(dissenting). Whether a nontenured member of a teaching staff should be given reasons for nonrenewal of his or her contract is a question that has received contradictory answers from legislatures and courts throughout the nation.1 Cogent and persuasive arguments can readily be marshalled in support of either position.
*249My dissent in this case does not rest upon a belief that the result reached by the majority is wrong as a matter of policy, but rather upon the conclusion I have reached that a controlling legislative enactment governs the issue now before the Court, and that this being so, there is no room for judicial intervention. The opinion of the majority expressly states that its conclusion is not based upon federal constitutional law, and it certainly does not rest upon state constitutional grounds.2 This being so, if an applicable statute *250has been enacted — as is here the case — and the legislative intent can be discerned, either from the words of the statute itself or from the history of its passage through the Legislature, the function of the judiciary is confined to giving effect to that intent.
In 1969, at the time plaintiff’s contract was not renewed, there was no relevant statute with respect to the reemployment of probationary (i. e., nontenured) teachers. This is no longer the case. L. 1971, c. 436, now N. J. S. A. 18A:27-10 et seq., became effective September 1, 1972.3 Under this *251statute, in the event of nonrenewal, a probationary teacher need only be given written notice that further employment will not be offered; nothing is mentioned about giving reasons therefor. The board of education is neither explicitly required to give reasons nor is it expressly authorized to refrain from doing so. Had the statute, in plain words, adopted one or the other of these positions, I take it that further argument would have been precluded. Similarly, if the history of the legislation clearly and unequivocally reveals the legislative intent as to providing or not providing reasons for nonrenewal, further judicial review should similarly be foreclosed.
Here the legislative history of the statute is enlightening. The bill which eventually became L. 1971, c. 436 was introduced in the Senate January 29, 1970 as Senate Bill 470.4 *252N. J. Sen. Jour. (1970) 196. As so introduced, the bill provided not only for the giving of reasons, upon request, but also for a hearing before the board of education. Amendments to the bill, however, deleting all reference to the giving of reasons and the holding of hearings, were introduced *253in the Senate on March 23, 1970. N. J. Sen. Jour. (1970) 536-37. These amendments were adopted by voice vote on the same day. Id. As so amended, with all reference to the giving of reasons having been expressly deleted, the bill passed the Senate on April 2, 1970 by a roll call vote of 31-0. Id. at 563-64. With further slight changes not germane to the issue here, the bill took its further legislative course and eventually was enacted into law as L. 1971, c. 436 (N. J. S. A. 18A:27-10 et seq.).
The manner of the adoption of this law, as set forth above, makes the legislative intent entirely manifiest. On March 23, 1970 the Senate formally acted to excise from the bill all reference to the giving of reasons. This cannot be described as legislative inaction; it was positive action. Such legislative action on proposed amendments to a bill is a well-recognized guide in the interpretation of a statute.
One of the most readily available extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutes is the action of the legislature on amendments which are proposed to be made to a bill during the course of its consideration in the legislature. Both the state and federal courts will refer to proposed changes in a bill in order to interpret the statute into which it was finally enacted.
Adoption of an amendment is evidence that the legislature intends to change the provisions of the original bill. [2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) sec. 48.18, p. 224]5
*254As stated above, the majority opinion does not base its conclusion that reasons must be given for nonrenewal upon any federal constitutional ground. Any such reliance would clearly be untenable in the light of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). Bather it adopts the view, in which I concur, that “. . . the issue before us may be disposed of on grounds which are wholly State in nature.” It then enters upon a fairly extensive discussion of the case of Monks v. State Parole Board, 58 N. J. 238 (1971) where this Court held that prisoners were entitled to be given reasons for the denial of parole applications. It concludes the discussion by observing that “[ejverything said in Monies may equally be said in support of the teachers claim here . . .” There is, however, one completely distinguishing difference between this case and Monies, of which the majority take only passing note. Beferring to the central issue in Monks — whether a prisoner should be given reasons for a denial of a parole application — the majority opinion says, “[t]he Legislature had remained silent on the subject.” That is not the case here. Our Legislature has expressed its point of view affirmatively, clearly and without reservation or ambiguity. In Monks this Court was entirely free to adopt a rule that reasons be given prisoners denied parole. It was a matter as to which the Legislature — which clearly has the last word —■ had not spoken. The contrary is true here. We know, from an examination of legislative history, that this statute was enacted into law only after the Senate had specifically and affirmatively expressed itself as opposed to the requirement that reasons be given.
