dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the Majority only to the extent that it holds that the Superior Court erred by ruling on the issue of whether PCRA counsel’s “no-merit” letter satisfied the requirements of Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa.Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 (1988), as this precise issue was not raised by the parties at any point in the proceedings. The Majority, however, goes far beyond this narrow issue, which was the sole subject of our grant of allocatur. Without citation to any authority, the Majority summarily holds that Appellee waived the independent claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal, because Appellee did not raise such claim *22“prior to his PCRA appeal.” Op. at 9 n. 4, 981 A.2d at 880 n. 4. While not recognized as such by the Majority, this ruling-raises a hotly contested issue that was discussed at great length in our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125 (Pa.2009), Nos. 486-87 CAP, 2009 Pa. LEXIS 930, where this Court was evenly divided as to whether a PCRA petitioner could challenge PCRA counsel’s performance on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. Unlike Ligons, where only six-members of this Court were eligible to vote, the instant case could ultimately serve as the vehicle by which we resolve this difficult issue.
Consistent with my position in Ligons, I would rule that the claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness, raised in the appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, is not waived because it was presented at the first and only viable opportunity Appellee had to challenge post-conviction counsel’s performance. As explained in detail infra, this position is consistent with the controlling case law of this Court. The contrary view adopted by the Majority, which requires Appellee to challenge PCRA counsel’s stewardship during the ongoing proceeding before the PCRA court, is so obviously unworkable that it should finally be put to rest. Having concluded that the challenge to PCRA counsel’s stewardship is not waived, I would hold that Appellee has pled sufficient facts which, if believed, would entitle him to relief in the form of reinstatement of appellate rights pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999) (holding that counsel’s failure to file a requested direct appeal constitutes prejudice per se ).1 Accordingly, I would remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing to allow Appellee to prove his claim via the presentation of evidence.
I begin my analysis with a review of the facts, as they illustrate perfectly why PCRA petitioners must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge PCRA counsels’ effectiveness. Here, in January of 2003, Appellee pled guilty to four counts of burglary and one count of simple assault. On May *239, 2003, Appellee pled guilty to an additional six counts of burglary. The trial court sentenced Appellee to an aggregate term of twenty-one to forty-two years of imprisonment, followed by ten years of probation. The same counsel represented Appellee at the plea proceeding and at sentencing (hereinafter, “trial counsel”). Trial counsel filed a timely petition to vacate and reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. Significantly, no direct appeal was filed.2
On June 18, 2003, Appellee filed a pro se PCRA petition in which he contended that he pled guilty because his attorney mistakenly advised him that, if he did so, he would be sentenced to five to ten years of incarceration. Counsel was thereafter appointed (“PCRA counsel”), but she did not file an amended PCRA petition on Appellee’s behalf. Rather, on July 23, 2004, PCRA counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, supra, and Commonwealth v. Finley, supra. Therein, PCRA counsel acknowledged that Appellee was unhappy with the duration of his sentence, but never lodged a direct appeal to challenge it. Nevertheless, PCRA counsel asserted that, upon reviewing the Quarter Session files, the notes of testimony from the plea and sentencing proceedings, and communications with Appellee, it was her professional opinion that the issue raised in the pro se PCRA petition was meritless because Appellee knowingly and intelligently entered the guilty pleas. She further concluded that there were no other issues which could have been raised in a counseled amended PCRA petition, and sought leave to withdraw from the case. PCRA counsel did not address in the Tumer/Finley letter why a direct appeal had not been filed, despite Appellee’s expression of dissatisfaction with his judgment of sentence.
The PCRA court found that the issue raised in the pro se PCRA petition concerning the validity of Appellee’s guilty plea was meritless because the record revealed that he was clearly *24informed of the potential sentences arising from his convictions. Accordingly, the PCRA court dismissed Appellee’s petition, and granted PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw.
