amendment and ordering only the valid portions be submitted to the voters. This Court was emphatic when Chief Judge Marbury, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
“The charter, as they have ordered it submitted to the voters, is emasculated, and is not the charter submitted by the Charter Board. We have been referred to no case which authorizes the courts to strike out, before submission, part of a proposed enactment which the people are to vote upon. If they find such proposal partly invalid they may so hold but they cannot delete the invalid part and submit the remainder. The only charter which can be submitted, if any, is the one drafted by the Charter Board without deletions.” (Emphasis added).
Id. at 323, 61 A.2d at 673. The Court also made it clear that, where parts of a petitioned charter or charter amendment are invalid, a court’s task is to determine whether the invalid parts are “so inseparable from the remainder that its invalidity makes the whole invalid.” Id. If the invalid part makes the whole amendment invalid, nothing is submitted to the voters. If the invalid part does not invalidate the entire amendment, the proposed amendment as drafted by the petitioners, not as drafted by the judiciary, is to be submitted to the voters.
In Rivergate Restaurant Corp. v. Metro Dade Cty., 369 So.2d 679 (Fla.App.1979), a Florida circuit court had deleted an invalid provision of a petitioned ordinance. In holding *258that the lower court had no power to delete even invalid provisions, the District Court of Appeals stated:
“An individual piecemeal attack upon a portion of the proposal, as opposed to an attack on the proposal in toto, was not sufficient to enable the circuit court to enjoin the election or to delete the language of the proposed ordinance that the court found to be unconstitutionally vague____
In short, the circuit court’s authority was restricted to an overall examination of the constitutionality of the proposed ordinance on its face. It fell into error when it went beyond that and determined that a portion thereof was unconstitutionally vague and should be deleted prior to consideration by the electorate.” (Footnote omitted).
Id. at 683.
Our function in the instant case should be limited to determining whether the proposed amendments could be, if adopted by the voters, legally operative. We should not, at this stage, attempt to determine whether the proposed amendments may have severable but invalid aspects or applications. We certainly should not insert into, delete from, or rewrite the amendments and place the Court’s rather than the petitioners’ amendments on the ballot. By analogy, the Court may invalidate severable provisions of an enacted statute, but the Court cannot substitute provisions in a statute and cannot order that the statute be republished in the Annotated Code omitting the provisions invalidated by the Court or order republishing of the statute as modified by the Court.
In passing on the validity of the amendments, we should consider them in their entirety. Whether specific segments of the proposal are void should not be considered as long as any potentially invalid provisions are severable and do not invalidate the whole. See 5 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 16.69 (3rd ed. 1989). If the Court does examine individual segments, it is improper for the Court to delete even invalid provisions or insert new and different provisions in their *259place. The Court should either submit the petitioned amendments as petitioned or enjoin their submission. The amendments as petitioned by the voters, not as interpreted by the courts, should be what is placed on the ballot.
It is ironic that in Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 606 A.2d 1060 (1992), this Court would not let the people who drafted, circulated, and collected over 10,000 signatures on a charter amendment to elect to substitute for their petitioned amendment a county council amendment which they claimed equally or better met the goals of the signers. This Court refused to allow that substitution quoting with approval from Monplaisir v. Katz, 26 A.D.2d 804, 805, 273 N.Y.S.2d 839, 841, aff'd sub nom. Cassese v. City Clerk of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 813, 275 N.Y.S.2d 523, 222 N.E.2d 389 (1966) that: “Electors have the right to vote on validly submitted propositions even if confusion may be a consequence.” Id. 326 Md. at 630 n. 2, 606 A.2d at 1062 n. 2. Yet in the instant case, the Court does not allow the voters to vote on the “validly submitted propositions;” instead, it substitutes its own formulation of the amendments apparently to avoid voter confusion.