I would hold that the decision in this ease should be governed by the controlling statute, N. J. S. A. 18A:27-10 et seq.6 Examination of the legislative history of this enact*255ment reveals an unequivocal repudiation by the upper branch of the Legislature of the requirement that reasons be given to a nontenure teaching staff member upon the nonrenewal of his or her contract. This Court should defer to this clear expression of legislative intent and accept it as binding.
I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division for the reasons set forth above.
Clifford, J. joins in this dissent.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Jacobs, Hall, Sullivan and Pashman — 5.
For affirmance — Justices Mountain and Clifford — 2.
Several state legislatures have enacted provisions relating to nontenured teachers which parallel N. J. S. A. 18A:27-10 et seq., and *249omit any requirement of a statement of reasons for nonrenewal. See, e.g., Ala. Code Title 52, sec. 361(2) (1960); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 123-18-10 (Supp. 1967); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. sec. 38.83 (1967); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 189:14-a (1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 3319.11 (Supp. 1972). Other state legislatures have enacted provisions specifically requiring a statement of reasons. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. sec. 14.20.175(a) (1971); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 15-259 (1956); Cal. Educ. Code sec. 13443 (Deering 1969); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 10-151 (Supp. 1972); Del. Code Ann. Title 14 see. 1410 (Cum. Supp. 1970); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 122, sec. 24-11 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
State courts have generally determined the question as to whether a statement of reasons is required for nonrenewal of the contracts of nontenured teachers by reference to state legislative enactments. Where the relevant legislation does not require a statement of reasons, courts have concluded no such statement is mandatory. See, e. g., Still v. Lance, 279 N. C. 254, 182 S. E. 2d 403 (1971); Munro v. Elk Rapids Schools, 383 Mich. 661, 178 N. W. 2d 450 (1970); Williams v. School District of Springfield, 447 S. W. 2d 256 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1969); Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Three Village Teachers Ass’n, 39 A. D. 2d 466, 336 N. Y. S. 2d 656 (App. Div. 1972). Where the relevant legislation has mandated a statement of reasons, courts have acquiesced in the legislative decision. See Waller v. Board of Ed. of Century Com. U. Sch. Dist. #100, 13 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 302 N. E. 2d 190 (App. Ct. of Ill. 1973). See generally, Fleming v. Concordia Parish School, 275 So. 2d 795 (Ct. of App. of La. 1973).
Federal courts, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents v Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972), also disagreed as to the need for providing reasons for non-renewal of nontenured teachers’ contracts. Compare Orr v. Trinter, 444 F. 2d 128 (6 Cir. 1971) with Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F. 2d 1182 (1 Cir. 1970).
The authorities cited by the majority clearly indicate that the state constitution does not form the basis for the majority opinion. See State v. Kunz, 55 N. J. 128, 144 (1969); State v. Laws, 51 N. J. 494, 514 (1968); State v. Cook, 43 N. J. 560, 569 (1965).
This statute, in its present form, provides:
18A:27-10. Nontenure teaching staff member; offer of employment for next succeeding year or notice of termination before April 30
On or before April 30 in each year, every board of education in this State shall give to each nontenure teaching staff member continuously employed by it since the preceding September 30 either
a. A written offer of a contract for employment for the next succeeding year providing for at least the same terms and conditions of employment but with such increases in salary as may be required by law or policies of the board of education, or
b. A written notice that such employment will not be offered.
18A:27-11. Failure to give timely notice of termination as offer of employment for next succeeding year
Should any board of education fail to give to any nontenure teaching staff member either an offer of contract for employment for the next succeeding year or a notice that such employment will not be offered, all within the time and in the manner provided by this act, then said board of education shall be deemed to have offered to that teaching staff member continued employment for the next succeeding school year upon the same terms and conditions but with such increases in salary as may be required by law or policies of the board of education.
ISA :27-12. Notice of acceptance; deadline
If the teaching staff member desires to accept such employment he shall notify the board of education of such acceptance, in writing, on or before June 1, in which event such employment shall continue as provided for herein. In the absence of such notice of acceptance the provisions of this article shall no longer be applicable.
18A:27-13. Inapplicability of act to teaching staff employees of county colleges
Notwithstanding the provisions of N. J. S. 18A :64A-13 the provisions of this act shall not apply to teaching staff employees of county colleges.
The bill as originally introduced provided:
An Act concerning education and providing for continued employment of nontenure teaching staff members and supplementing Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes.
Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
1. Every board of education in this State shall cause each non-tenure teaching staff member employed by it to be observed and evaluated at least twice in each school year, to be followed by a conference between that teaching staff member and his or her superior or superiors for the purpose of identifying any deficiencies, extending assistance for their correction and improving instruction.
2. On or before April 30 in each 'year, every board of education in this State shall give to each nontenure teaching staff member continuously employed by it since the preceding September 30 either
a. A written offer of a contract for employment for the next succeeding year providing for at least the same terms and conditions of employment but with such increase in salary as may be required by law or policies of the board of education, or
b. A written notice that such employment will not be offered.
3. Any teaching staff member who receives a notice of nonemployment pursuant to section 2 of this article, may within 5 days thereafter, in writing, request a statement of the reasons for such nonem-ployment, which statement shall be given to the teaching staff member in writing within 5 days after receipt of such request.
4. Any teaching staff member who has received such notice of non-employment and statement of reasons and who has been employed, or *252if said employment were continued to April 30 would be employed, in the district for the equivalent of more than 1 academic year shall be entitled to a hearing before the board of education, provided a written request therefor is received in the office of the secretary of the board of education within 5 days after receipt by the teaching staff member of the statement of reasons.
5. The hearing provided for in section 4 of this article shall be conducted by the board of education in accordance with rules of procedures established by the State Board of Education and a determination as to the employment or nonemployment of said teaching staff member for the next succeeding year shall be made and a copy thereof served upon the teaching staff member on or before May 31. The determination of the board of education made and served within said time shall be conclusive.
6. Should any board of education fail to give to any nontenure teaching staff member either an offer of contract for employment for the next succeeding year or a notice that such employment will not be offered and upon request by the teaching staff member, a statement of reasons and a hearing, and in the event of such hearing shall fail to make and serve a copy of the determination, all within the time and in the manner provided by this article, then said board of education shall be deemed to have offered to that teaching staff member continued employment for the next succeeding school year upon the same terms and conditions but with such increases in salary as may be required by law or policies of the board of education.
7. If the teaching staff member desires to accept such employment he shall notify the board of education of such acceptance, in writing, on or before June 1, in which event such employment shall continue as provided for herein. In the absence of such notice of acceptance the provisions of this article shall no longer be applicable.
8. Any nontenure teaching staff member who receives a notice that his employment will be terminated pursuant to a provision contained in said contract shall be entitled to a statement of reasons and a hearing as provided for in section 3, 4 and 5 of this article, except that a determination of the board of education shall be made and served before the expiration of the notice period provided for in said contract. Should the board of education fail to comply therewith, then said notice of termination shall be invalid and of no force and effect and the employment of the teaching staff member shall continue as if such notice had not been given.
9. This act shall take effect September 1, 1970.
Other authorities supporting the view that amendments adopted during the course of legislative enactment are appropriate materials for use in the interpretation of the statute as finally adopted, include: Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U. S. 76, 83, 72 S. Ct. 130, 134, 96 L. Ed. 100, 105 (1951); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 463-464, 57 S. Ct. 556, 562, 81 L. Ed. 736, 744 (1937); United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 287 U. S. 144, 154-155, 53 S. Ct. 28, 32, 77 L. Ed. 223, 230 (1932); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 550-552, 41 S. Ct. 569, 570, 65 L. Ed. 1084, 1086 (1921); United States v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co., 247 U. S. 310, 318, 38 S. Ct. 525, 528, 62 L. Ed. 1130, 1134 (1918). See also, Ablondi v. Board of Review, 8 N. J. Super. 71, 77-78 (App. Div. 1950); Note, “Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation — The New Jersey View,” 8 Rutgers L. Rev. 486, 490-91 (1954).
The majority observe, with complete accuracy, that at the time Mrs. Donaldson’s contract expired, the pertinent statute, N. J. S. A. 18A:27-10 et seq., had not yet been adopted, and hence, as of that *255date, could not be deemed controlling. It is, however, somewhat disingenuous of the majority to labor this point inasmuch as its holding is intended to operate as an ongoing rule which boards of education will “hereafter be obliged” to follow. The rule here adopted by the majority is certainly not intended to be limited in its effect to the present plaintiff or to the period prior to the enactment of N. J. S. A. 18A:27-10 et seq.
As to the plaintiff in this case, I would hold that she is not entitled to a statement of reasons for nonrenewal of her contract. There was no practice of giving reasons at the time plaintiff’s contract was not renewed, there was no constitutional requirement, either then or now, for giving reasons, and the Legislature has since impressed its imprimatur upon the administrative practice.