Appellee thereafter filed a pro se appeal to Superior Court, raising the single issue of whether PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a requested direct appeal. Appellee did not raise the specific issues of whether the Tumer/Finley letter was valid and whether the PCRA court erred by granting counsel’s request to withdraw from the case.3 In a memorandum opinion filed January 26, 2006, the Superior Court held that, notwithstanding that Appellee did not raise a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness before the PCRA court, the claim was not waived because “the pro se appeal from the denial of the PCRA order is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel.” Slip Op. at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 302 (1999); Commonwealth v. Gallman, 838 A.2d 768, 776 (Pa.Super.2003)).
The court went on to hold that, in view of Appellee’s claim that he communicated to trial counsel his desire to appeal, Appellee pled sufficient facts upon which PCRA counsel could have amended the PCRA petition to include a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. The court concluded that had PCRA counsel pled these facts and obtained an affidavit from Appellee attesting to the fact that he asked trial counsel to file a direct appeal, an evidentiary hearing on the claim would have been warranted pursuant to Lantzy, supra. Accordingly, the Superior Court vacated the order of the PCRA court, which had dismissed Appellee’s PCRA petition, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his layered claim of ineffective assistance. I believe this was a proper disposition of this matter, as it recognized that Appellee pled a cognizable layered claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness, and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing where Appellee could prove his claim *25by the presentation of testimony establishing that he: (1) requested trial counsel to file a direct appeal challenging his judgment of sentence; and (2) requested PCRA counsel to file an amended PCRA petition challenging trial counsel’s omission.
Regretfully, however, this was not the Superior Court’s final ruling in the case. Rather, that court granted the Commonwealth’s request for reconsideration, looked behind the claim raised by Appellee regarding PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, and sua sponte examined the independent issue of whether the PCRA court properly permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 2929 EDA 2004 (Unpublished Memorandum dated October 27, 2006, at 4, 915 A.2d 148) (stating “[although [Appellee] contends that his PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we must first determine whether the PCRA court properly permitted counsel to withdraw.”).4
The court went on to hold that PCRA counsel failed to comply with the dictates of Turner and Finley because she failed to explain in her no-merit letter why Appellee could not pursue claims based on the legality of the sentence, the discretionary aspects of the sentence, and, most significantly, the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal challenging his sentence. The Superior Court concluded that the PCRA court erred in permitting PCRA counsel to withdraw on the basis of the no-merit letter.
*26Accordingly, the Superior Court again vacated the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellee’s PCRA petition, and remanded for the filing of an amended PCRA petition in which counsel properly “pleads and proves”: (1) the claims raised in Appellee’s pro se petition; (2) any issues raised in a subsequent discussion/correspondence with Appellee; and (3) any other issues apparent from the certified record. Finally, the Superior Court directed counsel to obtain from Appellee an affidavit, attesting to the fact that he asked trial counsel to file a direct appeal.
