dissenting. I am unable to agree with the result reached by the majority. Accordingly, I feel compelled to file this dissent. I would affirm.
If the record left any doubt as to defendant’s intelligence or ability to understand the proceedings against him, including his right to counsel, or suggest any confusion on his part, I would be more inclined to concur with the exhaustive litany which the majority recites as requirements to be followed by the trial courts in determining whether or not a waiver of counsel is “knowing and intelligent.”
I do not disagree that compliance with the full panoply, as outlined in the majority opinion may be, as the opinion suggests, “the better practice,” in all cases; nevertheless, it should not be cast in unyielding stone as a rigid sine qua non. In the absence of such a catechism, the issue should be resolved from the record on a case-by-case basis.
In my judgment the repeated efforts by the trial court in this case to protect defendant’s right to counsel were more than sufficient. As it is, the majority has created a trap which snaps shut if a single item of the litany is omitted regardless of other considerations. It produces, at the very least, automatic grounds for an appeal and at least a remand for further findings if not a new trial.
A factor not addressed by the majority is the strength of the State’s evidence during the trial. It was persuasive to a degree that the verdict seems to me inevitable. It is unlikely that an acquittal would result even if defendant had been represented by ah attorney. Any error was harmless. State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186, 189-90, 531 A.2d 595, 597 (1987).
*430Since I am unable to agree with the result, it states the obvious to say that I am also unable to agree with the concurring opinion. It would stretch even further the unwarranted result and the consequences thereof reached by the majority. Given the scope of defendant’s grasp of the proceedings, as disclosed by the record in this case, the steps taken by the trial judge in protecting his right to counsel should not be called either “confusing” or “inadequate”; certainly defendant himself exhibited not the slightest suggestion of confusion. Notwithstanding the court’s frequent attempts to persuade him to obtain counsel, to the extent that the judge indicated defendant might consult an experienced attorney who was apparently present in the courtroom, he stubbornly insisted on representing himself. The issue was not raised until after the fact of the verdict. In effect, he kept a card in his sleeve as a safeguard against an unfavorable verdict; the jury found him guilty based on the strong evidence against him, whereupon, with a triumphant flourish he now produces his ace in the hole.