with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Nothing in the Worker’s Compensation Act compels the result reached by the Court, and yet much of the purposes and policies of the Act suggest a contrary result.
The settlement of “all payments ... that may become due in the future” by payment of a lump sum may often be in the best interest of the employee. See former section 71 of the Act. That settlement ought not be delayed by a dispute between insurance carriers over apportionment of benefits previously paid by the carrier on the last injury as required by section 104-B. In the present case, the Commissioner acted within her discretion and in accord with the purposes of the Act when she noted that the apportionment decision should issue despite the commutation of all future payments. Nothing in the record before us suggests that the two insurance carriers intended their separate settlements of Kennedy’s claim for future benefits to affect the pending dispute over apportionment of past benefits. Indeed, St. Paul requested findings of fact on the apportionment decision but did not object to its issuance. I would conclude that the docket notation as well as the subsequent decree and findings *682of fact all served effectively to sever the issue of the apportionment of benefits already paid by Hartford.
St. Paul contends, however, that the boilerplate language of form WCC-10, entitled “Commutation of Benefits or Compromise Settlement,” precluded such a severance. St. Paul points to the “Release” portion wherein the employee releases “the employer and insurer” from further liability and to the “Decision” portion wherein the Commissioner approves the settlement and dismisses “all pending petitions based on this claim”. St. Paul insists that there was nothing left to be dealt with separately because its liability was totally extinguished.
It makes no sense that Hartford, not a party to St. Paul’s settlement of future benefits, should lose the right to receive from St. Paul its proportionate share of ■prior payments. Section 71 deals with the commutation of future benefits payable to the employee. Section 104-B deals with subrogation “to the employee’s rights ... for all benefits [Hartford] has paid. ” (emphasis added) As a result, the section 71 settlement does not discharge St. Paul’s accrued liability to Hartford. The language of section 71, “the employer shall be discharged from all further liability,” must, in this instance, be construed not to include St. Paul’s liability to Hartford. Section 2 of the Act states that “[i]f the employer is insured, the term ‘employer’ includes the insurer unless the contrary intent is apparent from the context or is inconsistent with the purposes of this Act.” In this case, the Court’s interpretation of section 71 is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, defies common sense and elevates form over substance.
Because I would not permit boilerplate language to defeat the clear intention of the Commissioner, I would approve the separation of the issues and affirm her decision.