It is from this ruling that the Commonwealth has appealed, arguing that the Superior Court sua sponte created new Tumer/Finley requirements by ruling that PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter was defective. In addressing this issue, I respectfully submit that the Majority conflates the issue of the propriety of the Superior Court’s ruling in this regard with the independent issue of whether a PCRA petitioner can challenge PCRA counsel ineffectiveness on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. As to the former issue, to the extent the Majority holds that the Superior Court erred by ruling on the issue of whether PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter satisfied the Tumer/Finley requirements, I agree with this very narrow proposition, as such issue was never raised by the parties. While I have no opposition to the general notion underlying the Superior Court’s rationale, i.e., that an attorney filing a Tumer/Finley letter should inquire as to why a particular criminal defendant did not receive his constitutional right to a direct appeal, the Majority aptly notes that the Superior Court is not free to resolve an issue that is not before it on appeal.5
I vigorously dissent, however, from the Majority’s alternative holding that Appellee waived the claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, which was layered properly and raised at the first viable opportunity in the collateral proceeding. The Majority rejects the notion that Appellee’s appeal to the *27Superior Court was his first occasion to challenge PCRA counsel’s performance, and states that Appellee “could have challenged PCRA counsel’s stewardship after receiving counsel’s withdrawal letter and the notice of the PCRA court’s intent to dismiss his petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, yet he failed to do so.” Op. at 9-10 n. 4, 981 A.2d at 880 n. 4. As Appellee cogently notes, however, our criminal procedural rules do not suggest that a PCRA petitioner’s failure to respond to a Rule 907 dismissal notice renders claims waived for appellate review. Instead, Rule 907 provides that once the PCRA court provides the requisite notice of the intention to dismiss the PCRA petition and states the reasons for the dismissal, “[t]he defendant may respond to the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Thus, according to the plain text of Rule 907, a petitioner’s filing of a response to a dismissal notice is optional. As there is absolutely no language in the criminal rules or in the case law of this Court indicating that a petitioner must file a response to the PCRA court’s notice of dismissal or risk waiver of his claims, Appellee cannot be faulted for failing to follow a nonexistent procedure.
Furthermore, requiring petitioners to challenge PCRA counsel’s effectiveness at any point during the PCRA proceeding is simply unworkable. To overcome the presumption that counsel is effective, a PCRA petitioner must satisfy a three-pronged test and demonstrate that: (1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001). A PCRA petitioner could never demonstrate that he was prejudiced by PCRA counsel’s performance, i.e., demonstrate that the outcome of the PCRA proceeding would have been different, when the PCRA proceeding has not yet concluded and no ruling by the PCRA court has been issued.
*28The actual procedure followed by Appellee, raising a layered claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, is the accepted method of obtaining review for such claims. As this author recently explained in the plurality opinion in Ligons, this Court has repeatedly held that a defendant may challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief because it is his only opportunity to do so. Commonwealth v. Hall, 582 Pa. 526, 872 A.2d 1177, 1182 (2005); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293 (1999); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693 (1998).
In Albrecht, we held that Rule 904 (formerly Rule 1504) makes the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings mandatory. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (providing that “the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant’s first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.”). We stated in Albrecht:.
It is axiomatic that the right to counsel includes the concomitant right to effective assistance of counsel. Indeed the right to counsel is meaningless if effective assistance is not guaranteed.
Id., 720 A.2d at 699-700 (citing Commonwealth v. Albert, 522 Pa. 331, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (1989)). Thus, our express holding in Albrecht was that a PCRA petitioner has an enforceable right to effective post-conviction counsel. 720 A.2d at 700. Accord Pursell, 724 A.2d at 302 (holding that our Court may review claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel in a capital appeal from the denial of PCRA relief because it is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel). The Majority ignores this controlling precedent of this Court by summarily concluding to the contrary.
The Majority additionally suggests, without any analysis or citation to authority, that Appellee’s attempt to obtain review on a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness “amounts to a serial PCRA petition.” Op. at 9 n. 4, 981 A.2d at 880 n. 4. Id. A similar position was taken in Chief Justice Castille’s concurring opinion in Ligons, where the Chief Justice viewed a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness as a “new” claim, over which *29we lack jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b)(1) (providing that “[a]ny petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless the petitioner proves one of the exceptions to the time-bar, which are not at issue here).
To the contrary I opined that “the practical application of [viewing a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness as a ‘new’ claim] renders a PCRA petitioner’s right to effective representation unenforceable and, therefore, meaningless.” Ligons, 971 A.2d at 1139. I explained that
... a petitioner cannot challenge PCRA counsel’s effectiveness before the PCRA court because the alleged ineffectiveness is playing out as that proceeding occurs, and ineffectiveness cannot be identified until the proceeding has concluded. Similarly, absent invocation of one of the three statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirement set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), it would be virtually impossible for a petitioner to ever file a serial petition raising PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in a timely manner as his first PCRA petition would not be disposed of before the one-year statutory filing period expires. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (2000) (holding that when PCRA appeal is pending, subsequent PCRA petition cannot be filed until resolution of review of pending PCRA petition by highest state court in which review is sought, or at the expiration of time for seeking such review).