In directing that each county’s Board of Supervisors of Elections submit the cap amendments to the voters “in the following form,” this Court also usurped a legislative function and violated a statutory mandate. It is quite clear that the county councils, not the courts, prepare and certify the form that charter amendments appear on the ballot. Md. Code (1957, 1990 Repl.Vol.), Art. 33, § 16-6(a) is clear and direct. It provides:
“The county commissioners, county councils, or treasurer of Baltimore City, as the case may be, shall prepare and certify to the boards the form in which local questions shall appear on the ballots.”
See also Md.Code (1957, 1990 Repl.Vol.), Article 33, § 23-1(a) and Anne Arundel Co. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976).
*260AMENDMENT PETITIONS
The reason given for the Court’s deleting from and rewriting the cap amendments in the instant cases is
“submission of an amendment with invalid and severable portions intact would mislead the public during the election by asking them to vote on an amendment which, in its present form, was incapable of becoming part of their charter. We do not believe that it is appropriate to deceive the voters in this fashion.”
Majority Op. at 248. The Court implies that its interpretive changes do not substantially change the petitioned amendments, yet acknowledges that the amendments as petitioned would mislead and deceive the voters. If the cap amendments in the exact form petitioned would mislead and deceive the voters, then the 20,000 plus voters who signed those petitions were also misled and deceived and the Court should have found the petitions invalid. See, e.g., Takoma Pk. v. Citizens for Decent Gov’t, 301 Md. 439, 449-50, 483 A.2d 348, 354 (1984) (holding the referendum petition at issue did not describe the statute under consideration in sufficient detail to advise petition signers, therefore the referendum should not be placed on the ballot). If the amendment petitions in the form in which they were signed are not being substantially modified by the Court, then all of the voters should be able to vote on them in the form that 20,000 voters signed them. If the original amendment petitions signed by over 20,000 voters are in fact misleading and deceptive, then they are obviously invalid. The Court cannot make misleading and deceptive petitions, which were endorsed by over 20,000 voters, valid by rewriting the signed petitions. The cap amendments as modified by the Court clearly were not petitioned for by the voters—they signed amendment petitions which, according to the Court, were misleading and deceptive. This Court has no authority, no matter how good its intentions, to draft and place its own charter amendments on the ballot. The cap charter amendments the majority has ordered placed on the ballot *261were not petitioned for by the voters; they were constructed by this Court.
This Court had before it two decisions holding that the cap amendments violated Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. This Court quite properly reversed those decisions. The judges below made no attempt to determine whether § 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article voided the “roll backs” and “escape clauses.” This Court should not have decided those issues or rewritten the amendments. I dissent from Part IV of this Court’s opinion.
. The Baltimore County petitioned amendment had provided that "for the tax year 1992-1993, and for succeeding years the County property tax may be increased, but by no more than 2 percent per year." The majority changed the date the County Council could begin its 2 percent increase from tax year 1992-93 to tax year 1991-92, the date the act would have gone into effect. The Anne Arundel petitioned amendment had provided that, "commencing 1 July 1992, and applicable to subsequent tax years," the Council may increase the tax rate by up to the consumer price index or 4.5 percent whichever is the lesser. The majority changed the date the Council may begin the increase from 1 July 1992 to 1 July 1991, the date the amendment would have gone into effect.
. I hope that the majority is not, without any opportunity for briefing or argument on the point, inadvertently voiding existing cap provisions. See Article VI, § 614 of the Talbot County Charter, as amended in 1978, which provides in part:
“[T]he Council may not establish property tax rates which would provide more property tax revenues than were raised during the 1978-79 tax year, unless such additional revenues are the result of assessments on newly constructed property or other property not previously assessed.”
See also Article VIII, § 817B of the Prince George’s County Charter, as amended in 1984, which provides in part:
“(a)(1) Except as provided in this Section 817B, the Council shall not levy a real property tax which would result in a total collection of real property taxes greater than the amount collected in fiscal year 1979;
(2) The Council may levy a real property tax which would result in a total collection of real property taxes greater than the amount collected in fiscal year 1979 if the real property tax rate does not exceed Two Dollars and Forty Cents ($2.40) for each One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) of assessed value.”