Id. at 1139-40.
This author emphasized that the only way to afford a PCRA petitioner an opportunity to enforce his right to effective PCRA counsel is to permit the filing of such claims on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. Id. at 1140. While the Ligons plurality recognized that addressing such claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness places the appellate court in the position of reviewing claims that were not reviewed by the PCRA court, we found that there is no viable alternative to ensure that the right to effective PCRA counsel can be enforced and a remedy granted in the appropriate case, where *30the petitioner has satisfied the rigorous burden of establishing a multiple-layered claim of ineffectiveness set forth in Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014 (2003).6
Somewhat remarkably, Appellee has satisfied that rigorous burden here to the extent necessary to afford him an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2) (stating that the PCRA court shall order a hearing where petitioner raises a material issue of fact). Appellee asserted in his pro se appeal to Superior Court that he requested trial counsel to file a direct appeal; that no such appeal was filed; that he requested PCRA counsel to amend his PCRA petition to include a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a requested appeal; and that PCRA counsel failed to so amend Appellee’s petition, and instead filed a Tumer/Finley letter in which she maintained that there were no issues which could be raised in a counseled amended PCRA petition. Thus, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lantzy, Appellee’s assertions, if believed, would clearly entitle him to reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Under these circumstances, I would remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing to afford Appellee the opportunity to prove his layered claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In conclusion, this case presents the quintessential example of why claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness must be recognized on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. Assuming his assertions are true, Appellee was denied his constitutional light to a direct appeal, and was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel in his first PCRA petition. To further deny him an evidentiary hearing to prove his layered claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, when he is clearly entitled to the same pursuant to Lantzy, Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2), Hall, Pursell, and Albrecht, is to deny justice in this case.
Justice SAYLOR and Justice TODD join this opinion.. As in the instant case, the defendant in Lantzy had also pled guilty to various criminal offenses, and did not receive a direct appeal of his judgment of sentence.
. Appellee filed a pro se petition to withdraw his guilty plea on May 15, 2003, which was never ruled upon because, at that time, Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(C) precluded the clerk of courts from accepting pro se filings when the criminal defendant is represented by counsel.
. I recognize that the issue of the validity of the no-merit letter and the issue challenging PCRA counsel's effectiveness are based on the same factual predicate. The two issues, however, are legally discrete in that the former issue involves an interpretation of the Tumer/Finley requirements, and the latter issue does not.
. In support thereof, the Superior Court cited its previous decision in Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa.Super.2006), which had been decided after the court issued its first memorandum opinion in this matter. In Friend, the Superior Court was faced with procedural facts similar to those presented here, and noted that it was "obliged to consider whether the PCRA court properly permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw under Tumer/Finley before it considered the issues of ineffectiveness actually raised by the appellant on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief.” Id. at 612. The Majority herein rejects this reasoning, holding that it goes “beyond the parameters of appropriate appellate review.” Op. at 9, 981 A.2d at 879. Specifically, the Majority concludes that, “[t]o the extent Friend stands for the proposition that an appellate court may sua sponte review the sufficiency of a no-merit letter when the defendant has not raised such issue, we disavow such holding.” Id. *26at 9, 981 A.2d at 879. I agree with the Majority's limited ruling in this regard.
. In all fairness to the Superior Court, however, it is not that far a leap to conclude that because Appellee presented a cognizable claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness in his pro se appeal, the no-merit letter submitted by PCRA counsel was deficient.
. In Commonwealth v. McGill, this Court addressed the proper layering of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and held that a PCRA petitioner must present argument as to each layer of ineffectiveness, establishing all three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard for each attorney. Id. at 1022.